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Preface
The bi-annual conference of the German Cognitive Science Society took
place the 11th time since the founding of the society in 1994. The number
of society members as well as the number of participants at the confer-
ence series grew steadily over the years. We were pleased to welcome
more than 120 guests at KogWis 2012 in Bamberg.
For the statistics: KogWis 2012 had 46 accepted talks and 23 accepted
poster contributions. Furthermore, 40 researchers presented their work
in 9 symposia. The majority of participants came from German univer-
sities and research institutions. However, there were also participants
from The Netherlands, Denmark, Turkey, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. Disciplines covered (by keyword classification of submis-
sions) are Anthropology (2), Artificial Intelligence (19), Cognitive Psy-
chology (53), Language (24), Neuroscience (16), Philosophy of Mind (18)
and applications in eduction (5), human-computer-interaction (11), and
clinical work (6).
Over the last years the German Cognitive Science Society formed
KogWis to be a conference which focusses on providing a forum for ju-
nior scientists and at highlighting current research topics in the German
cognitive science community. Therefore, the reviewing process is not
very competitive and only abstracts and not long papers are submitted
and published in the proceedings. The mixture of sessions with short
presentations and symposia with focus topic provides a good balance
between presentations of young researchers and established ones. On
the one hand, many German students give their first conference presen-
tation at KogWis. On the other hand, many senior researchers appreci-
ate the opportunity to discuss specific research topics with colleagues.
Of course, being a cognitive science conference, the presenters and their
audience have an interdisciplinary background and participants value
the possibility to learn from presentations and discussions from disci-
plines different from their own.
xvi
We were proud that we could win four very renowned researches as
plenary speakers: Elsbeth Stern (ETH Zürich) highlighted the relation
between cognitive science and education, Mike Oaksford (Birkbeck Col-
lege, University of London) presented current research in the domain of
probabilistic reasoning, Rainer Goebel (Universiteit Maastricht) showed
how experimental psychology, neuroimaging and computational neu-
roscience can play together to gain a better understanding of how the
mind emerges from the brain, and Dietrich Dörner (University of Bam-
berg) challenged the audience with his proposition that artificial intelli-
gence does not exists.
The following areas of cognitive science research were covered in
the invited symposia: Cognitive Aspects of Human-Technology Inter-
action (Manfred Thüring, TU Berlin), Cognitive Models of Error Pro-
cessing (Marco Steinhauser, KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt), Modeling Cog-
nition in Communcation (Stefan Kopp & Kirsten Bergmann, Univer-
sität Bielefeld), Linguistic versus Non-Linguistic Knowledge (Barbara
Kaup & Claudia Maienborn, Universität Tübingen), Multimodal Inter-
action (Christopher Habel, Universität Hamburg), Social Cognition and
Culture (Albert Newen, Universität Bochum & Kai Vogeley, Univer-
sity of Cologne), and Spatial Cogniton – Foundations and Applications
(Christoph Hölscher, Universität Freiburg). Two further symposia were
dedicated to the topics of Cultural Consitution of Causal Cognition
(Sieghard Beller & Andrea Bender, ZiF Research Group, Bielefeld Uni-
versity and University Freiburg) and Clinical Applications of Cognitive
Science (Wolfgang Trapp, SozialStiftung Bamberg).
The conference program furthermore included a doctoral symposium
(organized by Stefan Kopp), a satellite workshop of the German Na-
tional Educational Panel Study (NEPS) and – the first time at a KogWis
conference – tutorials covering cognitive modeling approaches and hu-
man-computer interaction.
By the selection of plenary speakers and symposia organizers, we
hope to highlight the motto of the Bamberg conference “From Cogni-
tive Models to Cognitive Assistance” by bringing together basic cogni-
tive science research with applications in education and HCI.
The Editors
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2 INVITED TALKS
Does Artificial Intelligence Exist?
No, it doesn’t!
Dietrich Dörner
Theoretische Psychologie, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg
Does artificial intelligence exist? In my eyes there exists not one example
for artificial intelligence. What is intelligence? Unfortunately Psychol-
ogy does not provide us with a sound definition of this term, although
since more than a hundred years psychologists try to develop systems
to measure intelligence and the story of intelligence testing is consid-
ered as a story of success. Normally in intelligence testing subjects get
a number of tiny tasks which they have to solve and intelligence is con-
sidered hence accordingly as a collection of abilities to solve such tasks.
Systems of artificial intelligence can solve such tiny tasks too, but they
can solve "big" tasks additionally. They can play chess on grandmas-
ter level, solve algorithmitically not solvable problems as the ’travelling
salesman’-problem, etc. But unfortunately the systems of artificial intel-
ligence have no insight, why they solve such problems in the form they
do. And therefore they cannot understand why it is better to solve one
problem in this way, another one in a different way. To understand why
I use a certain strategy opens the possibility to elaborate strategies or to
change them or to abandon them. Without this insight a system could
change strategies only by the criterion of success or failure. Certainly
this criterion works, but in no ways it is the best one. I shall discuss,
what insight means in this context and why insightful thinking is only
possible by using natural language with its polysemie and metaphors
and unlimited levels of reasoning about the characteristics of a lower
order language.
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Cracking the Columnar-Level Code in the
Visual Hierarchy with Sub-Millimeter fMRI
and Neural Network Modeling
Rainer Goebel
Universiteit Maastricht, Faculty of Psychology, Department of Neurocognition
The brain is the most complex organ we know but we still do not un-
derstand how cognitive phenomena such as object recognition, speak-
ing and consciousness are created by billions of interacting neurons.
With standard functional brain imaging (i.e. fMRI at 3 Tesla), we can
routinely see specialized areas in the human brain, including “experts”
for colour, visual motion, faces, words, language, planning, memory
and emotions. This level of resolution reveals an amazing organisation
of the brain that is similar, but not identical, across individuals. We
still, however, know little about the representations coded inside spe-
cialised brain areas and how complex features emerge from combina-
tions of simpler features when we move from one area to the next. With
high-field MRI scanners (7 Tesla and beyond), the achievable functional
resolution reaches to the sub-millimetre level (500–1000 microns). This
is important since neurons with similar response properties spatially
cluster into functional units or cortical columns with a lateral extent of
hundreds of microns. Studying the brain at the cortical columnar level
seems to be the right level to reveal the principles that the brain uses
to code information. I propose that this columnar-level code can be
“cracked” by adequately combining clever experimental designs (psy-
chology), sub-millimetre fMRI (neuroimaging), sophisticated data anal-
ysis tools (signal analysis) and large-scale neuronal network modelling
(computational neuroscience). It is my belief that, with a massive at-
tempt to crack the columnar-level code in as many areas as possible, we
will ultimately reach a deeper understanding how mind emerges from
simpler units in the brain. I will present first empirical evidence that
cracking the columnar-level code is indeed possible. I will also show
exciting applications of real-time brain scanning at the columnar-level
that will allow to create sophisticated brain computer interfaces (BCIs).
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A Probabilistic Approach to the Psychology of
Conditional Inference
Mike Oaksford
Birkbeck College, University of London
A new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning has recently emerged
(Over, 2009) that proposes a probabilistic approach to reasoning where
previously logical approaches had prevailed, e.g., mental logic and men-
tal models. In this talk, I discuss one particular probabilistic approach to
conditional reasoning-involving if...then statements-developed by Nick
Chater and I over the last couple of decades (Oaksford & Chater, 2009).
At the computational level, this theory views conditional inference as
dynamic belief update by Bayesian conditionalization (Oaksford et al,
2000; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). I review the theory and some of the data
it can explain before addressing recent critiques (Oberauer et al, 2006).
I show that a more recent model incorporating rigidity violations bet-
ter explains the data (Oaksford & Chater, 2008) and that experiments on
enthymematic and explicit conditional inference reveal results only con-
sistent with the probabilistic approach. I then discuss possible algorith-
mic level implementations of the probabilistic approach in a constraint
satisfaction neural network (Oaksford & Chater, 2010) and using Causal
Bayesian Networks (Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011). I conclude with a
proposal for the cognitive architecture of reasoning based on these em-
pirical and theoretical results and compare it to recent proposals in dual
and tri process theory (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011).
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Presidential Lecture
Kognitionswissenschaft als interdisziplinäres Projekt.
Grenzen und Perspektiven.
Michael Pauen
Institut für Philosophie, Berlin School of Mind and Brain,
Humbold-Universität zu Berlin
Kognitionswissenschaft ist von ihrer Anlage her interdisziplinär. Will
man sie ernsthaft betreiben, dann ist man auf die Zusammenarbeit ei-
ner ganzen Reihe von Disziplinen angewiesen: Dazu gehören Psycholo-
gie und Neurowissenschaften, Informatik, Linguistik und Philosophie.
Diese Zusammenarbeit, ursprünglich ein Experiment mit ungewissem
Ausgang, klappt mittlerweile erstaunlich gut – und sie wird vielfach
gefördert. Meine These ist, dass die Zukunftsperspektiven interdiszipli-
närer Forschung umso besser sind, je genauer man sich deren Gren-
zen vor Augen hält. Das Wissen um solche Grenzen dient nicht nur
dem Schutz vor Dilettantismus, sondern auch der Konzentration auf
die wirklich erfolgversprechenden Projekte – eben die mit den besten
Perspektiven.
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Understanding what students know: How
Cognitive Science can inform Educational
Decisions
Elsbeth Stern
ETH Zurich
It has been repeatedly shown that teachers’ pedagogical content knowl-
edge (PCK) has noticeable influence on students’ learning gains. PCK
is understood as the integration of content knowledge and knowledge
about human learning and cognition, and it provides the basis for un-
derstanding learners’ difficulties with particular content areas and re-
acting properly to them. PCK can be characterized as seeing the content
through the eyes of the learners. Therefore, teachers need knowledge
about human learning and cognition, such as it has been developed in
Cognitive Science. Concepts like working-memory, reasoning, proce-
dural and declarative knowledge or problem solving have to be made
usable for teachers, whose university training predominantly focused
on subject knowledge. At present, however, there is still a wide gap be-
tween what Cognitive Science and Psychology have ascertained about
powerful learning environments, and how these findings do inform
daily classroom practice. On the one hand, schools are still governed
by traditions that are in conflict with well accepted principles of human
learning and cognitive functioning. On the other hand, findings from
research on learning and cognition hardly ever go along with clear prac-
tical implications, and therefore may be more confusing than helpful for
teachers. An approach in teacher education that has as yet not met with
much success has been to teach the concepts developed in Cognitive
Science in isolation. Instead of being applied to school subjects, these
concepts often have been trivialized by deriving oversimplified recipes.
In more promising attempts of teacher education, the concepts devel-
oped in Cognitive Science are translated from the very beginning into
a language of didactics and merged into Pedagogical Content Knowl-
edge. In my talk I will evaluate these attempts.
Invited Symposia and
Symposia
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Social Cognition and Culture
Organisers: Albert Newen1 and Kai Vogeley2
1 Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2 Zentrum für Neurologie und Psychiatrie, Uniklinik Köln
Contributors: Shaun Gallagher, Shinobu Kitayama, Albert Newen,
Kai Vogeley
The leading questions of the symposium are: How do we understand
other human beings, what are the best theoretical perspectives, what
can we learn from cognitive neuroscience and what is the role of culture
in the process of understanding others? In the recent development of
social cognition it has become clear that we not only have to account for
the observational stance towards other people but that we also have to
systematically consider situations of online interaction with other hu-
man beings (2nd person perspective). Furthermore, it will be reflected
in which way self-understanding and understanding others interact. Fi-
nally, a strong focus of the symposium will be the discussion of the role
of a cultural dimension for representations of oneself and of the other.
The main aim of the symposium is to present the state of the art of some
key topics of social and cultural cognition and to outline some paradig-
matic lines for future research.
Introduction and Statement “Theories of social and cultural
understanding”
Albert Newen
Diversity and Narrative in Social Cognition
Shaun Gallagher
Culture, Mind, and the Brain: Implications for Social Cognition
Shinobu Kitayama
A Statement: “The neuroscience of social and cultural cognition.”
Kai Vogeley
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Spatial Cognition – Foundations and
Applications
Organiser: Christoph Hölscher
University of Freiburg
hoelsch@cognition.uni-freiburg.de
Contributors: Sven Eberhardt1, Tobias Kluth1, Thomas Reineking2,
Christoph Zetzsche2, Kerstin Schill2, Florian Röser3, Antje
Krumnack3, Kai Hamburger3, Markus Knauff3, Thomas Wolbers4,
Christoph Schlieder5
1Universität Bremen
2SFB/TR8, Universität Bremen
3Justus Liebig University Gießen
4DZNE Magdeburg
5University of Bamberg
sven2@cognium.de
tkluth@math.uni-bremen.de
trking@tzi.de
{zetzsche, kschill}@informatik.uni-bremen.de
{Florian.Roeser, Antje.Krumnack, Kai.Hamburger,
Markus.Knauff}@psychol.uni-giessen.de
thomas.wolbers@dzne.de
christoph.schlieder@uni-bamberg.de
This symposium brings together neuroscientific, psychological and com-
puter science researchers whose common theme is the investigation of
human spatial cognition. This session serves as a showcase of current
trends in spatial cognition research in four German research groups.
The talks illustrate the broad range of topics of basic and applied re-
search, including the neural basis of place perception, empirical inves-
tigation of landmarks as well as age-related changes in wayfinding per-
formance and representing place information in a digital recommender
system.
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Models for invariant place recognition
Sven Eberhardt, Tobias Kluth, Thomas Reineking, Christoph Zetzsche,
and Kerstin Schill
The representation and interaction of humans with the spatial environ-
ment is essentially linked to the concept of place. The discovery of place
cells (O’Keefe und Dostrovsky 1971) has connected the concept of ’be-
ing at a place’ to a neural level, motivating the use of bio-inspired mod-
els for place detection. Though this task is related to the problem of
object recognition, it differs in the specific invariance properties being
required.
We used a setup for systematically investigating the rotational in-
variance and place selectivity of different place recognition methods.
First, the method is applied to three different holistic representations:
raw pixel values , wavelet-like histograms, texture descriptors, where
a strong generalization performance is achieved. We also found some
fundamental differences that limit the suitability of different image pro-
cessing techniques for place recognition. Second, we show the applica-
bility of hierarchical multi-layer systems for place detection.
Wayfinding: the influence of structural salience and visibility
Florian Röser, Antje Krumnack, Kai Hamburger, and Markus Knauff
Landmarks are essential for wayfinding and human orientation. But
how can landmarks be defined? And what does the term “landmark
salience” exactly mean? There exist three accepted aspects of landmark
salience: visual, semantic, and structural. “Visibility” is another impor-
tant aspect. Klippel and Winter (2005) used these saliences and defined
a mathematical model for the connection and relation between them.
We will present empirical evidence for the connection between visibil-
ity and structural salience.
Spatial navigation – a unique window into mechanisms of
cognitive ageing
Thomas Wolbers
While research into cognitive ageing is a very active field, one key cog-
nitive ability that is particularly relevant to everyday functioning has
received very little attention: Surveys have shown that elderly people
often report substantial declines in navigational abilities, for example
problems with finding one’s way in complex environments, planning
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routes to distant locations and returning to the car after a trip to the
supermarket. Such deficits severely restrict the mobility of elderly peo-
ple and affect levels of (physical) activity and social participation, but
the underlying behavioural and neuronal mechanisms are poorly un-
derstood.
In this talk, I will outline recent studies that have begun to elucidate
age-related changes in navigational processing, using novel paradigms
that target specific spatial computations. These studies not only demon-
strate that key regions of the brain’s spatial navigation network are par-
ticularly sensitive to the deleterious consequences of ageing, but they
also offer novel insights into general mechanisms of brain ageing that
also affect processes beyond the spatial domain.
Image-based Place Models for Geographic Recommendations
Christoph Schlieder
Classical recommender systems solve an information filtering task by
suggesting data objects that are likely to be relevant to the user based
upon her or his previous choices. A geographic recommender system
recommends items from a library of geo-referenced objects. In multi-
object recommendation, collections of items are suggested which should
consist of somehow similar exemplars but, at the same time, must show
variability. A geographic multi-object recommender suggests, for in-
stance, a list of cities to visit or a slide show of images illustrating a
certain place.
The talk presents the approach taken by our Tripost multi-object rec-
ommender for selecting a small set of geo-referenced images of a touris-
tic location. Motivated by this research, we ask how different concep-
tualizations of a city can be identified in web-based image collections.
In addition, the talk presents a recently collected data set of GPS tracks
and geo-referenced photographs taken from visitors of the Old Town of
Bamberg. Our data suggests that differences in the frequency of spatial
choices need to be taken into account when building place models for
recommender systems.
References
Klippel, A., & Winter, S. (2005) Structural salience of landmarks for route discrimination.
In: A.G. Cohn & D. Mark (Eds.), Spatial Information Theory. International Conference
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Linguistic vs. Non-Linguistic Knowledge
Organisers: Barbara Kaup1 and Claudia Maienborn2
1 Psychologisches Institut, Universität Tübingen
barbara.kaup@uni-tuebingen.de
2 Deutsches Seminar, Universität Tübingen
claudia.maienborn@uni-tuebingen.de
Contributors: Nicholas Asher1, Christian Dobel2, Holden Härtl3,
Maj-Britt Isberner3, Barbara Kaup4, Claudia Maienborn4,
Tobias Richter3
1CNRS Toulouse
2Universität Münster
3Universität Kassel
4Universität Tübingen
Nicholas.Asher@irit.fr,
cdobel@uni-muenster.de,
{holden.haertl, maj-britt.isberner,
tobias.richter}@uni-kassel.de,
{barbara.kaup, claudia.maienborn}@uni-tuebingen.de
For understanding language we may exploit a huge variety of rich knowl-
edge resources: linguistic structure, contextual information, sensory-
motor input, world knowledge, pragmatic strategies, etc. The question
of whether there is a need for systematically distinguishing between
linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge is of interest for both linguis-
tics and cognitive psychology. Yet, until recently both sides tended to
ignore this issue more or less. Theoretical linguists usually suppose tac-
itly that there is such a difference but then only take care of (what they
assume to be) the linguistic meaning part. (A prominent exception is
Asher’s (2011) theory of lexical meaning in context.) In cognitive psy-
chology the standard assumption is that word forms gain meaning by
being connected to nodes in the conceptual system. However, the ex-
act nature of this relationship is rarely discussed. With a few exceptions
(e.g., Vigliocco & Vinson, 2007), most authors seem to assume that word
meanings and concepts are identical.
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This issue is particularly relevant because it points to the status of
compositionality as a guiding principle for the formation of complex
meanings. In a frequently cited study by Hagoort et al. (2004) the dis-
tinction between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge has been chal-
lenged by experimental results. Hagoort et al. concluded that semantic
and conceptual information is processed in one step, making obsolete
the distinction, and challenging, furthermore, the idea of compositional-
ity which proclaims the primacy of syntax as a combinatorial guideline.
This controversial issue has been taken up more recently in several ex-
perimental studies (e.g., Pylkkänen et al. 2009). What can be learnt from
these studies is above all, that we are strikingly missing a good under-
standing of what could count as methodically and empirically solid cri-
teria to distinguish linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. The sym-
posium will provide an interdisciplinary platform for linguists and cog-
nitive psychologists to discuss questions pertaining to the distinction of
linguistic vs. non-linguistic knowledge.
Linguistic Structure Meets Natural Language Metaphysics
Nicholas Asher
In this talk I want to address the themes of the workshop from the per-
spective of someone who works in lexical semantics. I will argue that
phenomena that are ubiquitous in the understanding of language pose
problems for a strict Fodor-like separation between conceptual struc-
ture related to the non linguistic world and the sort of type system and
composition logic needed to handle complex predications that involve
coercion or the selection of an aspect of some type of object for predica-
tion.
On the Time Course of Semantic/Conceptual Processing –
Insights from Neutral and Emotional Words
Christian Dobel
We found in a series of studies (e.g. Dobel et al., 2010) that the N400 can
be taken as a general index for the difficulty of retrieving conceptual
knowledge. In contrast, if the sentential context facilitates a visual rep-
resentation, we also found earlier activity in regions of visual process-
ing arguing for “embodied” semantic representation (Hirschfeld et al.,
2010). Similarly, the processing of emotional words is characterized by
enhanced activity already around 100 ms (Keuper et al., subm.) which
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has been often interpreted as attentional effects. It seems, thus, that
“meaningful” representations can be achieved by several means with
different time course and neural correlates.
Pitfalls in the Language-Thought Distinction: a View on Studies of
Linguistic Relativity
Holden Härtl
The distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic cognition is a logi-
cal prerequisite for the old Whorfian hypothesis that “thought”, i.e. our
perception of the world, is structured relative to “language”. In my
paper I will critically discuss a selection of current linguistic relativ-
ity studies and in how far they indeed access non-linguistic cognition
and, in particular, if accusations of a circular reasoning in the interpreta-
tion of the observed effects may be justified. Here, the characteristics of
the causal relations involved in cognitive differences between linguistic
systems need to be carefully considered as well as the philosophically
rooted notion of the unavoidability of language.
Is Comprehension Feasible Without Validation? Evidence from a
Stroop-like Paradigm
Maj-Britt Isberner and Tobias Richter
Based on the distinction between semantic and world knowledge, com-
prehension and validation of linguistic information have often been con-
ceptualized as separate stages in a two-step process, with validation be-
ing subsequent, optional and strategic. In contrast with this idea, we
present evidence from a Stroop-like paradigm suggesting that valida-
tion is nonstrategic and fast by showing that readers cannot ignore vio-
lations of (easily accessible) world knowledge even if this is in conflict
with their processing goal. These results indicate that both access to
and evaluation based on world knowledge are obligatory components
of language comprehension.
“Accumulating a coin” or “accumulating nuns”: Processing
Semantic vs. Conceptual Violations
Barbara Kaup and Claudia Maienborn
The talk is concerned with the distinction between semantic and con-
ceptual knowledge. In a first experiment the final word of a sentence
(e.g., sour) was processed more slowly when it brought about a seman-
tic compared to a conceptual violation (These clocks were sour vs. These
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bananas were sour.). However, similar differences were observed when
the respective word pairs (e.g., clocks–– sour vs. bananas – sour) were
presented in a word priming experiment, suggesting that the results
may reflect differences in lexical associations instead of differences in
the type of knowledge that is being violated. In our talk we will dis-
cuss several alternative ways to empirically investigate the distinction
between semantic and conceptual knowledge.
References
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Kognitive Modelle der Fehlerverarbeitung
Organisator: Marco Steinhauser
Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
Contributors: Claudia Danielmeier1, Nicola K. Ferdinand2,
Hans-Jochen Heinze3, Marcus Heldmann3,4, Thomas Münte4,
Marco Steinhauser5, Markus Ullsperger1, Nick Yeung6
1Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour,
Radboud University
2FR Psychologie, Universität des Saarlandes
3Campus Lübeck, Klinik für Neurologie, Universitätsklinikum
Schleswig-Holstein
4Universitätsklinik für Neurologie, Magdeburg
5Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
6University of Oxford
Optimales Verhalten erfordert, dass Fehler im eigenen Verhalten erkannt
und aus diesen gelernt wird. In den letzten Jahren sind hierzu eine Rei-
he theoretischer Vorstellungen entwickelt worden, die mit unterschied-
lichen neuro- und kognitionswissenschaftlichen Methoden getestet wur-
den. Das Symposium stellt verschiedene theoretische und methodische
Ansätze aus diesem Forschungsbereich vor.
Lernen aus positivem und negativem Feedback: Die Rolle von
Erwartungsverletzungen
Nicola K. Ferdinand
Wir scheinen vor allem aus solchen Ereignissen zu lernen, die unse-
re Erwartungen verletzen. Die Verarbeitung solcher Erwartungsverlet-
zungen lässt sich besonders gut mit Hilfe ereigniskorrelierter Potentia-
le, beispielsweise anhand der sog. „feedback-related negativity“ (FRN),
untersuchen. In den meisten Paradigmen liegt dabei der Fokus auf der
Untersuchung von negativem Feedback und es wird allgemein ange-
nommen, dass die FRN auftritt, wenn ein Ereignis „schlechter als er-
wartet“ ist. Das Ziel unserer Studie war es, ein Paradigma zu entwickeln
mit dem auch positive Erwartungsverletzungen untersuchbar sind. Zu
diesem Zweck haben wir eine Zeitschätzaufgabe entwickelt, in der das
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Feedback in Abhängigkeit der Performanz der Probanden unerwartet
positiv, unerwartet negativ oder erwartet (neutral) sein konnte. Um die
Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit von positivem und negativem Feedback
gering und somit unerwartet zu halten, wurde ein adaptiver Mecha-
nismus verwendet, der das Feedback an die Leistung der Probanden
anpasste. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine FRN nicht nur im Falle von
unerwartetem negativen Feedback auftritt, sondern auch bei unerwar-
tetem positiven Feedback. Dieser Befund spricht dafür, dass die Erwar-
tungsverletzung, nicht aber die negative Valenz des Feedbacks, kritisch
für die Generierung der FRN und somit für Verhaltensanpassung und
Lernen ist.
Ereigniskorrelierte lokale Feldpotentiale des Nucleus Accumbens
bei Handlungskontrolle
Marcus Heldmann, Hans-Jochen Heinze und Thomas Münte
Die erfolgreiche Anpassung eigenen Verhaltens an sich ständig ändern-
de Umweltbedingungen wird als Ausdruck erfolgreicher Handlungs-
kontrolle erachtet. Holroyd & Coles (2002) postulieren in ihrem rein-
forcement learning Modell eine zentrale Bedeutung des mesolimbische
dopaminerge Belohnungssystem für diesen Teilbereich der exekutiven
Funktion. Bei psychiatrischen Störungsbildern, insbesondere Zwangs-
störungen oder Substanzabhängigkeiten, die u.a. durch eine gestörte
Handlungskontrolle charakterisiert sind, nimmt man entsprechend ei-
ne veränderte Funktionalität des mesolimbischen dopaminergen Beloh-
nungssystems an. Eine Möglichkeit bei der Behandlung schwerer thera-
pierefraktärer Zwangsstörungen und Substanzabhängigkeiten stellt die
Tiefe Hirnstimulation dar. Dabei ist der Nucleus accumbens als Teil des
mesolimbischen dopaminergen Belohnungssystems Zielstruktur der Tie-
fen Hirnstimulation, wodurch man nicht nur die Möglichkeit erhält,
durch Stimulation auf diese für die Handlungskontrolle wichtige anato-
mische Struktur unmittelbar Einfluss zu nehmen, sondern ebenso ereig-
niskorrelierte lokale Feldpotentiale abzuleiten und die elektrophysio-
logischen Korrelate der Handlungskontrolle mit einer ausgezeichneten
räumlichen und zeitlichen Auflösung darzustellen. In einer Serie von
Einzelfalluntersuchungen haben wir uns dabei an zwei ereigniskorre-
lierten Komponenten von Oberflächenpotentialen orientiert, der error
related negativity (ERN) und der feedback related negativity (FRN). Mit
der Untersuchung dieser beiden Komponenten können wir einen Bei-
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trag zur Bedeutung des Nucleus accumbens bzw. des ventrale Striatum
für die Handlungskontrolle liefern.
Die Rolle des posterioren frontomedianen Cortex bei adaptiven
Prozessen in visuellen und motorischen Arealen
Claudia Danielmeier und Markus Ullsperger
Wenn wir einen Fehler machen, ist es wichtig, dass unser Verhalten
und relevante Prozesse im Gehirn möglichst schnell angepasst werden,
um weitere Fehler zu vermeiden und unser Handlungsziel zu errei-
chen. Der posteriore frontomediane Cortex (pMFC) spielt eine wesent-
liche Rolle bei Prozessen der Handlungsüberwachung. Es wurde spe-
kuliert, dass die Aufgabe des pMFC darin besteht, notwendige neuro-
nale Anpassungen zu signalisieren. Ich werde Daten vorstellen, die zei-
gen, dass aus der Aktivität des pMFC die Anpassungen nach Fehlern
in visuellen und motorischen Hirnarealen vorhergesagt werden kön-
nen. Nach Fehlern werden üblicherweise verlängerte Reaktionszeiten
beobachtet (post-error slowing, PES), die möglicherweise hilfreich sind,
um Anpassungsprozesse zu implementieren. Mit Hilfe der funktionel-
len MRT und diffusions-gewichteter Bildgebung konnten wir zeigen,
dass a) fehlerbezogene pMFC-Aktivität Aktivitätsänderungen im mo-
torischen Cortex vorhersagt, die mit PES in Zusammenhang steht, und
b) PES strukturell mit Verbindungen in der weißen Substanz assoziiert
ist, die ein Netzwerk bilden, dass funktionell der motorischen Inhibiti-
on dient. Darüber hinaus gibt es attentionale Anpassungen nach Feh-
lern, die sich in aufgaben-relevanten und aufgaben-irrelevanten visuel-
len Arealen unterschiedlich auswirken, und die ebenfalls mit der voran-
gehenden pMFC-Aktivität in Verbindung stehen. In einer Folgestudie
wurde die Rolle von Acetylcholin bei diesen attentionalen Anpassun-
gen untersucht.
Mechanismen der bewussten Fehlerdetektion
Marco Steinhauser und Nick Yeung
Eigene Fehler in einfachen Klassifikationsaufgaben können meist zu-
verlässig detektiert und angezeigt werden. Während Prozesse der Feh-
lerverarbeitung bereits unmittelbar nach Auftreten eines Fehlers nach-
weisbar sind, scheint die bewusste Fehlerverarbeitung erst deutlich spä-
ter einzutreten. So konnte durch eine Reihe von Studien gezeigt werden,
dass vor allem die Amplitude der späten Fehlerpositivierung (Pe) in er-
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eigniskorrelierten Potenzialen zwischen detektierten und nicht-detek-
tierten Fehlern differenziert. In diesem Vortrag soll die Frage diskutiert
werden, wie bewusste Fehlerdetektion zustande kommt und was be-
wusste Fehlerverarbeitung von unbewusster Fehlerverarbeitung unter-
scheidet. Hierzu werden zum einen experimentelle Studien dargestellt,
in denen der Zusammenhang bestimmter ereigniskorrelierter Potenzia-
le mit der bewussten Fehlerdetektion untersucht wurde. Zum ande-
ren wird ein konnektionistisches Modell der bewussten Fehlerdetektion
diskutiert, welches bewusste Fehlerdetektion als Konsequenz selbstkor-
rigierenden Verhaltens postuliert. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studien deuten
darauf hin, dass der bewussten Fehlerdetektion Entscheidungsprozesse
zugrunde liegen, die eine große Ähnlichkeit mit primären Aufgaben-
prozessen aufweisen.
Modeling Cognition in Communication
Organisers: Stefan Kopp and Kirsten Bergmann
Center of Excellence “Cognitive Interaction Technology” (CITEC), SFB 673
Alignment in Communication, Bielefeld University
{skopp, kbergman}@techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Contributors: Jan de Ruiter1, Vera Demberg2, Kirsten Bergmann3,
Hendrik Buschmeier4
1Dept. of Linguistics, Bielefeld University
2Center of Excellence on “Multimodal Computing and Interaction”,
University Saarbrücken
3SFB 673, Bielefeld University
4CITEC, Bielefeld University
jan.deruiter@uni-bielefeld.de,
vera@coli.uni-saarland.de,
kirsten.bergmann@uni-bielefeld.de,
hbuschme@techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Modeling cognitive processing has become a vital branch of Cognitive
Science. General purpose architectures, like SOAR, ACT/R, CLAR-
ION, etc., provide us with means of simulating cognitive tasks based
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on principles of human-like memory, activation, control, or distributed
processing. Bayesian models allow for modeling cognitive phenomena
while considering incompleteness and uncertainty of data as a ubiq-
uitous constraint. Such methods have been successfully employed to
model and understand tasks like categorization, language processing,
arithmetics or car-driving. Modeling the complex cognitive processes
underlying communication and social interaction, however, still poses
open challenges and has been investigated only rudimentarily. At the
same time, there is a growing awareness that cognitively plausible (or
at least inspired) models and algorithms can help to build better au-
tonomous technical systems. Yet, they are relatively underrated in the
design of interactive systems that model human-like communication
with natural language, nonverbal behavior, or dialogue. This sympo-
sium aims to further the development and the convergence of these two
branches of Cognitive Science: (1) the use of techniques from cognitive
modeling to study what the human mind is doing in interactive settings;
(2) the use of cognitively oriented approaches to model communicative
abilities for technical systems. Four presentations by researchers in dif-
ferent fields will emphasize the role of cognitive models in modeling
communication from different perspectives:
Modelling Prediction in Language Processing
Vera Demberg
Recent psycholinguistic evidence indicates that humans do not only
process language incrementally but also anticipate upcoming input. An-
ticipation of input or events is not only restricted to language processing
but evident from other aspects of cognition as well, and can be thought
of as a process that helps humans deal with partial or noisy information.
A cognitively plausible model of language processing should therefore
also have an explicit prediction mechanism. I will briefly present PLTAG,
a grammar formalism which allows us to model incremental predictive
processing as well as a linking theory which links the parsing process to
processing difficulty.
The Production of Co-speech Iconic Gestures
Kirsten Bergmann
In this talk a comprehensive computational simulation model for the
production of co-speech iconic gestures in virtual agents will be pre-
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sented. Based on empirical insights from a corpus analysis, we employ
Bayesian decision networks which combine data-driven machine learn-
ing techniques with rule-based decision making. This enables us to ac-
count for both commonalities as well as inter-individual differences in
how meaning is mapped onto gesture form. Evaluation studies have
shown that this approach allows to successfully approximate human
use of iconic gestures, and moreover, when brought to application in
a virtual agent, the generated gestural behavior was found to be posi-
tively rated by human recipients.
Adapting to Addressee Feedback on the Basis of Attributed
Mental States
Hendrik Buschmeier
Speakers design their utterances with their addressees’ general needs
in mind and respond to communicative listener feedback by adapting
their language to more specific aspects. In this talk I will (1) present
a speaker-centric, cognitive model that enables probabilistic reasoning
about an addressee’s mental state of listening on the basis of her feed-
back signals and (2) discuss how this ‘attributed listener state’ can in-
form a speaker’s decisions of whether and how to adapt his subsequent
communicative actions to accommodate the addressee.
The AIRBUS Model: A Bayesian Model for Intention Recognition
in Communication
Jan de Ruiter
The rapid and fluent nature of human communicative interactions strong-
ly suggests the existence of an online mechanism for intention recogni-
tion. In this talk, I propose a new mathematical model that addresses
these requirements. Our model provides a way of integrating knowl-
edge about both directions of the relationship between linguistic ex-
pressions and communicative intentions, through a rapid process of
Bayesian update. It enables us to generate new predictions about the
process of intention recognition during (explicit) communication. More-
over, by equipping this model with entropy related distance measures,
we can also predict under which circumstances utterance planning can
start before the preceding utterance is completed, and when repair must
be initiated to resolve "misalignment". I will sketch an example of this
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model in operation in an existing robot platform, and discuss its impli-
cations for a broader theory of communication.
The Cultural Constitution of Causal Cognition:
Cross-disciplinary perspectives from the ZiF Research
Group
Organisers: Andrea Bender and Sieghard Beller
Center for Interdisciplinary Research ZiF, Bielefeld University
Contributors: Sieghard Beller1,2, Andrea Bender1,2, Sibylle Duda1,3,
York Hagmayer1,4, Anita Schroven1,2, Keith Stenning1,5,6,
Heike Wiese1,3
1Center for Interdisciplinary Research ZiF, Bielefeld University
2University of Freiburg
3University of Potsdam
4King’s College London
5University of Edinburgh
6University of Gieen
Causality is one of the core concepts in our attempts to make sense of
the world, and this renders causal cognition a core topic for the social as
well as the cognitive sciences. In the past, however, respective research
has been split into diverging paradigms, each pertaining to a distinct
(sub)discipline and focusing on specific domains, thus creating a rather
fragmented picture of causal cognition. Furthermore, most of this pre-
vious research paid only incidental attention to culture as a constitutive
factor. Yet, cultural variation can be expected with respect to the delin-
eation of domains, the concepts referred to, the mechanisms of process-
ing, and even the willingness to search for causal explanations in the
first place (e.g., Bang et al., 2007; Bender & Beller, 2011; Legare & Gel-
man, 2008). A systematic and thorough investigation into the cultural
constitution of causal cognition is thus overdue.
The current ZiF Research Group on “The cultural constitution of causal
cognition: Re-integrating anthropology into the cognitive sciences” (fund-
ed by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research at Bielefeld University)
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intends to take on the challenge. In this symposium, fellows of the re-
search group with backgrounds in anthropology, linguistics, psychol-
ogy and philosophy present their perspective on causal cognition and
its cultural constitution, and try to establish connections across disci-
plines and paradigms.
How Universal is Causal Cognition? And How Can we Know?
Andrea Bender, Sieghard Beller, and Anita Schroven
This talk briefly introduces the ZiF Research Group and its agenda.
It provides an overview on cultural variability in causal cognition, on
conceptual and methodological aspects in approaching respective ques-
tions, and on the strategies developed by the Research Group to tackle
them. In doing so, it will also elaborate on what can be learned from
anthropological contributions.
Weighing up Physical Causes in Germany and Tonga: Effects of
Presentation and Answer Mode
Sieghard Beller and Andrea Bender
When people determine which of the entities involved in a physical in-
teraction is responsible for its outcome, they weigh the entities differ-
ently even if the interaction is symmetric. This effect depends on var-
ious factors and also varies cross-culturally (Beller et al., 2009; Bender
& Beller, 2011). However, our results differ from previous research. In
a replication study with participants from Germany and Tonga we in-
vestigate whether this is due to differences in the presentation of stim-
uli (visual vs. verbal) or to differences in answer mode (explanations
vs. ratings of responsibility), and we test hypotheses on which cultural
and/or linguistic factors may account for the cultural differences.
Complex Causal Relations Without Overt Linguistic Expression:
the Case of Sonst (‘else/otherwise’)
Heike Wiese and Sibylle Duda
In naturally occurring discourse, causal relations are often not expressed
explicitly but have to be retrieved from asyndectic clausal chains, such
as “I like him. He is such a friendly person.” An interesting case in
point are instances like “Don’t open. Alarm will ring.”, where a com-
plex causal connection for an ‘otherwise’ condition, usually epistemi-
cally mediated, is left unexpressed – even though it is crucial for the
preferred interpretation – thus making the literal interpretation infelici-
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tous. Such patterns pose an interesting challenge for models of semantic
composition and the interface between grammar and causal cognition.
We discuss a German construction from this domain that involves a
clause-initial particle sonst (‘else/otherwise’), using data from a corpus
of spontaneous speech in adolescent peer-groups (Wiese et al., 2012).
How Causal Models of Mind and Behavior Shape Causal Models
of Mental Illnesses
York Hagmayer
The literature is full of causal models of mental illnesses, some of which
describe folk-theories of lay-people. These models are seemingly con-
strained by general framework models of mental illness, which in turn
are based on how people assume causal relations connecting mind and
behavior. Developmental studies indicate that some of these assump-
tions may be universal, whereas cross-cultural studies report substan-
tial differences. This talk explicates how causal models of mind and
behavior constrain framework theories of mental illness by specifying
normal and abnormal mental states and behaviors. Such fundamental
differences in causal models about mind and behavior are one reason for
why cross-cultural differences in mental illnesses are difficult to capture
by standard diagnostic manuals.
Causality and Discourse: How do we Talk Ourselves into the
Causal Models that we Use?
Keith Stenning
Halpern and Pearl (2005) propose the “structural model” approach to
causality which makes a distinction between the causal systems in the
“real world” and the highly abstracted structured models which we em-
ploy in assigning causes in context. On this view, it is possible to arrive
at two quite different causal attributions about the same event by rea-
soning from two perfectly reasonable different structured models of the
context. This talk will explore implications for causal cognition of the
separation of “actual causation” from structural models. It will argue
that this separation makes the interpretative component of establish-
ing structural models an essential part of causal cognition, and that this
makes defeasible logical models preferable to probability based ones.
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Clinical Applications of Cognitive Science
Organiser: Wolfgang Trapp
SozialStiftung Bamberg
Contributors: Michael Landgrebe, Robert Meyrer, Matthias
Weinberger, Christoph Ziegelmayer
SozialStiftung Bamberg
Mental Relief by Electromagnetic Stimulation – can rTMS Cure
Depression?
Michael Landgrebe
Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) is a modern, non-
invasive neurostimulation and neuromodulation technique, based on
the principle of electromagnetic induction of an electric field in the brain.
Originally, rTMS has been developed as a diagnostic tool in neurologi-
cal disorders. After the discovery, that depending on the stimulus fre-
quency, long-lasting modulation of neuronal activity can be induced,
the therapeutic potential of rTMS has been investigated in various neu-
ropsychiatric conditions (e.g. depression, schizophrenia, hallucinations,
chronic tinnitus). Low-frequency rTMS (i.e. 1 Hz or below) leads to a
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reduction while high-frequency stimulation (i.e. 1 Hz or more, usually
10–20 Hz) increases neuronal activity in the directly stimulated cortical
areas as well as in transneuronally connected regions. First clinical stud-
ies of rTMS in the treatment of depression have been performed more
than 15 years ago. Since that, numerous studies point to a therapeutic
potential of rTMS in depression.
A Creeping Mental Breakdown – Why Dementia is Still a Big
Therapeutic Challenge
Robert Meyrer
Due to demographic developments in Germany the number of patients
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease is expected to double by 2050. Alz-
heimer’s disease and other dementias represent an increasing clinical
challenge. They are associated with substantial economic costs and bur-
den to health services. Therefore, early detection of possible precursors
of dementia, early diagnosis and management of dementia and its pro-
dromal stages become increasingly important.
The effectiveness of presently approved specific antidementive drugs
for symptomatic treatment of Alzheimer’s disease is still not satisfac-
tory. Existing medical treatments slow the progression of symptoms of
the disease, but their efficacy does not extend to all patients and is not
sustained beyond an average of 6 months. Despite a number of promis-
ing rationales for therapeutic treatments in Alzheimer’s disease, very
few of these have been developed beyond preclinical studies. Still there
is a distinct lack of novel approaches or new disease modifying thera-
pies for Alzheimer’s disease.
The question arises whether the treatment of modifiable risk factors,
comorbid somatic diseases or cognition-based nonpharmacologic train-
ing may constitute an effective intervention in Alzheimer’s disease and
its prodromal stages.
Molding the Virtual Body – How Induced Illusions can Help
Patients Suffering from Chronic Pain
Matthias Weinberger
In the last few decades we have learned that pain is more than just a
result of tissue damage: Exiting insights have emerged leading to the-
ories that integrate pain perception and behavior into more complex
frameworks. Imaging studies have found multiple brain regions that
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are activated during subjective experience of pain and thus matching
its complex sensory, emotional and cognitive aspects.
Mirror therapy is a very recent therapeutic strategy that creates the il-
lusion of intact and pain-free movement of either amputated or painful
body parts mainly by mirrored visual feedback. This approach leads to
a dramatic reduction of pain in many cases where conventional treat-
ment has proven either ineffective or only slightly effective. An under-
lying assumption is that the patients’ mental model of their own body
(their so called virtual body) is distorted and because of this, creating
the illusion of an intact virtual body acts on brain areas responsible for
their experience of pain.
After a short historical outline covering “milestones” of mirror ther-
apy treatment, results of an own study applying mirror therapy to 30 pa-
tients suffering from chronic low back pain are presented.
Cognitive Remediation is Fun! Effects of Game-like Cognitive
Training Interventions for Psychiatric Patients
Wolfgang Trapp
Dysfunction of attention, memory and problem solving is considered as
a key symptom in many mental diseases. These deficits tend to persist
even after conventional treatment and limit social and vocational func-
tioning. Hence it makes sense to administer cognitive training to posi-
tively influence patients’ further course of illness. However, controlled
efficacy studies of cognitive training in patients (mainly suffering from
schizophrenia) have remained inconclusive hitherto: While some report
significant effects mainly on working memory and executive function,
minor or no effects could be found in other studies. Results of sev-
eral controlled studies using training software that was designed very
“game-like” and motivating are presented. Positive effects - mainly on
executive function and working as well as episodic memory - could
be found throughout for several patient groups und training settings.
Even effects on the long term course of illness could be demonstrated.
Finally an outlook is given, how future approaches in cognitive reme-
diation could utilize mobile device’s “multi-player features” and thus
bring cognitive training from psychiatric wards into patients’ everyday
life.
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Pressing the Brain’s Reset Button – is Electroconvulsive Therapy
Still an Option?
Christoph Ziegelmayer
Die Methode, über durch elektrische Stimulation ausgelöste Krampf-
anfälle eine Linderung bei psychischen Störungen zu erreichen (Elek-
trokonvulsionstherapie, EKT) ist bereits relativ alt. Im Zuge der Ein-
führung der Psychopharmaka in den 50er Jahren und aufgrund nega-
tiver Darstellung in den Medien ist ihre Anwendung zwischenzeitlich
deutlich zurückgegangen. Seit intensiven wissenschaftlichen Untersu-
chungen in den 80er Jahren und der Anerkennung des wissenschaftli-
chen Beirates der Bundesärztekammer 2003 hat die EKT bei der Thera-
pie affektiver und schizophrener Erkrankungen an Bedeutung deutlich
gewonnen. Ihre Wirksamkeit ist inzwischen eindrucksvoll empirisch
belegt. Der Beitrag enthält Informationen über Indikationen und Kon-
traindikationen der EKT sowie Risiken und Nebenwirkungen dieser Be-
handlungsform. Ergebnisse zu kurz und langfristigen Effekten auf die
kognitive Leistungsfähigkeit und zur therapeutischen Wirksamkeit an-
hand einschlägiger Metaanalysen sowie anhand von Daten aus der Be-
handlung von Patienten in der Klinik für Psychiatrie, Psychotherapie
und Psychosomatik der Sozialstiftung Bamberg werden dargestellt.
Cognitive Aspects of Human-Technology
Interaction
Organiser: Manfred Thüring
Technische Universität Berlin
Contributors: Martin Baumann1, Stefan Brandenburg2, Uwe
Drewitz1, Thomas Franke3, Maik Friedrich1, Astrid Kassner1,
Josef Krems3, Michael Minge2, Nele Rußwinkel2, Marlene Vogel2,
Dieter Wallach4
1Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt
2Technische Universität Berlin
3Technische Universität Chemnitz
4FH Kaiserslautern
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Technology has become an integral part of everyday life. It is present
in our homes, it is part of our working places, we use it to travel, and
when we are on the move we are equipped with mobile devices that
support us in many ways. Cognition plays a major role when we learn
how to operate a technical system, when we try to understand its func-
tionality and when we finally employ it. Obviously, human-technology
interaction (HTI) offers a wide range of fascinating research opportuni-
ties for cognitive science. At the same time, it poses a number of serious
challenges.
To begin with, most technical systems are complex by nature and so
are the cognitive processes that are involved when we try to master such
a system. This constellation is highly demanding for theories that in-
tend to capture the cognitive aspects of human-technology interaction.
Due to the large variety of cognitive aspects involved, HTI may prove
as an ideal test bed for theories that reach beyond the explanation of
isolated phenomena. In the future, research in this field may therefore
contribute to fulfill the requirements of a “unified theory of cognition”
as called for by Alan Newell in 1990.
Introduction
Manfred Thüring
Investigating the Emergence of User Experience
Stefan Brandenburg and Uwe Drewitz
Zeitabhängige Entscheidungsfindung im Fluglotsenkontext
Nele Rußwinkel and Maik Friedrich
Temporal Aspects of User Experience
Manfred Thüring, Marlene Vogel, and Michael Minge
Driving and Situation Awareness: a Cognitive Model of Memory-
Update Processes
Josef Krems, Thomas Franke, and Martin Baumann
Der Einfluss des Automationsgrads auf die Situationsrepräsen-
tation des Fahrers: Ein Experiment zur Reaktionszeit des Fahrers
in Übernahmesituationen
Martin Baumann and Astrid Kassner
Human-Computer Interaction: Lessons in Applied Cognitive Sci-
ence
Dieter Wallach
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Multimodal Interaction
Organiser: Christopher Habel
International Research Training Group (“Graduiertenkolleg”, IRTG) 1247
“Cross-modal Interaction in Natural and Artificial Cognitive Systems”
(CINACS), Department of Informatics, Universität Hamburg
habel@informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Contributors: Christopher Habel1, Kai Hamburger2, Barbara Kaup3,
Stefan Kopp4, Florian Röser2, Junlei Yu1
Phenomena of multimodal interaction can be investigated and discussed
on a variety of layers, namely, (1) the representational layer, e.g. lan-
guage – graphics, taking into consideration sub-layers, e.g. “speech”
– “language in written form”, and (2) the perceptual layer, in particu-
lar, the layers concerning the sensor channels of vision, audition, and
haptics.
Multimodality in the Wild – Speech and Gesture in Human
Communication
Stefan Kopp
Multimodal behavior is ubiquitous in human communication. One strik-
ing example is speech and co-verbal gesture which are produced spon-
taneously, especially when communicating spatial information. Both
modalities are known to be coordinated in a number of ways, e.g., with
respect to temporal, semantic or pragmatic aspects (McNeill 2005), but
the underlying coordination principles and cognitive processes are still
largely unknown. I will present findings from ongoing empirical as well
as computational work on how humans coordinate concomitant speech
and gesture with each other in spatial direction-giving dialogues. Re-
sults suggest that the multimodal coordination does not follow uni-
versal principles but underlies both communicative and cognitive con-
straints that arise dynamically in an interactive context.
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The Role of Sensorimotor Representations for Language
Comprehension
Barbara Kaup
In language comprehension research many authors nowadays assume
that sensori-motor representations play an important role for language
comprehension: Comprehenders are assumed to mentally simulate the
experience of the referent situation during text processing (e.g., Zwaan,
2004). Research has until now focused mainly on providing evidence
that linguistic and non-linguistic cognition interact. Relatively little at-
tention has been devoted to the exact processes by which meaning is be-
ing composed at the sentence level. In my talk I will report about an on-
going research project devoted to investigating this issue. I will discuss
several different possibilities with respect to the role that sensory-motor
processes and representations play during language comprehension.
Modality Switching Costs – Evidence from Human Wayfinding
Kai Hamburger and Florian Röser
How much does it cost to switch between modalities when process-
ing landmark information for wayfinding? Recognition and wayfind-
ing tasks in our virtual environment SQUARELAND (Hamburger &
Knauff, 2011) revealed no evidence for modality switching costs (lower
performance, increased decision times). For example, learning visual
landmarks and retrieving them visually was as effective as learning vi-
sual landmarks but retrieving them in the acoustic domain. This was
tested for visual, verbal, and acoustic material. Results challenge the
assumption of switching costs in wayfinding. The human brain seems
to integrate relevant information in different modalities at the time of
exposure (learning) so that no additional costs occur at information re-
trieval.
Verbally Assisted Exploration of Virtual-tactile Graphical
Representations
Christopher Habel and Junlei Yu
External representations that are based on graphical elements consti-
tuting meaning by use of their spatial properties and spatial relations
among them are effective means in communication and collaboration
(cf. Kosslyn 1989, Habel & Acartürk 2007). For visually impaired peo-
ple appropriate substitutions of such graphical representations are re-
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quired. Haptic interfaces for human-computer interaction offer a large
variety of prospects for training and assisting blind people. To over-
come deficits in haptic exploration, providing additional information,
such as auditory assistance through the auditory channel, has been pro-
ved to be helpful. The tasks of providing conceptual information to the
user can be distributed between different modalities based on principles
of “division of labor” (DoL) (Habel & Acartürk, 2007). We exemplify
this in a floor-plan exploration-task: the provided content is distributed
between the haptic and the auditory modality, and additionally, in the
auditory layer between speech and non-speech audio, based on system-
atic DoL-principles.
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Das Nationale Bildungspanel (NEPS): Anlage,
Funktion und Messung von Kompetenzen
Organisatoren: Jutta von Maurice, Cordula Artelt und Sabine Weinert
Universität Bamberg
{jutta.von-maurice, cordula.artelt,
sabine.weinert}@uni-bamberg.de
Teilnehmer: Jutta von Maurice1, Sabine Weinert1, Claus H.
Carstensen1, Cordula Artelt1, Marion Händel2, Stefan
Zimmermann1, Karin Gehrer1, Anna Südkamp1, Kathrin Lockl1,
Annika Langmann1, Kristin Hecker1, Hans-Peter Blossfeld1,
Elsbeth Stern3
Ziel des Nationalen Bildungspanels (NEPS) ist es, qualitativ hochwerti-
ge und nutzerfreundlich aufbereitete Daten zu den relevanten Bildungs-
prozessen und zur Kompetenzentwicklung von früher Kindheit bis ins
hohe Erwachsenenalter zur Verfügung zu stellen. Im Rahmen eines Multi-
Kohorten-Sequenz-Designs wurden in den Jahren 2009 bis 2012 sechs
repräsentative Startstichproben mit insgesamt etwa 60.000 Personen ge-
zogen; alle Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer werden auf ihren indivi-
duellen Lebenswegen begleitet und regelmäßig werden Daten zu Kom-
petenzen, zu jeweils relevanten Lernumwelten, Bildungsentscheidungen
und Bildungsrenditen erhoben. Die Entfaltung sozialer Ungleichheit und
die besondere Situation von Personen mit Migrationshintergrund wer-
den dabei beleuchtet.
Das Symposium gibt zunächst einen Überblick über die thematischen
Schwerpunkte, die methodische Anlage und das Datenangebot des NEPS
(von Maurice/Blossfeld). Der weitere Fokus des Symposiums liegt auf
der Darstellung und Begründung der Auswahl und Konzeption der
im Rahmen des NEPS erfassten Kompetenzen. Im Beitrag von Artelt
u.a. wird ein Überblick über die gemessenen Kompetenzen gegeben.
Diese reichen von domänenspezifischen kognitiven Kompetenzen (z.B.
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Sprachkompetenzen, Mathematik) über allgemeine kognitive Grundfä-
higkeiten bis hin zu Metakompetenzen (z.B. ICT Literacy, Metakogniti-
on) und sozialer Kompetenz. Drei der erfassten Fähigkeiten – Hörver-
stehen, Lesekompetenz und Metakognition – werden in einzelnen Bei-
trägen genauer dargestellt.
Im Beitrag von Südkamp u.a. wird das Konstrukt des Hörverstehens
auf Diskursebene (in der Mehrheitssprache Deutsch), so wie es im NEPS
operationalisiert wird, dargestellt und begründet. Hörverstehen auf der
Diskursebene wird definiert als die Fähigkeit, längere und kürzere Ab-
schnitte realistischer, gesprochener Sprache automatisiert und in Echt-
zeit zu verarbeiten und die hierin enthaltenen Informationen bei der
Beantwortung von Fragen zu nutzen.
Der Beitrag von Händel u.a. beschäftigt sich mit den Herausforderun-
gen der Messung metakognitiven Wissens in verschiedenen Altersstu-
fen und verdeutlicht, wie das Ziel der validen Erfassung des deklara-
tiven Aspekts von Metakognition im NEPS über verschiedene Alters-
gruppen (Grundschulalter bis Erwachsenenalter) und damit einherge-
hend variierenden Fertigkeiten und Fähigkeiten als lebensweltlich re-
levantes Konstrukt umgesetzt wird. Dargestellt wird u.a., wie sich die
gewählte Operationalisierung im Rahmen von Pilotstudien (hier spezi-
ell bei Grundschülerinnen und -schülern) bewährt hat.
Schließlich wird im Beitrag von Zimmermann u.a. eine Gegenüber-
stellung der kognitiven Anforderungen von Leseverstehensaufgaben aus
Kompetenzstufenmodellen verschiedener Studien vorgenommen, und
mit den Verstehensanforderungen aus den NEPS Tests zur Messung von
Lesekompetenz verglichen und die Implikationen bzgl. der Vergleich-
barkeit bewertet. Abschließend diskutiert Elsbeth Stern die vorgestell-
ten Beiträge.
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Beiträge
1. Das Nationale Bildungspanel (NEPS): Thematische Schwerpunk-
te, methodische Anlage und Datenangebot
Jutta von Maurice und Hans-Peter Blossfeld
2. Die Messung von Kompetenzen im Rahmen des NEPS
Cordula Artelt, Sabine Weinert und Claus H. Carstensen
3. Entwicklung von Aufgaben zur Erfassung von Hörverstehen auf
Diskursebene
Anna Südkamp, Anika Langmann und Kristin Hecker
4. Herausforderungen bei der Erfassung metakognitiven Wissens in
verschiedenen Altersstufen
Marion Händel, Kathrin Lockl, Sabine Weinert und Cordula Artelt
5. Kognitive Anforderungen von Leseverstehensaufgaben auf den
unteren Kompetenzstufen in IALS und PISA: Implikationen für
die Messung von Lesekompetenz im NEPS
Stefan Zimmermann, Karin Gehrer und Cordula Artelt
6. Diskussion
Elsbeth Stern
Doctoral Symposium
organised by Stefan Kopp
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Technical Agency – A Minimal Theory of Mind
Holger Lyre and Gerhard Chr. Bukow
Department of Philosophy, University of Magdeburg
Our DFG-funded project (and my PhD-project) deals with the founda-
tions of realistic non-ideal agents and the minimal components such
agents must have to have a capacity for Theory of Mind. First, it works
on the interface of philosophy and cognitive psychology and links The-
ory of Mind to the human capacity to “thought-follow” the structural
change of belief systems. Second, it bases on the cooperation with the
Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology and develops Theory of Mind-concepts
in the realm of man-machine-interface. The project’s aim is to give a
theory about the connections between agents, rationality and Theory of
Mind and to give advice for its practical usage.
Our main motivation is that in the philosophical theory of agency,
agents are mostly thought to have an idealized form of rationality –
and this background constrains models of agents handled in Theory of
Mind-research. But, it is dubious how such models should be able to
capture the essentials of realistic agents – not just in case of limits of
computational power, but with respect to properties of the cognitive
machinery, change of belief system, inconsistency, or different levels of
rationality. In the first part of the project, we investigated in the hypoth-
esis that the capacity to follow the change (e.g. revision) of belief sys-
tems is strongly connected to Theory of Mind – not just the attribution
of just singular beliefs. We used experiments in spatial cognition and
mental model theory as a case study to ground what it does mean for
a realistic agent to be able to follow another agent’s variation of mental
models and how to think of minimality in cognitively informed way.
In the second part of the project, now, we are concerned with the han-
dling of inconsistency by a Theory of Mind-agent, e.g. the capacity to
understand inconsistent belief systems and to be able to follow their
changes. We argue that inconsistency is an essential part of every real-
istically based Theory of Mind-agent. But what does it mean to follow
rationally inconsistent belief systems? In the next two years, we inves-
tigate in 1) how different levels of rationality influence Theory of Mind-
capacities, 2) the entanglement of psychology and ontology of agents
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(e.g. in consistency), and 3) how to transfer insights about Theory of
Mind, change and inconsistency to man-machine-interaction.
Reading Comprehension and Mental Models
Regina E. Fabry
Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz
The purpose of my PhD project is to develop an interdisciplinary frame-
work in order to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for read-
ing comprehension. The target phenomenon has been investigated by
various researchers in cognitive science. However, a unifying account of
the various results and implications is still lacking. Furthermore, a satis-
fying description of reading comprehension has to be accompanied by a
thorough metatheorical discussion. This philosophically motivated ap-
proach aims at evaluating the plausibility, significance and conceptual
coherence of empirically developed insights and theories.
Refering to Philip N. Johnson-Laird’s (1983) claim, that the result of
comprehensive language and text processing consists in the construc-
tion of a mental model that represents the state of affairs described
in a discourse, the following core questions have to be resolved: 1.
How can mental discourse models be linked to the external world? 2.
To what extent do mental models and perceptual representations con-
verge? 3. How are mental models and their construction mechanisms
implemented in the human brain? 4. What are the differences between
reading and listening comprehension with regard to linguistic process-
ing? The general background assumption of my PhD project amounts
to the insight that the development and application of reading compre-
hension ideally leads to the distribution of knowledge structures. Since
this phenomenon is crucial for cultural and scientific communication,
I argue that an interdisciplinary and integrative framework is urgently
needed in order to describe and explain the underlying neural, func-
tional, computational and representational mechanisms.
As I have been working on my PhD project since April 1 2012, my
progress consists primarily in the ongoing evaluation of the relevant lit-
erature. After having finished this important stage, I plan to contribute
to the conduction of further experiments that could resolve existing in-
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consistencies and desiderata. To date, one crucial question that seems
to be negleted consists in the influence of specific text genres and their
properties on particular reading comprehension processes.
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Enabling Semantic Context in the Agent
Simulation ARS (Artificial Recognition System)
Isabella Hinterleitner
Vienna University of Technology
The work solves the problem of establishing semantic context in project
ARS [1]. Semantic context is needed in the artificial life simulation ARS,
if two agents have to solve a question in a certain problem domain. It is
defined through a domain specific ontology and a general upper ontol-
ogy.
Relevant work in the field has been discussed in the following works
[2¸ 3, 4, 5, 6].
Talking about a specific problem requires agents to know the exact
problem domain and domain-specific knowledge. Solving a more gen-
eral problem requires a less domain-specific ontology, such as an upper
level ontology and semantic knowledge. For that reason, two different
ways of knowledge bases and ontologies exist. Up to now different on-
tologies haven been realized including a function for the context. Based
on defined use cases it will be demonstrated at the end of the work how
semantic context can be established in specific situations.
In building automation usage of domain-specific ontologies and se-
mantic situational context solves the question of a user-centered con-
trol. For example, a building automation system is usually controlled
by one control unit. The idea of a user-centered control is that a domain-
specific ontology gathers data on routines of a person in a room. If a cer-
tain context is established frequently by one user the control unit stores
a situational semantic context. Thus, the system can adapt to the in-
dividual based on past experiences that have been stored as semantic
situational context. According to the semantic context established by
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the individual in one room, the building automation systems’ control
takes into account the needs of the individual that is represented in a
domain-specific ontology.
Further work includes usage of semantic situational context in the
field of cognitive vision systems and autonomous robots for navigat-
ing in novel situation. The research investigates how a robot can adapt
to a new situation when entering a room and successfully fulfill a task
there. The challenge is that general models of a room cannot be used to
adapt to a new situation. The problem is tackled by defining an ontol-
ogy hierarchy, ranging from process and object to abstract knowledge
[7]. Another way of addressing the problem is, using upper and lower
level ontologies for establishing context and enabling the robot to adapt
to a novel room based on contextual knowledge.
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Relational Message Communication Through
Touch by Humanoid Robots
Laura Hoffmann
Social Psychology: Media and Communication, University Duisburg-Essen
laura.hoffmann@uni-due.de
Motivation
In the near future robots can be applied in a wide range of fields, where
they possibly get into physical contact with humans. From a social psy-
chological point of view, interactions that take place in social domains
where robots act as pets, companions, or health advisors are of spe-
cial interest. Studies that compared physically embodied robots with
virtual characters resulted in inconsistent findings with regard to the
question which entity is more persuasive, present and better evaluated
(Hoffmann & Krämer, 2001 for an overview). For instance Jung and Lee
(2004) reported differences in the evaluation and the perceived sense of
social presence between the robotic dog Aibo and a computer simula-
tion, however, they could not replicate these findings in a second study.
A closer look at the studies revealed that the interaction between the
subject and the robot included touch in the first study, but not in the
second one. Based on this the authors concluded that touch seems to
be a crucial factor in the interaction with robots which is necessary for
them to unfold their full potential. Because of that it seems reasonable
to deepen the focus on touch within human-robot interaction (HRI).
Research Objective
This PhD work is generally concerned with the evaluation of human-
robot interactions that include touching. In order to get first insights on
how touch is perceived within HRI an interview study is conducted in
which participants were confronted with photographs that depict situa-
tions in which touch happens between a humanoid robot and a human.
The design of the study is based on the work of Burgoon (1991), who re-
searched relational messages conveyed via touching. Therefore he com-
pared photographs that showed different kinds of touches that occurred
between two persons (e.g. handshake, touch to the face) and asked for
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an evaluation of these pictures. The results unveiled that highly inti-
mate touches like handholding or touch to the face express more affec-
tion, immediacy, trust, composure, similarity and informality than the
other forms of touch. The interview study should reveal whether these
results can be replicated within HRI and if touch with robots is per-
ceived as desirable. Since it can be suspected that the size of the robot
may influence whether touch by a robot is desirable or not, robots of
different sizes are chosen as stimulus material (e.g. Robosapien, Nao
and iCub).
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An Analytical Framework for Place Research
Dominik Kremer
Research Group on Computing in the Cultural Sciences, Laboratory for
Semantic Information Technology University of Bamberg
dominik.kremer@uni-bamberg.de
Spatial cognition research has recently become interested in the notion
of place (Winter et al. 2009). Beside cognitive aspects place as a “mean-
ing soaked entity” (Lynch 1960) also covers social processes. This in-
terplay has been studied – with an emphasis on the social aspects –
by place research, a field within human geography (Cresswell 2004)
that methodologically complements spatial cognition. While the cog-
nitive processes involved in the constitution and the use of places are
best studied using spatial behavior data, social negotiation processes
are examined best by qualitative content analysis. I argue that for a de-
tailed analysis of place, both approaches should be combined. My talk
presents two data sets, (1) movement tracks of tourists, and (2) narratives
of a place tradition from which I derive requirements for an analytical
framework for studying social and cognitive processes in the context of
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place research. Prototypical software implementations for parts of the
framework are discussed.
Due to a pervasive use of GPS-sensors there is now a rich basis of em-
pirical data reflecting locomotion behavior. The data from Schlieder/
Kremer 2011 covers motion patterns and images taken of day-trip first
time visitors in the Old Town of Bamberg. Laube et al. (2007) provide
a framework for a criteria-based extraction of features. Turning from
behavior to action, geo-tagged image data indicate decisions taken and
attention paid (Schlieder/Matyas 2008, Schlieder/Kremer 2011). Qual-
itative content analysis of places can be derived from image tags, di-
aries or interviews. The second data set covers narratives on the place
tradition of Bamberg collected by guided interviews of people living
for longer than 10 years in Bamberg. Common text mining approaches
can reveal basic symbolic understanding. Social sciences have devel-
oped techniques to extract place based argumentation patterns (Christ-
mann/Mahnken 2011).
Based on a first analysis of the two data sets, I propose a set of require-
ments that an analytical framework for place research has to meet. The
most important are: (1) beside behavioral locomotion data, the frame-
work hast to support action sequences (e.g. image data) and text as in-
put data. (2) The framework should allow place to be identified as lo-
comotion pattern, action pattern and as argumentation pattern. (3) The
association of all types of patterns should be supported. (4) Temporal
analyses regarding change and connectivity of places have to be possi-
ble.
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From Discrete Systems to Evolving
Representations: An Integrative Model of
Visual Working Memory
Johannes Lohmann
Department of Cognitive Modeling, University of Tübungen
Working memory is a crucial part of the human cognitive system. It
provides an interface between perception, memory and action. One of
the most influential models of working memory is the one proposed by
Baddeley and Hitch [1], which distinguishes between visual and phono-
logical working memory, which are both controlled by a central execu-
tive.
Early research on visual working memory (VWM) indicated that VWM
consists of a volatile but very detailed sensory memory and a longer
lasting, more abstract short-term memory. The content of VWM de-
pends on selective attention. Usually sensory memory, short-term mem-
ory, and attention are investigated separately. But there is evidence that
these mechanisms are based on the same neural processes [2]. Therefore
we propose a computational model based on TVA [3] that integrates se-
lective attention, sensory memory, and short-term memory. The key
assumptions are that:
1. encoding of information can be modeled in terms of a race model
as proposed by TVA;
2. the amount of information stored in VWM changes over time;
3. these changes are due to probabilisitc processes of active mainte-
nance and passive decay;
4. the same processes that guide top-down biases on attention are
involved in the maintenance of information.
We use change detection tasks as benchmark tests for our model, as
change detection allows the study of the interactions between memory
and attention. We implemented our model to predict mean detection
rates as well as distributions of responses. We also track the eye move-
ments of the participants as it should be possible to model performance
based on scan paths.
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Our final goal is to provide a computational model that can account
for visual attention and visual working memory in a single framework
with a sparse parameter set. Such a model combines results from cog-
nitive psychology and neuroscience and could provide another bridge
between both fields of research.
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Perspective and Perspectivation in Language
and Cognition: A Cognitive-Linguistic and
Cognitive-Developmental Approach
Michael Pleyer
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
The notion of ‘perspective’ captures an important dimension of how
knowledge and meaning are communicated, transmitted and shared
(Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002). It thus also presents an important con-
cept in cognitive science.
In particular, the phenomenon of perspective-taking and -setting in
language, interaction and cognition has come to be one of the central
topics in a number of fields in cognitive science, including Cognitive
Linguistics (Verhagen 2007), developmental psychology (Moll & Toma-
sello 2007), language acquisition (Tomasello 2003) and psycholinguistics
(Barr & Keysar 2006).
In my dissertation project I argue that the concept of perspective can
be used as an integrative, interdisciplinary concept at the interface of
these disciplines. Specifically, I hold that the analytical apparatus of
Cognitive Linguistics developed to capture the complex phenomena of
perspectivationin language and cognition can be applied fruitfully to
the analysis of young children’s cognitive and linguistic development.
In Cognitive Linguistics, the concept of perspectival construal describes
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the fact that when conceptualizing a scene for purposes of expression,
speakers structure scenes in a specific manner and from a certain per-
spective. They employ the perspectival nature of linguistic utterances to
assign salience to specific aspects of a conceptualisation and to organize
conceptual content with respect to a particular vantage point (Verhagen
2007).
In my dissertation, I am looking at how young children learn to take
and set perspectives in discourse and how they learn the inventory
of perspectival constructions used to conceptualise states of affairs in
specific ways. I am currently preparing a Cognitive-Linguistic corpus
study of the acquisition of construal operations, whose results will then
be integrated with theories and data from developmental psychology
and psycholinguistics. Overall, my PhD project will yield a more com-
plete cognitive-scientific explication of the concept, structure and devel-
opment of perspective-taking and -setting. It will also enable a fruitful
synergetic dialogue between Cognitive Linguistics, developmental psy-
chology, language acquisition research and psycholinguistics and high-
light points of convergence and common foci of interest.
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Facial Expressions of Pain
Automated Analyses
Michael Siebers
Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Science, University of Bamberg
Facial expressions convey a lot about the mental state of a person. Thus,
the analysis of facial expressions is a promising research area [1]. My
thesis is attended to facial expressions of persons in pain, especially the
individually of those expressions. I’m surveying this topic from two
perspectives: One aim is to determine whether subject-specific image
classifiers are neccessary for a good accuracy. On the other hand I’m
interested in the temporal patterns of facial pain expressions.
To answer the first question a study comparing subject-specific and
general classifiers were compared. A broad repertoire of learning algo-
rithms was used. The study was conducted with images of subjects in
pain (no acting involved). Though first results indicated that subject-
specific classifiers were not needed, it could be shown that the study
suffered a lot of overfitting. The experiences of the first study will be
used to redesign the experiment.
Nevertheless, at first we are collecting a baseline for the classifiers. We
are running a study with human observers which are to rate images ac-
cording to the shown facial expression. Shown are neutral expressions,
expressions of pain, and – as distraction – expressions of disgust. The
study is designed as a learning experiment that allows us to attribute
accuracy to general knowledge about pain expressions, familarity with
the shown person, and knowledge about the individual pain expression
of the person shown.
For the second aim the facial expressions are encoded as Action Units
(AU). The temporal patterns of AU beginning and endings are analysed.
In general this kind of learning is challenging as only positive examples
(in a narrow meaning) are available. In a first study we tried to form
a context-free grammar from the beginnings using the ABL framework
of van Zaanen [2]. The results are promissing yet disappointing. Jus-
ing clustering methods we could identify related patterns. However,
the grammars contain too many rules to be comprehensible. In further
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studies I will try different approaches to the grammar induction (evo-
lutionary algorithms) and also adhere to the endings of the AUs. Also
context-sensitive grammars might pose a more natural representation
of expression generation rules.
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Building a Hierarchy of Functional
Representations for Domain-Independent
Reinforcement Learning in Non-Markovian
Environments
Mark Wernsdorfer
Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Science, University of Bamberg
This project explores dependencies between specific ways of represent-
ing sensomotoric data, identifying its functional role and in how far it
enables inferring appropriate conclusions about different rewarding en-
vironments. Following the initial proposal of Harnad (1990), a hybrid
architecture has been designed that consists of a sub-symbolic and a
symbolic layer. The project is motivated by the assumption that symbols
need not be grounded in communication, but can also be exclusively
mental in nature. Therefore it differs from other research in Symbol
Grounding like Steels (1999) where a community of artificial speakers
tries to agree upon a common dictionary for designating objects. Fur-
thermore, the motivation for grounding is not consensus but reward in a
continuous environment. Successful interaction with different reward-
ing environments can be approached by Temporal Difference Learning
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). But optimality of this method is limited to envi-
ronments where the agent’s sensorimotor states are dependent only on
the frequency of previously experienced states (Markov assumption).
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This does not hold for interaction with natural environments. There-
fore different inductive biases besides probability have been examined
(sequentiality, hierarchical structure and functional role of input data).
Inductive transfer is the problem of how obtained knowledge from
one domain may be reused in a significantly different domain (e.g. Pan
and Yang (2010)). By subsuming representations according to function
rather than structural features, knowledge from structurally different
domains can be interchanged. In future research, inductive transfer
promises to be a fertile field for determining whether symbols have
been grounded “the right way.” Function centered representations also
connect to research in modeling affordances and designing according
algorithms (Rome, Hertzberg, & Dorffner, 2008).
The system’s modules have been identified. Algorithms for initial
partitioning of sensorimotor space have been determined. Also several
different Markov predictors have been modified to produce hierarchi-
cal representations on different levels of generalization. Hierarchisation
of representations, however, has not yet overcome the probabilistic lim-
itation of Markov predictors. Alternatives like L* (Angluin, 1980) and
Stochastic Context Free Grammars are being investigated for applicabil-
ity.
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Computational Exploration of the Structure of
Spatial Representations in Humans
Rasmus Wienemann
SFB/TR 8 Cognitive Systems, Universität Bremen
What is the inherent structure of mental spatial representations? Are
they pseudo-pictoral, inspected before the mind’s eye (e.g. Kosslyn et
al., 2006)? But spatial need not be visual (Johnson-Laird, 1989) and
vice versa: Most visual information is not spatial at all nor need spa-
tial information be visual. Schultheis et al. (2007) have argued against
a dichotomous distinction between spatial and visual, though, and pro-
posed a continuous scale between the two extremes. Within the frame-
work of Casimir, a cognitive architecture for spatial knowledge process-
ing (Schultheis & Barkowsky, 2011), my doctoral research will explore
which differences in information content constitute changes on this con-
tinuum and what information humans represent.
Spatial cognition is a necessity for an intelligent, moving organism,
so pervasive that spatial metaphors and analogies are used in human
reasoning. Understanding the structure of the formed representations
will advance the understanding of spatial cognition.
After extensive study of the literature I have designed the first exper-
iment and will start collecting data within the next month. With the ex-
periment I will investigate which knowledge types (e.g. dis- tance, ori-
entation) are (implicitly) included in mental representations of spatial
configurations of abstract entities. This is the first experiment investi-
gating wether a positive correlation between the number of represented
knowledge types and the visuality of the representation exists.
To study these elusive processes a novel methodology will be used
utilizing analogies. Analogies can be formalized using the Structure
Mapping Engine (e.g. Falkenhainer et al., 1989). This allows for objec-
tive mapping from mental representations of an abstract domain to a
non-spatial domain sensitive to the structure of the spatial representa-
tion. Thus providing means to study the mental representation without
implying a visual or non-visual interpretation of it. I intend to present
the results of the first experiment at the doctoral consortium.
The approach with an established formalization enables us to analyze
the requirements of spatial representations as well as make predictions
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of what effect the presence or absence of knowledge types has. This will
help advance Casimir and also provide a first step towards automated
assistive technology (e.g. in architecture, CAD, wayfinding).
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A Mereotopological Theory for the Unity of
Consciousness
Wanja Wiese
Johannes Guttenberg-Universität Mainz
Problem description and motivation
Mereotopologies are formal theories that define mereological and topo-
logical notions and relations between them in an axiomatic way (see
Casati and Varzi 1999). Although it is common in philosophical ac-
counts of the unity of consciousness to use mereological and topolog-
ical notions like parthood, overlap, continuity or connectedness, it is
uncommon to apply mereotopological theories explicitly and in a rigor-
ous way. With my dissertation, I seek to occupy this niche and show that
a mereotopological treatment of the unity of consciousness can promote
the discussion in at least two ways:
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1. Mereotopology can help formulate philosophical accounts in a
clearer and more systematic manner, as well as open paths to new,
conceptually coherent accounts;
2. Mereotopology can be used to formulate bridging principles be-
tween different levels of description. My goal is to show how
mereotopological axioms can be applied to the phenomenological,
representational, functional, informational-computational, and
neurobiological level of description. A mereotopological theory
that can meaningfully be applied to all these levels can thus be
used as a tool to integrate research programs operating on differ-
ent levels of description. This will hopefully also promote inter-
disciplinary research on consciousness in general.
Progress made to date
So far, I have started analyzing phenomenological descriptions of the
unity of consciousness in terms of mereological and topological notions
and have begun to provide a representationalist reading of those no-
tions. This work has partly been conducted in cooperation with my su-
pervisor Thomas Metzinger (see Wiese and Metzinger (forthcoming)).
Two main conclusions drawn by us are that
1. the talk of “temporal parts” that is ubiquitous in discussions of the
continuity of consciousness is questionable;
2. some aspects of the unity of consciousness can be captured by the
notion of a self- embedding, which can be analyzed on the repre-
sentational level by alluding to meta- representational processes
and what we call the “Principle of Globalization by Representa-
tional Fusion” (PGRF).
Proposed plan of further research
The next steps in my dissertation project will include:
• a comprehensive formulation of a mereotoplogical theory that can
be applied to the domain of conscious experience;
• a more detailed analysis of mereological and topological notions
on the representational level of description, including an account
of (subpersonal) meta-representation;
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• a formulation of desiderata for research on the informational-com-
putational and neurobiological level to enable the application of
mereotopology to these domains.
References
Casati, R., and Varzi, A.C. (1999). Parts and places: The structures of spatial representa-
tion. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Wiese, W., and Metzinger, T. (forthcoming). Desiderata for a mereotopological theory
of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness.
In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, and N. Zach (eds.), Being in Time. Dynamical models of
phenomenal experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Tutorials
56 TUTORIALS
Human-Computer Interaction: Concepts,
Methods, Tools
Tom Gross and Christoph Beckmann
Human-Computer Interaction Group, University of Bamberg
Aim
The aim of this tutorial is to present basic concepts and paradigms of
Human-Computer Intearction (HCI) as well as its design principles and
prototypes. The primary focus is on concepts, methods, and tools for the
design, the implementation, and the evaluation of interactive systems.
Contents
In particular the following areas are covered: introduction and basic
concepts; human factors and technological factors; interaction, design,
and prototyping; as well as evaluation and usabililty. In evaluation and
usability participants will get hands-on experience to empirical meth-
ods and eyetracking.
Instructors
Dr. Tom Gross is full professor and chair of Human-Computer Inter-
action at the Faculty of Information Systems and Applied Computer
Science of the University of Bamberg, Germany. He also heads the Co-
operative Media Lab. Christoph Beckmann is a senior researcher in the
group. Further information on the research and teaching of the instruc-
tors can be found at: http://cmlab.de/.
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Die Kognitive Architektur ACT-R
Marco Ragni
Universität Freiburg
Kognitive Modellierung ist die Algorithmisierung psychologischer Theo-
rien. Das Ziel ist es, neben der Identifikation von Widersprüchen in
psychologischen Theorien, ein algorithmisches und zugleich psycho-
logisch fundiertes Erklärungsmodell zu entwickeln, welches die präzi-
se Reproduktion empirischer Ergebnisse (Reaktionszeiten und Fehler-
raten) und auch die Vorhersage aufgabenspezifischer Gehirnaktivatio-
nen (aus fMRT-Untersuchungen) gestattet. In diesem Tutorial wird da-
bei die kognitive Architektur ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson,
2007) vorgestellt. ACT-R ist ein Produktionsregelsystem und zugleich
eine hybride Theorie (mit symbolischen und subsymbolischen Elemen-
ten) menschlicher Kognition. Die Architektur umfasst eine Reihe von
Grundannahmen, die es erlauben kognitive Phänomene verschiedener
Bereiche zu modellieren. Die einzelnen Elemente (sogenannte Modu-
le) sind dabei psychologisch fundiert und schränken zugleich mögliche
kognitive Modelle sinnvoll ein. Anwendungen reichen dabei von ko-
gnitionspsychologischen Modellen des Lernens und Gedächtnisses, des
Problemlösens, der Wahrnehmung, der Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung, bis
hin zur Mensch-Computer-Interaktion (HCI).
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Modeling Motivational Dynamics with
Psi/MicroPsi
Joscha Bach1 and Dietrich Dörner2
1 HU Berlin
2 Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg
The Psi theory (Dörner 1999, Dörner et al. 2002) contributes to a gen-
eral understanding of the principles of cognition. Specifically, it ex-
plains how a finite set of physiological, social and cognitive demands
can be functionally specified and lead to the observable heterogeneity
and dynamism that characterizes human intentions, goals and decision
making. It details the emergence of affective states and emotion, and
their integration into perceptual, anticipatory, reflective, deliberative
processes and so on. Thereby, the Psi theory defines constraints and
principles for a cognitive architecture with respect to motivational con-
trol, affective modulation, perception, mental representation and gen-
eral organizational principles. MicroPsi (Bach 2009) is an implementa-
tion of the Psi theory as an AI architecture. It offers of a simulator for
spreading activation networks that represent semantic content and are
grounded in sensory input and actuator output. MicroPsi agents are
situated in dynamic simulation environments and implement a moti-
vational system with a set of physiological, social and cognitive drives,
and have been applied for experiments in affective computing, catego-
rization and multi-agent interaction.
The tutorial will give an overview over the general principles and
core assumptions of the Psi theory, and introduce our implementation
approaches, which can either be directly used, or adapted for other com-
putational models of autonomous behavior, affective modulation and
grounded representation.
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Towards a Computational Cognitive Model of
Concept Blending
Ahmed Abdel-Fattah, K.-U. Kühnberger, H. Gust, U. Krumnack,
T. R. Besold, and M. Schmidt
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück
Concept blending (CB) has been proposed as a powerful mechanism
that facilitates the creation of new concepts by a constrained integration
of available knowledge. As a framework, CB proved its importance in
expressing and explaining cognitive phenomena, such as counterfactual
reasoning, metaphor-making, as well as creating new theories. How-
ever, there is no general computational account of blending, as of yet,
that has proven powerful enough to cover all the examples from the
literature. The well-known optimality principles of CB raise another
sort of challenge: these principles are the guideline pressures that are
assumed to derive the generation of a feasible blend and distinguish
good blends from bad ones. Only very few accounts have been given
to formalize such principles, though they are not broad enough to suit
generic computational accounts of CB (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).
We present a logic-based framework for CB. The framework is based
on HDTP, which is a powerful analogy making system for computing
analogical relations between two domains axiomatized in first-order
logic (Schwering et al., 2009). The motivation and background needed
for our approach are provided, along with an overview of CB and an
exploration of its applicability in settings as diverse as mathematical
domain formation, classical rationality puzzles, and noun-noun com-
pounds. We also explain how CB is an essential cognitive mechanism
for productivity and is related to creativity abilities of natural cognitive
agents (Martinez et al., 2011).
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The Contextual Planning Effect: Memory
Processing in Visuospatial Problem Solving
Rebecca Albrecht and Marco Ragni
Center for Cognitive Science, University of Freiburg
The Tower of London (ToL) task is a powerful tool to assess human plan-
ning abilities (Shallice, 1982). ToL is a disk manipulation task, where a
given goal state has to be reached by applying operations sequentially
on an initial state. A state consists of three pegs and three disks; the al-
lowed operation is to move an unblocked disk from one peg to another.
Typically, it is not allowed to move disks during the planning process,
i.e. changes to the initial state have to be performed mentally. The num-
ber of moves necessary to reach a goal state correlates with planning
time and error rates. This effect has been explained by limited work-
ing memory capacity (Phillips et al., 2001). We extend this theory to
explain human planning performance on fine-grained task differences.
We show that not only the total number of moves but also the visually
observable context of a disk has an impact on internal memory process-
ing. Context describes the position of a disk relative to the positions of
the other disks in one state. The similarity between the configuration
of the initial state and the goal state influences the ability to recall the
target location and the intermediate location of a disk during the plan-
ning process. We present an ACT-R (Anderson et al, 2004) model, which
explains effects on planning time and eye-movement patterns for eight
different problems within the category of three-move problems (Kaller
et al., 2010). Context is realized by using spreading activation. Based on
relations between disks recognized during the planning process, disks
occurring in similar configurations are recalled more easily. This expla-
nation yields a deeper understanding on internal memory processing of
visually presented tasks and their properties.
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Linearization Processes during Language
Production: A Case Study of Object Pronouns
in German
Markus Bader, Sascha Dümig, and Friederike Kops
Department of Linguistics, Goethe-University Frankfurt
We present a corpus study and three experiments that have jointly ex-
amined the linearization of arguments during natural language produc-
tion. Our major question is how non-grammatical factors like weight
interact with grammatical factors like animacy and definiteness.
The particular phenomenon under investigation is the placement of
object pronouns in German embedded clauses. Like other objects, ob-
ject pronouns can precede or follow the subject (“. . . dass der Opa ihn
besucht” – lit. ‘that the grandpa him visits’ vs. “. . . dass ihn der Opa
besucht” - lit. ‘that him the grandpa visits’). Prior corpus studies reveal
that the placement of definite objects is almost exclusively determined
by animacy (‘animate before inanimate’) (Bader & Häussler, 2009). For
pronouns, more factors seem to be involved (Heylen, 2006). However,
Heylen’s study analyzed only 179 personal pronouns and did not in-
clude definiteness as a factor.
To overcome these shortcomings, we analyzed about 3000 embedded
clauses with object pronoun from the deWac corpus (Baroni et al., 2009).
Overall, the object occurred in front of the subject in ca. 63% of all
cases, which is about ten times higher than for definite objects. A lo-
gistic regression analysis shows that the order of object pronoun and
non-pronominal subject is mainly a function of the subject’s animacy,
modulated by the subject’s weight and definiteness.
In three production experiments, participants first read a sentence
(e.g., “Der Opa besucht den Lehrer” – ‘Grandpa will visit the teacher’).
After a visual prompt with a main clause (“Der Lehrer sagt” – ‘The
teacher says’), the initial main clause had to be orally repeated from
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memory in form of an embedded clause (‘dass ihn der Opa besucht’).
The first factor in all experiments was the order of subject and object
within the sentence to be transformed. In two experiments with ani-
mate agents as subject, subject-object order was strongly preferred. In
a third experiment with inanimate theme subject, object-subject order
was strongly preferred. Additional factors (weight and definiteness of
the subject) had only small effects.
Corpus and experimental results converge on the conclusion that word
order is mainly determined by the animacy constraint, with weight and
definiteness also having important effects. We use our results for evalu-
ating current two-stage accounts of syntactic production, asking whether
the strict separation of syntactic-function assignment and linearization
can be upheld.
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The Missing-VP Effect in German: Evidence for
Shared Production and Comprehension
Mechanisms
Markus Bader1 and Jana Häussler2
1 Department of Linguistics, Goethe-University Frankfurt
2 Department of Linguistics, University of Potsdam
Ever since Chomsky & Miller (1963), multiple center-embedding (“The
rat the cat the dog chased killed ate the malt.”) has played a pivotal
role for theories of sentence complexity. A special phenomenon in this
regard is the so-called missing-VP effect: sentences in which the VP of
the higher relative clause is missing (“The patient the nurse the clinic
had hired met Jack.”; Frazier, 1985) are often perceived as grammatical.
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While the missing-VP effect is well-established for VO-languages, Va-
sishth et al. (2010) presented evidence indicating that it does not occur
in the OV language German.
In our presentation, we review data from comprehension experiments
and a corpus study that have investigated German sentences with mul-
tiple center-embedded relative clauses, focusing in particular on the
missing-VP effect. A corpus analysis of the deWac corpus (Baroni et
al., 2009) revealed 352 instances of embedded clauses containing a dou-
bly center-embedded relative clause. In ca. 16% of these sentences, the
VP of the higher relative clause was missing, as in Frazier’s original ex-
ample. This shows that, as far as the OV language German is concerned,
the missing-VP effect occurs in language production.
Several reading experiments lead to the same conclusion for language
comprehension. In experiments using speeded-grammaticality judg-
ments, sentences with doubly center-embedded relative clauses in which
the VP of the higher relative clause was missing were judged as gram-
matical at a rate of 40–60%. When the relative clauses were extraposed
into a sentence-final position, in contrast, sentences with a missing VP
were rejected as ungrammatical with high reliability. In a self-paced
reading experiment, the final VP of missing VP sentences was read some-
what faster than the final VP of complete sentences, indicating that read-
ers did not notice the ungrammaticality caused by the missing VP.
In sum, our data show that the missing-VP effect occurs in German,
an OV-language, too. Since this is true for both language production
and comprehension, it points to shared resources underlying language
production and comprehension. We will discuss our findings with re-
gard to current theories of working memory constraints on language
processing. With regard to Vasith et al’s finding of no missing-VP effect
in German, we will present evidence showing that this is due to stimu-
lus differences concerning the position of the doubly center-embedded
relative clause within its superordinate clause.
References
Baroni,Marco, Silvia Bernardini, Adriano Ferraresi & Eros Zanchetta. 2009. The WaCk-
yWide Web: A collection of very large linguistically processed web-crawled corpora.
Language Resources and Evaluation Journal 23(3). 209–226.
Chomsky, Noam & George A. Miller. 1963. Introduction to the formal analysis of natural
languages. In R. Duncan Luce, Robert R. Bush & Eugene Galanter (eds.), Handbook of
mathematical psychology. Vol. II, 269–321. New York, London & Sidney:Wiley.
TALKS 65
Frazier, Lyn. 1985. Syntactic complexity. In David R. Dowty, Laurie Karttunen & Arnold
Zwicky (eds.), Natural language parsing. Psychological, computational and theoreti-
cal perspectives, 129–189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vasishth, Shravan, Katja Suckow, Richard L. Lewis & Sabine Kern. 2010. Short-term
forgetting in sentence comprehension: Crosslinguistic evidence from verb-final struc-
tures. Language and Cognitive Processes 25(4). 533–567.
Moral Aspects in Mental Models of Risk
Perception
Claudia Bassarak1, Hans-Rüdiger Pfister1, and Gisela Böhm2
1 Leuphana University Lueneburg
2 University Bergen
Our research is concerned with mental models of risk perception. We
draw on the psychometric paradigm for studying risk perception (cf.
Slovic, 1987). The traditional approach of the psychometric paradigm
presents a multitude of potentially hazardous technologies, substances
or activities to study participants. Then, participants evaluate each of
these risks with respect to several risk characteristics such as voluntari-
ness, controllability or knowledge of possible consequences, resulting
in a questionnaire of risks being fully crossed with evaluations. Subse-
quent principal component analysis of aggregated data usually yields
two underlying factors of people’s risk perception that relate to the dread-
fulness and the novelty of a risk. We expand the psychometric paradigm
regarding two aspects. First, we consider moral aspects of people’s risk
perception. Second, we explore the sample of presented risks and sub-
categorize it. In sum, we add morality-related risk characteristics plus
moral judgment items and we subcategorize the sample of presented
risks according to their perceived fragility of scientific evidence.
We assume that morality-related risk characteristics and moral judg-
ment relate to each other. Furthermore, we hypothesize that risk-related
moral emotions, moral judgments and epistemic judgments of presented
risks are interrelated. We expect moral judgment to predict epistemic
judgment, particularly regarding risks with high perceived fragility of
scientific evidence.
Principal component analyses show that morality-related risk charac-
teristics and moral judgment contribute to the explanation of the same
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principal component, albeit not composing a separate dimension within
the mental model of risk perception, when all risk items are considered.
However, regarding risks with low perceived fragility of evidence (i.e.
unambiguous risk items) a separate morality dimension can be found.
Multilevel regression analyses treating risks and individuals as ran-
dom effects indicate that in general moral emotions significantly predict
moral judgment. Furthermore, moral judgment significantly predicts
epistemic judgment, with fragility serving as a binary moderator vari-
able. If risks are perceived as reprehensible, they are judged more risky.
This effect attenuates when perceived fragility of evidence is low.
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Gestural Alignment in Human-Human and
Human-Machine Dialogue
Kirsten Bergmann and Stefan Kopp
AG “Sociable Agents”, SFB 673, CITEC, Technische Fakultät, Universität
Bielefeld
A well-known phenomenon in natural interaction is that speakers adapt
their linguistic and nonverbal behaviors. Research on gestural align-
ment is, however, still in its early stages based on evidence from experi-
mental settings in human-human communication (e.g. Holler & Wilkin
2011, Mol et al. 2012). We report complementary evidence from two
different studies of gestural alignment in dialogues with humans and
virtual agents.
First, we present a systematic analysis of gesture form convergence
in natural human-human dialogues based on a large sample of data
(4449 iconic/deictic co-speech gestures; Bergmann & Kopp 2012). Here,
we found evidence for gestural alignment, but not all gesture features
are subject to the alignment effect. While some form features like wrist
movement and “finger orientation seem resistant to these contingencies,
we found that the use of particular gestural representation techniques as
well as the gesture form features handshape, handedness and palm ori-
entation are significantly subject to inter-speaker convergence effects. In
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a detailed analysis of those sensitive features we further address ques-
tions of how gestural alignment depends on the temporal distance be-
tween gestures, and whether intra-speaker or inter-speaker influences
on gesture form are stronger.
Second, we are currently concerned with a study to test whether ges-
tural alignment also takes place in interaction between humans and vir-
tual agents: Participants are engaged in a communication game with
a virtual agent in which tangram figures have to be explained to one
another. In a between-subject design the virtual agent uses different
variations of gesturing behavior whereby particular gesture features are
systematically manipulated (e.g. two-handed vs. one-handed gestures).
We present and discuss our results regarding the question to which de-
gree humans adopt their own gestural behavior to the gestures used by
virtual agents.
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Cognitivizing Turing’s Test
T. R. Besold
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück
tbesold@uni-osnabrueck.de
Initially, I discuss and compare the two main interpretations of the Tur-
ing Test (Turing, 1950), namely the “Standard Turing Test” and the “Orig-
inal Imitation Game Test” (Sterret, 2003), also outlining why the latter is
a by far more meaningful and suitable test for machine intelligence.
Against this background, a proposal for the cognitively-inspired Sub-
Turing decomposition (Besold, 2012) of the Turing Test into smaller sub-
tasks is reproduced. This decomposition, in a form of division of labor
between different AI subfields and research programs, formulates four
intermediate subtasks solutions of which can be considered condiciones
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sine quibus non on the way to successfully passing the overall Turing
Test: human language understanding, human language production, hu-
man rationality and human creativity.
This decomposition follows the idea that human intelligence is closely
connected to actual cognition, rendering human-style intelligent behav-
ior an emergent phenomenon on the basis of a set of cognitive capaci-
ties.
Subsequently, in accordance with this paradigm, initial ideas and sug-
gestions for how to address two of the subtasks (namely the rationality
and the creativity task) on system level are sketched: Proposed meth-
ods for solving these tasks include models for computational analogy-
making and conceptual blending.
Finally, on a more meta-theoretical level, two important conceptual
questions concerning the status and implications of the SubTuring tasks
are addressed. Firstly, in order to clarify the status of the SubTuring de-
composition itself, the difference between the original Turing Test and
the decomposition is considered. Secondly, reflections on what the con-
sequences a failure in any of the SubTuring tasks would have for the
overall endeavor of general artificial intelligence are given.
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An Ecological Rationality Multiverse
T. R. Besold, K.-U. Kühnberger, U. Krumnack, H. Gust, M. Schmidt,
and A. Abdel-Fattah
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück
tbesold@uni-osnabrueck.de
We argue for a new view on and an approach to rationality as a concept
of study and modeling paradigm of human behavior.
Traditional (normative) approaches to rationality, decision-making,
and rational behavior, namely logic-based, probability-based, game theory-
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based, and heuristics-based theories and frameworks, all by themselves
exhibit shortcomings and disadvantages: Classical logic-based and pro-
bability-based models of rationality struggle with findings from experi-
ments such as the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966) or the Linda prob-
lem (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1983), game theory offers a plethora of dis-
tinct equilibrium and solution concepts, possibly defining very different
notions of rationality, and the “heuristics toolbox” as a theory suffers
from severe meta-methodological drawbacks (e.g. a tendency towards
apodicticity due to its open nature).
Therefore, continuing work started in (Besold & Kühnberger, 2012),
we present cornerstones of a positive, integrative, and holistic concep-
tion of frameworks for rationality and related cognitive capacities: Sub-
ject-centricity (i.e. integration of subject-related properties and constrain-
ts), a positive predictive nature of theories, realized in holistic and inte-
grative models (i.e. without a priori commitment to one single formal-
ism).
Finally, we show close connections of our approach to many of the
ideas and insights underlying the notion of “ecological rationality” (Ries-
kamp & Reimer, 2007), proposing analogy as one possible mechanism of
linking cognition and environment, i.e. as one of the driving forces un-
derlying the alleged adaption of the reasoning process to the reasoner’s
context and surroundings.
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Dative Alternation in English as a Second
Language
Katja Böer
Universität Kassel
Dative alternation as displayed in (1) has been widely researched in the
language of native speakers of English (cf. among others Collins, 1995;
Bresnan et al., 2007; Bresnan & Ford, 2010).
(1)a. The young man gives the white flowersNP to his girlfriendPP.
[PP-Dative]
(1)b. The young man gives his girlfriendNP the white flowersNP.
[NP-Dative]
Factors like length, animacy, pronominality of theme and recipient,
respectively and the type of dative verbs govern the speaker’s choice
(cf. among many others Bresnan & Ford, 2010). Dative verbs are known
to bias the probability for a certain structure to occur in the one or other
direction, cf. Wasow (1997, 2002).
As of now, there are only few studies available which systematically
investigate the factors that govern dative alternation, i.e., the influence
of lexical and processing factors, for second language learners. Among
them is Mazukrevich (1984), whose results indicate that learners have a
general tendency to choose the PP-Dative over the NP-Dative, probably
since the former is easier to process. Further studies have shown that
French (Hawkins, 1987) and German (Führer, 2009) learners of English
are influenced by the same lexical bias as native speakers of English.
These studies imply that the acquisition of the dative alternation is gov-
ern by factors which are independent of the L1. However, up to now
no study has investigated the acquisition of the lexical bias for learners
whose native languages differ typologically and the processing factors
involved in the alternation.
This paper investigates the interplay of processing and lexical infor-
mation and the role of this interplay in the choice of particular syntactic
constructions. I hypothesize that verb bias is acquired by all learners,
irrespective of their L1, and, that this bias can easily be overridden by
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processing factors, which indicates that processing factors are more rel-
evant in the interlanguage than lexical ones.
To test this three studies are conducted, the first of which is based on
the ICLE corpus, a collection of English essays written by English learn-
ers speaking 16 different L1s. Here, sentences containing dative verbs
of both biases, produced by speakers of different L1s, are investigated.
The objective of the second study is to test Bresnan & Ford’s (2010)
stimuli on L2 speakers of English. Participants are asked to read a short
text passage followed by two dative structures and decide which struc-
ture seemed more natural to them. A first analysis of exploratory data
indicates that learners prefer structures which are easier to process to
those which are in line with lexical constraints, i.e. a verb biasing the
NP-Dative will nonetheless be preferred in the PP-structure if this en-
sures a long constituent occurring after a short one. This effect seems to
be much stronger than it is the case for L1 speakers.
A third experiment, a continuous lexical decision task is employed
in which the prepositional dative structures of the items above are read
word by word. The results are collected to validate the results of the
questionnaire study and give evidence that the observed effects are in-
deed a reflection of online mechanisms.
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Two Processes in Action Prediction as
Dissociated using (Non-)Human Movement
Kinematics
Simone Brandstädter1, Anne Springer2, and Waltraud Stadler3
1 Department of Work and Organizational Psychology,
University of Heidelberg
2 Department of Sport and Exercise Psychology, University of Potsdam
3 Department of Sports and Health Science, Technische Universität München
Previous research suggests that predicting another individuals action
during occlusion may involve two processes, real-time simulation (i.e.,
dynamic updating) and matching recently perceived action images (i.e.,
static matching) (Springer & Prinz, 2010). Here, we tested the impact of
movement kinematics on action prediction accuracy.
Our participants watched every-day actions performed by a point-
light actor animated with human movements (natural condition) or ar-
tificial movements that were more uniform regarding velocity profiles
and trajectories (artificial condition). The actions were briefly occluded
and then followed by a static test pose. Participants judged whether
or not this test pose depicted a coherent continuation of the previously
seen action. We independently manipulated the duration of the occlu-
sion and the temporal advance of the test pose relative to occlusion on-
set. This paradigm allows the assessment of real-time simulation and
static matching by comparing the prediction performances of different
combinations of occluder duration and test pose advance.
Consistent with our expectations, in the natural condition, perfor-
mance decreased with increasing temporal incoherence among occluder
duration and test pose advance, indicating evidence of real-time simu-
lation. In contrast, in the artificial condition, performance decreased
with increasing test pose advances (i.e. decreasing postural similarity),
revealing evidence of static matching. These results support the notion
that internal action prediction involves two processes, dynamic simula-
tion and static matching. Their relative contribution seems to depend on
stimulus-inherent factors like the velocity profile in the observed move-
ment. Results will be discussed with respect to recent research on the
neural correlates of action simulation, indicating that action prediction
involves sensorimotor representations of action (Stadler et al., 2011).
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Minimal Changes in Spatial Belief Revision
Leandra Bucher, Jelica Nejasmic, and Markus Knauff
Justus Liebig University Giessen
{leandra.bucher, jelica.nejasmic,
markus.knauff}@psychol.uni-giessen.de
Humans frequently need to change their minds in the light of infor-
mation that contradicts an existing set of beliefs. This process includes
decisions about which belief to retract and which one to retain. In the
spatial domain, this process is accomplished by the variation of spatial
mental models. Usually there are several alternatives for model varia-
tion to re-establish consistency and these alternatives are often logically
equivalent. Nevertheless, human reasoners show clear preferences for
certain alternatives. We report a series of response-time and drawing
experiments, in which the participants had to sketch models and then
to revise these sketches in order to consider a contradicting fact. With
these experiments, we tested whether these preferences result from the
principle of “minimal change”, which implies that as much as possible
of the initially existing model is maintained in the revised model. We
also tested whether the number of objects that must be changed affects
the revision process. Our results suggest that spatial belief revision fol-
lows the minimal change principle, whereas we did not find evidence
for the influence of the number of objects. We discuss these results in
the context of model-based theories of belief revision.
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A Model for Context-sensitive Interpretation of
Communicative Feedback
Hendrik Buschmeier and Stefan Kopp
Sociable Agents Group, CITEC and Faculty of Technology, Bielefeld University
hbuschme@uni-bielefeld.de
A prevalent and important coordination mechanism in dialogue is com-
municative ‘listener feedback’ in form of short verbal-vocal signals (e.g.,
‘uh-huh’, ‘yeah’, ‘huh’), head gestures (e.g., nodding, wiggling) or facial
expressions. Listeners’ feedback signals are indications of their cogni-
tive state and communicate whether listeners and speakers are in con-
tact, whether listeners perceive, understand and accept the speakers’
utterance as well as whether they agree to or which attitude they have
towards the speakers’ utterance (Allwood et al., 1992).
Feedback signals are rich in their form – enabling a fine-grained ex-
pression of subtle differences in meaning –, multi-functional, and in-
teract heavily with their dialogue context. Consequentially, feedback
is only conventionalised to a certain degree. Speakers are nevertheless
able to interpret communicative feedback, use it to reason about the lis-
tener’s cognitive state as well as their common ground, and adapt their
language accordingly (Clark, 1996).
Our objective is to model this ability of human speakers for artifi-
cial conversational agents (e.g., dialogue systems, embodied conversa-
tional agents), making them attentive to their users’ needs as expressed
in their feedback behaviour (Buschmeier & Kopp, 2011).
Here we present an agent-centric cognitive model for the interpreta-
tion of feedback signals in their dialogue context. It uses features of
the feedback behaviour observed by the agent as well as the agent’s ut-
terance, expectations and knowledge about the task to reason about an
‘attributed listener state’ (ALS; the agent’s reconstruction of the user’s
cognitive state) and the grounding status of information. Using the
framework of Bayesian networks, the model represents ALS and com-
mon ground probabilistically in terms of degrees of belief. Because of
this, it is straightforward to deal with the uncertainties inherent in the
observations, the form-meaning relation of a feedback signal and the
user’s behaviour.
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The Revision of Spatial Mental Models – Does
Distance Matter?
Stefan Czoschke, Leandra Bucher, Jelica Nejasmic, and Markus Knauff
Justus-Liebig Universität Gießen
The revision of mental representations is necessary whenever reason-
ers encounter conflicting, yet trustworthy information. The aim of such
a revision process is to regain consistency of the mental representa-
tion with the new information about the state of affairs. In the spatial
domain it is assumed that resolving such a conflict of information by
reestablishing consistency is achieved by modification of the initially
held spatial representation. Little is known about the nature of this
modification process. Even though a great deal of research has been
concerned with the construction and inspection of mental representa-
tions in the spatial domain, there is basically no research investigating
the processes underlying the revision of such representations. The aim
of our research is to present a first insight into these processes. In our ex-
periments we operationalize “revision” as the relocation of an object in
a given spatial layout. After learning a visually presented linear spatial
layout of different objects (e.g. peach – pear – kiwi – apple) participants
get a verbal piece of information about the spatial relation of two of
the layout’s objects (e.g., the kiwi is to the left of the peach) that is in-
consistent with the arrangement of the objects in the initial layout. The
participants’ task is to integrate the new information by modifying the
initial layout so that a revised layout, consistent with the verbal infor-
mation, results (e.g., kiwi – peach – pear – apple). This paradigm allows
us to systematically vary certain aspects of the task, such as the distance
the to-be-relocated object has to be “moved” within the layout as well
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as its initial and final position. In line with the spatial mental models
theory and the embodied cognition framework we assume that the re-
vision is based on a mental model that is spatial in nature and relies on
an actual movement-like variation process. Thus the mental process is
assumed to reflect a time-distance relationship resembling the physical
moving of an object (i.e. the further an object has to be moved from its
initial to its final position the longer the process takes). We will present
a first process-oriented description of the revision of mental models and
some future research directions.
Evolutionary Psychology and Massive
Modularity
Malte Dahlgrün
Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
The idea that the human mind is pervasively modular is widely re-
garded as a signature thesis of evolutionary psychology (EP). It is some-
times called the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH). In the first part
of this talk, I will distinguish and answer a variety of arguments that
have been levelled against the MMH from different disciplines in the
past two decades.
More often than not, these arguments misconstrue their target. Many
critiques of the MMH have rested on identifying EP’s notion of modu-
larity with the narrow notion of reflex-like mechanisms developed by
Fodor (1983) for perceptual input systems. This is an easily demolished
strawman when it comes to the entire mind. A generalized commit-
ment to such modules makes no evolutionary sense, nor is it suggested
by the writings of leading evolutionary psychologists such as Tooby,
Cosmides, Buss, and their academic progeny.
The most interesting challenge to actually existing statements of MMH
lies in charges of triviality recently voiced by philosophers such as J.
Prinz, R. Samuels, or Fodor. Statements of the MMH from within EP
tend to be extremely broad, requiring little more than functional spe-
cialization. This raises a question: Does the MMH endorsed by EP form
an interesting and distinctive thesis at all, or does it merely reflect a sci-
entifically uncontroversial commitment to functional decomposition?
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This question sets the agenda for the second part of the talk. I will
claim that EP does harbour a distinctive, interestingly modularist view
of the mind, and that evolutionary psychologists have merely neglected
to spell it out appropriately. The modules characteristic of EP are
(i) domain-specific in an ecological sense that goes beyond functional
specialization simpliciter and (ii) developmentally channelled.
Both features will be illustrated and related to the debate on EP and
modularity. I will argue that deliberate eschewals of developmental
canalization in defining EP-modularity are not well-motivated. They
are in fact incompatible with the fundamental commitments of EP.
Assigning Plausibilities to Probabilistic
Representations for Information Selection
Stephan Ehrenfeld1, Andreas Alin1, Jannik Fritsch2, and
Martin V. Butz1
1 Cognitive Modeling, Computer Science, University of Tübingen
2 Honda Research Institute
Both humans and robots typically perceive information about their body
and the environment from multiple sensory modalities. Additionally,
internal state estimates are maintained. Information from one modal-
ity is typically transferred to another modality using knowledge about
the body schema to infer current reference frame relations. In this way,
multiple sources of information can be combined effectively. If the data
from different sources of information deviate significantly, however, the
integration of these partially contradicting representations poses a big
challenge. The sensor contradictions may stem from sensor errors, body
schema errors, or contradicting behavioral forward models. To cope
with this challenge, we present a plausibility measure that can estimate
the accordance of one representation in comparison with all others.
As both humans and robots face high uncertainty due to sensory
noise, motor noise, and model uncertainty, it is crucial for them to rep-
resent their states in a probabilistic way. Accumulating evidence sug-
gests that the current body state and the environment are represented
probabilistically by means of distributed population codes in the human
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brain. Robots typically use probabilistic representations with closed-
form probability distributions, such as Gaussians. Using either of those
probabilistic representations, the states can be easily maintained over
time by adding a forward model and applying a Kalman filter approxi-
mation.
In this work we use both Kalman filtering and probabilistic popula-
tion codes in two different tasks: Simulated arm tracking and simulated
automotive tracking, where we encode spatial uncertainty with respect
to different modular modality frames or for alternative behavioral pat-
terns, respectively. The resulting competing state estimations are then
exploited to infer a measure of accordance with respect to all other state
estimations, which computes the plausibility that the respective infor-
mation is correct given all other information. We use the derived plau-
sibility measure to detect and adaptively avoid sensor failures or to se-
lect the most plausible behavioral pattern out of multiple possible al-
ternative behaviors, respectively. We believe that the pursued rigorous
Bayesian approach of computing plausibilities given redundant infor-
mation sources will be applicable in even more domains in the future.
Hand Motion Affects Allocation of Covert
Attention
Yariv Festman and Martin Fischer
Psychology, University of Potsdam
Background
Previous research on the interaction between manual action and visual
sensitivity has largely focused on the effects of static hand postures (e.g.,
Abrams et al., 2008) or of hand movement planning (e.g., Baldauf &
Deubel, 2010) on attention deployment. However, everyday actions ex-
tend over time and we must dynamically update our representation of
the visual world during action execution (e.g., Fischer, 1997). Here we
investigated how the positional and directional components of ongo-
ing hand movements influence deployment of covert attention. Based
on the premotor theory of attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1994), we expected
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congruency benefits from both components but had no prediction about
their time course.
Method
We combined a visually concealed hand motion with concurrent letter
discrimination. In each trial, participants moved their right hand from
the right to the left side under a display and back. Visual probes were
displayed at one of six times during each movement in the left or right
visual field. Probe discriminability was recorded after each trial and
exposure times were adjusted after each block to avoid floor or ceiling
effects. Eight healthy adults were tested in multiple sessions.
Results
We found clear effects of both hand position and hand direction on
attention deployment. Discrimination performance increased signif-
icantly with hand proximity and was better for movements towards
compared to away from the probes. A reliable interaction signaled that
the directional effect was limited to the most distal hand positions. We
found evidence for rapid modulation of attention as a function of move-
ment kinematics. These findings support the premotor theory of atten-
tion and extend our understanding of the dynamics of attention deploy-
ment for on-line action control.
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A Hierarchical View of Grounded, Embodied,
and Situated Numerical Cognition
Martin H. Fischer
Division of Cognitive Sciences, University of Potsdam
martinf@uni-potsdam.de
There is much recent interest in the idea that we represent our knowl-
edge together with the sensory and motor features that were activated
during its acquisition. This paper reviews the evidence for such embod-
iment in the domain of numerical cognition, a traditional stronghold of
abstract theories of knowledge representation. The focus is on spatial-
numerical associations, such as the SNARC effect (small numbers are as-
sociated with left space, larger numbers with right space). Using empir-
ical evidence from behavioral research, I first describe sensory and mo-
tor biases induced by SNARC, thus identifying numbers as embodied
concepts. Next, I propose a hierarchical relationship between grounded,
embodied, and situated aspects of number knowledge. This hierarchi-
cal conceptualization helps to understand the variety of SNARC-related
findings and yields testable predictions about numerical cognition. I
report several such tests, ranging from cross-cultural comparisons of
horizontal and vertical SNARC effects (Shaki & Fischer, 2012) to motor
cortical activation studies in adults with left- and right-hand counting
preferences (Tschentscher et al., 2012). It is concluded that the diagnos-
tic features for each level of the proposed hierarchical knowledge rep-
resentation, together with the spatial associations of numbers, make the
domain of numerical knowledge an ideal testing ground for embodied
cognition research.
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Comparing Automated Pain Classifiers with
Human Performance
Johannes Folger1, Michael Siebers1, Miriam Kunz2, Stefan
Lautenbacher2, and Ute Schmid1
1 Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Science, University of Bamberg
2 Physiological Psychology, Faculty Human Sciences and Education,
University of Bamberg
Facial expressions play an important role in the communication process.
They usually support the spoken words of communication partners. We
investigated the question whether facial expressions on their own are
sufficient to recognize the feelings of other persons. If this is the case, the
identification of certain emotions could be automatized. We compare
the accuracies of automated classifiers with human rater performance.
Our work is divided in two parts. The first part describes an empirical
study that examines how well subjects estimate the shown emotions of
other people. Subjects (n=60) are required to rate whether the person
shown in an image are in pain, in disgust or in a neutral state.
The second part covers the application of machine learning algorithms
(Support Vector Machines and Decision Trees) to the problem of classi-
fying facial expressions. Only two categories of expressions are con-
sidered, namely pain and disgust, in order to reduce complexity. The
selection of relevant features is based on psychological considerations
and dimensionality reduction mechanisms. We expect that machines
will outperform human raters.
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Percept Choice Dynamics of Stochastic
Self-Oscillator Model Dominates Percept
Reversal Rate Characteristics under
Periodically Interrupted Ambiguous Stimulus
Norbert Fürstenau
Inst. of Flight Guidance, German Aerospace Center
norbert.fuerstenau@dlr.de
A stochastic nonlinear dynamics model is presented which explains pub-
lished experimental results with periodically interrupted ambiguous sti-
mulus[1][2]. The model is related to the synergetic order parameter ap-
proach of Ditzinger & Haken [4] and was recently used for explaining
long range correlations of the percept reversal time series[3]. Delayed
perception state feedback via an attention control parameter (adaptive
gain) is used, which in turn is modulated through a slowly varying
bias (memory). A mapping of the perception, attention, memory (PAM)
equations to basic Thalamo-Cortical reentrant loops was suggested.
Experiments with the Necker cube with stimulus-off times toff < 1 s
exhibit a maximum of the percept reversal rate of Rmax =ca. 36 1/min
at toff =ca. 200 ms (with on-time = 300 ms) [1][2]. According to [1] for
toff > 200 ms the percept is stabilized with increasing toff due to recov-
ery from neural fatigue. Within the present model the percept choice or
stimulus-onset dynamics during the ambiguous stimulus off-on switch-
ing turns out to dominate over fatigue with increasing toff in agreement
with Noest et al.[5].
This onset dynamics is induced by the off-on switching of the stim-
ulus ambiguity parameter which correspondingly modulates the feed-
back. Onset-bifurcation of the perception state at the critical ambiguity
parameter value (percept choice) adds to the phase oscillator self- os-
cillations and to the effects of stochastic attention noise (a fluctuating
Langevin force). Numerical simulations are based on the dynamical
coupling of the behavioral PAM-variables with delayed feedback. The
toff-value at Rmax and the absolute reversal rate values are determined
by the time constants (fatigue, recovery, feedback delay = 40 ms) and
by the attention noise power as parameters of the nonlinear PAM-state
space equations. A linear approximation in the form of a second order
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Langevin equation allows for an analytic estimate of the percept rever-
sal rate (Rmax = 30 - 40 min-1) and of the perceptual damping time
constant (tauv =ca. 5 s). Within a thermodynamic equilibrium approx-
imation the Fluctuation-Dissipation theorem (or Einstein diffusion co-
efficient of Brownian motion) relates the noise power spectral density
and damping to an index of cognitive inertia and a cognitive perceptual
energy value of at least 16 orders of magnitude above the thermal noise
level at body temperature.
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Perceiving Other Minds: How Embodiment
Matters in Social Cognition
Nivedita Gangopadhyay
Center for Mind, Brain and Cognitive Evolution, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Successful social interaction is the key to all aspects of our modern life,
from everyday activities to highly complex cultural, technological, and
economic phenomena. One central research question, spanning philos-
ophy, psychology, neuroscience, psychiatry and anthropology, therefore
is: how do we understand other human beings? Some current inter-
disciplinary literature in social cognition discusses an immediate, non-
theorizing, form of understanding other minds under the title of empa-
thy. However, there seems to be little agreement as to what exactly the
term empathy stands for or what best characterises the phenomenon of
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empathy. Two main current approaches to understanding empathy are
simulation theories of mindreading (ST) and some recent phenomeno-
logical philosophy inspired accounts of direct perceptual understand-
ing of other minds (PT).
This paper proposes to address the issue of a basic, non-theorizing,
form of understanding other minds by developing an original theoreti-
cal framework which focuses on understanding the significance of ones
perceptual knowledge of the others embodied intentionality or skilful
bodily engagement with the world. Two main aims of the paper are as
follows:
1) understand the significance of ones perceptual knowledge of the
others embodied intentionality for attributing mental states to the other
with particular focus on unravelling the mechanisms of perception-action
coupling to investigate the role of motor cognition in ones immediate
perceptual access to the others embodied intentionality
2) uncover the nature of empathy as an immediate form of experi-
ential access to other minds by perceptually understanding the others
embodied intentionality, and specially focus on cognitive mechanisms
of action-understanding which draw on ones own interaction abilities.
The general aim of the paper is to develop a theory of basic forms of
intersubjectivity as active engagement between embodied social agents
and to clarify how the understanding of others depends on one’s own
abilities of interaction. The paper combines conceptual analysis of the
issues and interpreting recent experimental data from the field of social
–cognitive neuroscience and psychology.
Reconstructing Mental Concepts by Analyzing
Object Reference
Linn Gralla1, Thora Tenbrink1, and Elena Andonova2
1 Bremen University
2 New Bulgarian University
It has long been recognized that speakers flexibly adapt their object ref-
erences to their addressee’s presumed attention focus. However, inter-
acting with objects may also change speakers’ concepts about them. We
address object reference in think-aloud protocols in a self-assembly task
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and in assembly instructions. Whereas indefinite references signal the
unfamiliar status of an object, definite references and pronouns signal
familiarity, e.g. based on general knowledge or presence in the current
situation (Mangold-Allwinn et al., 1995). Nouns vary in lexical speci-
ficity and with respect to the conceptual domain.
52 participants were given 13 wooden parts to assemble. The degree
of prior knowledge about the goal object was varied so as to assess its
influence on reference production. Participants were either told to as-
semble a sensible object or a dollhouse, or they were shown a picture
of the dollhouse that they were asked to assemble. In a second study
20 instructions on the dollhouse assembly were recorded. Reference
forms were coded based on video recordings. Nouns were classified as
house-specific (‘roof’) or general (‘object’). Participants without prior
knowledge were assumed to use general nouns in initial reference. Par-
ticipants who had already seen the target dollhouse were expected to
use definite, house-specific references as they knew about the objects’
function. Over time references were assumed to become more specific.
Results reveal a range of significant patterns. Participants who saw
the picture frequently used pronouns in initial reference, reflecting the
integration of a specific object into an existing mental representation.
As expected, participants without prior knowledge used general nouns
signaling an unspecific mental concept of the goal object. In the commu-
nicative situation, instructors used more nominal forms in initial refer-
ence to objects. Adapting references to the uninformed addressee, they
used more general nouns than participants who received some domain
knowledge in the self-assembly task. In both studies subsequent men-
tion was predominantly pronominal.
References
Mangold-Allwinn, R., Baratteli, S., Kiefer, M. & Koelbing, H. G. (1995). Wörter für Dinge –
Von flexiblen Konzepten zu variablen Benennungen. Oblaten: Westdeutscher Verlag.
86 TALKS
LISA gets Moral – Extension of the Analogy
System LISA for Moral Decision Making
Peter Großmann
Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Sciences, University of Bamberg
Each culture has its own moral values. A moral value of the western
world can be viewed as immoral in countries such as India and Iran
and vice versa. So-called ‘sacred values” are part of the most important
moral values of a culture. A ’sacred value’ constitutes a moral value
that has a very high significance in certain culture and is not negotiable.
If one or more ‘sacred values’ exist in a certain scenario, people often
decide not to utilitarian, but according to deontological considerations.
Faced with the choice to hurt one or more ’sacred values’ or to seek
the largest (usually your own) benefit, utilitarian theories cannot ex-
plain the decision of the majority. However, most models for decision
making prefer utilitarian approaches. Therefore new models must be
developed to realize the deontological characteristics of moral decision-
making. Dehghani et al. found in experiments that moral decision mak-
ing is heavily influenced by stories from the respective culture (De-
hghani et al. 2009). The results of the experiments also strongly indicate
that analogies play a major role in the process of moral decision mak-
ing. Therefore, it is obvious to develop a model for moral decision mak-
ing that is based on analogies. The system ‘MoralLISA’ uses analogies
to model moral decision making, extending the hybrid analogy model
‘LISA’ developed by Hummel and Holyoak (Hummel & Holyoak 1996).
‘LISA’ is used, because it not only considers structural, but also seman-
tic properties for analogical inference. The ability to process semantic
properties, allows ‘MoralLISA’ to consider ‘sacred values’ for analogical
inference. Further semantic understanding is achieved through the use
of the lexical database ‘WordNet’ (Miller, 1995). Applied on a number
of scenarios, ‘MoralLISA’ seems to be a more plausible model for moral
decision making than Dehghanis ‘MoralDM’ (Dehghani et al. 2008).
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Implicit and Explicit Learning of Artificial
Grammars from Letter Strings, Visual, and
Visual-Motor Patterns
Jacqueline Hofmann, Tobias Kaiser, and Ute Schmid
Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Science, University of Bamberg
We present experimental data and an ACT-R model to examine the in-
fluence of different modes of presentation on implicit and explicit learn-
ing. Specifically, we were interested in differences between learning ar-
tificial grammars from strings vs. from graphical representations. Our
material was based on an artificial grammar investigated by Dienes et
al. (1991). The grammar was modified such that each string could be
composed from a set of four letters. The letters were interpreted as di-
rections in a two-dimensional grid. Graphical representations were ei-
ther presented in a passive mode – analogous to the string condition –
or supplemented by a motor-task where the given pattern had to be re-
produced with the cursor keys. In the implicit condition subjects were
instructed to memorize the presented items for a later test, in the explicit
condition subjects were instructed to try to detect the rules which are
common to all items. 55 subjects participated in the online-experiment.
Subjects were split into 6 groups with each group getting either letter,
passive graphical or active graphical presentation and implicit or ex-
plicit intruction. After the learning phase, subjects ran through a testing
phase consisting of a classification test, a pattern completion (SLD) test
and free reporting of learned (explicitly known) rules.
In all groups, accuracy was significantly higher than guessing proba-
bility, indicating that an implicit learning process took place in all con-
ditions. There was a weakly significant difference between the string-
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presentation and visual presentation: subjects in the two-dimensional
group performed better than subjects in the string group. However,
this could only be observed for the classification-test in the group with
implicit information, and for the SLD-test in the group with explicit in-
formation. A reinforcing influence of the motor-task could not be ob-
served.
The experimental conditions are currently modelled in ACT-R to re-
produce results for the classification test. Strings are represented as
transition rules. Visual patterns are represented as grid coordinates.
Motor patterns are represented as associations. Classification of test
items is based on utility for strings, on positional similarity for visual
patterns and on association strengths for motor patterns.
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Size Matters! How Value Organizes Our
Perception of Art
Martina Jakesch1, Stefan Ortlieb2, Marius Raab2, and
Claus-Christian Carbon2
1 Department of Psychological Basic Research and Research Methods,
Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna
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It’s one of the most famous findings in psychology: the perceived value
of an object influences how we internally represent that object. What
Bruner and Goodman (1947) have shown for coins—rich and poor chil-
dren showed significant differences in their judgment of coin sizes—
should also hold when value is a question of highly ideosyncratic ap-
preciation.
For works of art, there should consequently be a connection between
one’s appraisal of a given artwork (e.g., a painting) and an estimation of
that artworks ‘real’ size. Art experience is said to be linked with emo-
tions; and paintings are, in contrast to coins, rarely part of every-day
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routine. Consequently, we expect size estimation in the domain of aes-
thetic appreciation to be even more linked to personal value.
As a matching process between the painting’s real dimension and its
cognitive representation can only take place in the rare occasion of a
museum visit, reflecting on a painting is a highly constructive process,
and bound to be moderated by value (i.e., appreciation) and personal-
ity. To our knowledge, this alleged relationship has not been explored
for artworks or paintings. So far, the principle “the bigger the better”
was only shown for preferences for alphanumeric or Chinese characters,
symbols and abstract stimuli (Silvera, Josephs, & Giesler, 2002).
We selected a range of paintings that are typical for their respective
genres (surrealism, impressionism, ...) and at at the same time widely
known (tested in a pre-study). Furthermore, only paintings of compa-
rable dimensions were selected. Paintings are presented to test subjects
via a high-definition projector (212x118cm projection size) in random
order, each image starting as a small thumbnail; subjects are asked to
scale each painting “to the size the original artwork is”. As input de-
vice, we use a computer racing wheel; wheel position is smoothly and
instantly mapped to the dimensions of the artwork’s projection. After-
wards, for each painting we ask for a rating of appraisal (1-7) and hand
out the BFI-K personality test.
We expect subjective appraisal to be a strong predictor for the cogni-
tive task of estimating an artwork’s size; moderated by art-related per-
sonality traits like ’openness’.
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Behavioural and Neural Differences in Social
Engagement during Cross-Cultural Interactions
Katharina Krämer1, Gary Bente2, Iva Barisic1,
Siyang Luo3, Shihui Han3, and Kai Vogeley1,4
1 Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University of Cologne
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The expression of emotions is an important part of nonverbal communi-
cation in social interaction (Bavelas et al, 1986). The cultural background
in which a person grows up has a significant influence on the develop-
ment of these emotions. This not only accounts for behavioural differ-
ences in the expression and recognition of emotions (Elfenbein and Am-
bady, 2002), but also for differences in the neural activity during the per-
ception of emotions from people of different cultural groups (Han and
Northoff, 2008). Additionally, there are differences in emotion percep-
tion depending on whether one is involved in an interaction compared
to merely observing an interaction (Schilbach et al., 2006). In order to
study these differences, faces of Chinese-looking and German-looking
avatars were generated based on photographs of Chinese and German
people using the software FaceGen. In 3-second video sequences these
avatars express happiness and anger while they either gaze at the sub-
ject directly or at another invisible avatar. In a behavioural study, partic-
ipants from two cultural groups, China and Germany, assessed the per-
ceived valence of the emotions on a four-point rating scale. The results
show that participants perceived both emotions as more pronounced
when being directly looked at compared to being the mere observer of
the interaction. Analyses of the interaction of the participants’ Nation-
ality, the avatars’ Cultural Background, and the expressed emotions re-
vealed that participants perceived emotions expressed by avatars from
a different cultural group as more pronounced.
To characterize the neural correlates of these differences, we are cur-
rently performing an fMRI study with German participants using the
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same paradigm. We expect neural activity in the medial prefrontal cor-
tex during the perception of emotions in general. We also expect a more
dorsal part of the medial prefrontal cortex to be activated when partici-
pants are gazed at directly compared to when participants just observe
the interaction (Schilbach et al., 2006). As the behavioural results in-
dicate that participants perceive emotions expressed by avatars from a
different cultural group as more pronounced, we hypothesize that the
activation in the respective brain areas will be more pronounced when
participants observe emotions expressed by members of a different cul-
tural group.
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Constructing Meaning in Up or Down Situated
Sentences:
Is a sentence more than the sum of its words?
Martin Lachmair, Carolin Dudschig, and Barbara Kaup
University of Tübingen
The present study is concerned with the process of meaning construc-
tion from the perspective of the experiential-simulations view of com-
prehension. According to this view, words automatically re-activate
memory traces stemming form experiencing their referents. During sen-
tence processing, these traces are presumably combined to yield simula-
tions consistent with the meaning of the sentences (Zwaan & Madden,
2005). From a study by Lachmair et al. (2011) we know that process-
ing nouns with referents that are typically located up or down in ver-
tical space (e.g., ‘bird’ vs. ‘worm’) facilitates the planning of congruent
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movements (e.g., upwards for bird). The present study exploits this
word-based compatibility effect to shed some light on the processes of
constructing meaning in sentence comprehension.
Participants were presented with pairs of sentences, consisting of a
context and a target sentence, the latter always ending in an object noun
with a typical location in the upper part of vertical space (e.g., bird). The
context either supported or reversed this location. Thus, for supporting
sentence-pairs, the target object was located in the upper part of vertical
space (e.g. “Anna looks to the sky. There she sees the bird”), and for
reversing-pairs, in the lower part of vertical space (“Anna looks to the
ground. There she sees the bird”). Sentence pairs were presented au-
ditory, expect for the last word which was presented visually in one of
four colors to which participants responded with an up- or down-key
press. We found a significant interaction of sentence-type and response.
For supporting pairs, up-responses were faster than down-responses,
whereas for reversing pairs, down-responses were faster than up-re-
sponses. As both types of pairs ended in the same nouns, this result
suggests that the observed differences reflect processes at the sentence
or discourse level. To rule out the possibility that the words mentioned
in the context sentences (e.g., “sky” vs. “ground”) are responsible for
this effect, we are currently conducting an experiment in which partic-
ipants respond to the target words after reading a context word that is
associated with either an up- or a down location. If no context effect oc-
curs in this experiment, we can conclude that the observed interaction
effect indeed reflects processes beyond the word level.
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Levels of Cognitive Extension
Holger Lyre
Philosophy Department, University of Magdeburg
lyre@ovgu.de
Ideas about cognitive extension have flourished in recent years and quite
a debate about the general pros and cons of the hypothesis of extended
cognition (HEC) has taken place. While opponents to HEC have mainly
focused on the, as they see it, fallacious argument from coupling to con-
stitution, most supporters of HEC adopt an extended functionalist point
of view, where the couplings between system and world as well as be-
tween subsystems are all that matters to bring about cognitive function-
ality in extended cognitive systems. Hence, coupling has been noticed
as important and the quality and bandwidth of coupling as sufficient for
cognitive extension. But what has seldom been discussed is the question
whether different levels of cognitive extension must be distinguished
and what the corresponding different coupling conditions or coupling
mechanisms are. The present paper wants to fill this lacuna. My thesis
is that four levels of cognitive extension must be distinguished, which
relate to cognitive extension into (1) the body, (2) the physical environ-
ment, (3) the social environment, and (4) the information environment.
They are roughly motivated by ideas of embodied cognition and dy-
namicism (1&2), social cognition and theories of meaning (3) and situ-
ated cognition in general (1-4). The most complex level is perhaps the
third level which may further be divided into three sub-levels pertain-
ing cognitive extension into other minds (3.1), into “we-space” (3.2) as
well as into full language communities (3.3). Each level comes equipped
with its own type of coupling conditions and mechanisms, and it will
the main task of the paper to disentangle and scrutinize them in greater
detail. What will be crucial for our discussion is, moreover, the fact that
we must not only distinguish coupling conditions on the different lev-
els but also conditions which solely pertain the vehicles of cognition as
opposed to conditions pertaining cognitive content.
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Anxiety, Working Memory and Analogical
Reasoning
Alexander G. Perrone1 and Tarek R. Besold2
1 ILLC, University of Amsterdam
Alexander.Perrone@student.uva.nl
2 Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück
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A series of experiments was designed to explore the quantitative rela-
tionship between anxiety, working memory (WM), and analogical per-
formance in a picture-based analogy task. Experimental results obtained
from an initial exploratory series of tests indicate deviations from the
theoretical paradigm assumed in the literature:
Eysenck’s (Eysenck, 1979) working memory theory predicts that anx-
iety causes a reduction of the available capacity of working memory,
always reducing processing effectiveness.
Tohill and Holyoak (2000) hypothesized that anxiety exerts its effect
on analogical performance solely through a restriction on WM and re-
ported an analogical shift from relational to attribute mappings for par-
ticipants in the anxious condition, though no measure of WM was pro-
vided. Replicating this experiment produced the same anxiety-inducing
effect, but no analogical shift.
Waltz, Lau, Grewal, and Holyoak (2000) report decreased analogical
mappings for participants under a WM load. Replicating this experi-
ment, again no analogical shift was found.
In the first exploratory series of tests, correlational measures revealed
a strong negative correlation between anxiety (as measured by the state
portion of the STAI (Spielberger et. al., 1970)) and WM (as measured
by a digit-span task) for participants in the non-anxious condition, but
the opposite relationship held for participants in the anxious condition.
A relatively loose relationship held between WM and analogical per-
formance as a whole. For participants in the non-anxious condition,
Eysencks working memory theory closely predicted the observed rela-
tionship between anxiety and analogical performance, but not for par-
ticipants in the anxious condition.
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We conclude that the classical theory is only partially confirmed, and
that the anxiety-inducing task influences analogical reasoning in a way
not accountable by WM alone.
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Mind or Machine? – Assessing the Experience
of Engagement in Social Interaction in a
Combined Eye-Tracking and fMRI Paradigm
Ulrich Pfeiffer1,2, Leonhard Schilbach1, Bojana Kuzmanovic3,
Bert Timmermans1, Gary Bente4, and Kai Vogeley1,2
1 Neuroimaging Lab, Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital Cologne
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Forschungszentrum Jülich
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To investigate social interaction in real-time, we have developed an in-
teractive eye-tracking paradigm allowing participants to engage in gaze-
based interaction with an avatar. In a non-verbal Turing test, partici-
pants were asked to decide based on the avatar’s gaze behavior whether
he had been controlled by another participant or a computer while, in
fact, the latter was always the case and the other participant a confed-
erate. The probability of gaze-following as compared to gaze-aversion
was modified by varying the maximum number of gaze-following reac-
tions ranging from zero to five out of five trials. The test was conducted
in two conditions while eye-movements and neural activity were mea-
sured in an MRI scanner. In the naïve condition, the confederate was
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introduced as naturally reactive and unaware of the participant’s task.
In the cooperative condition, the confederate was introduced as coop-
erative and aware of the task. Behavioral results indicate that the as-
cription of humanness increases with higher degrees of gaze-following
in the naïve condition. Contrastively, humanness was also ascribed in
cases of high degrees of gaze aversion when the confederate had been
introduced as cooperative, thus indicating an expectation of more com-
plexly coordinated behavior from a cooperative interaction partner. In
the naïve condition, humanness ascription correlated with activation of
the nucleus accumbens – a brain region considered to be a vital part of
the brain’s reward system. In the cooperative condition there was ad-
ditional activation of the medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices,
two areas known to be implicated in thinking about the mental states of
others. This demonstrates that in unconstrained social interaction the
experience of interacting with a human interaction partner is guided by
reflexive, reward-related neural activity. In a cooperative context, the
same experience correlates with higher-order reflective processes in the
mentalizing system. This study constitutes the first empirical approach
to investigating the experience of being engaged in non-verbal social
interaction with another person ‘online’ and isolated from non-social
interaction.
An Operational Model of Joint Attention –
Timing of the Initiate-Act in Interactions with a
Virtual Human
Nadine Pfeiffer-Leßmann, Thies Pfeiffer, and Ipke Wachsmuth
SFB 673 Project A1, Artificial Intelligence Group, Faculty of Technology,
Bielefeld University
Joint attention has been identified as a foundational skill in human-
human interaction. In our research, we use virtual humans to evalu-
ate cognitive models, here, enabling them to engage in joint attention.
This requires an operational model with precise information on natu-
ral gaze timing. We aim at substantiating our model of joint attention
(Pfeiffer-Leßmann & Wachsmuth 2009) by studying human-agent inter-
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actions and present results on the timing of referential gaze during the
initiation of joint attention.
Our operational model of joint attention covers four phases: initiate-
act (1), respond-act (2), feedback phase (3), and focus-state (4). It is im-
plemented in the cognitive architecture of our virtual agent Max. For
the evaluation of the model in interaction with humans, investigations
on timeframes, human expectations and insights on how humans actu-
ally perceive Max’ behaviors are indispensable.
In the present study we focus on phase 1. We let the participants
engage in joint attention with Max in an immersive virtual reality envi-
ronment, which provides a highly controlled experimental setup. The
experiment had two conditions: in one the participants took the role of
the initiator, in the other Max was the initiator. We found that partici-
pants accepted the same kind of gaze patterns produced by Max using
our model as natural as they themselves performed when they had the
initiative. Thus, under both conditions we found a mean dwell time of
1.9s for the referential gaze act, which is compatible with related find-
ings in human-human interaction.
The applicability of our human-agent approach to investigate cog-
nitive modeling was confirmed in three ways. First, the participants
attested a high level of presence both to themselves and to the agent.
Second, there was no significant difference between produced and ac-
cepted timings in the two conditions. And third, the obtained results are
compatible with those from literature. Thus Max appears to be accepted
as an interaction partner. Motivated by the success of this approach, we
will iteratively investigate further phases of our joint attention model.
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Motion and Emotion: Using Kinect to Force
Ideomotor Empathy
Marius Raab1, Vera Hesslinger1, Claudia Muth1, and Sibylle Enz2
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According to Enz (2009) motor impulse is an important component of
empathy (‘ideomotor empathy’), along with cognition and emotion. This
is in line with the notion of cortical ‘mirror neurons’, and with theories
about so-called ‘ur-emotions’ (Parrott, 2010) that stress activation and
action readiness as foundations of higher cognitive and emotional ex-
periences. Yet, appropriate methods to measure ideomotor empathy
need to be found as, e.g., self-reports and questionnaires are not suited
for on-line measurement and suffer from the difficulty of rating motor
involvement on questionnaire scales.
In the present experiment, we assess the impact of ‘forced ideomotor
empathy’, i.e. the effect of a coerced combination of perception and ac-
tion by imitating performed movements, on emotional state and empa-
thy. Further, we address the above mentioned methodological problem
by testing whether the commercial off-the-shelf sensor Microsoft Kinect
can serve as a more valid and reliable device for measuring motor in-
volvement.
For the first part of the experiment, participants were assigned to
one of three experimental conditions: In condition (1) they watched a
video showing an actress who performed pronounced gestures while
speaking a highly emotional monologue (‘monologue scene’). In condi-
tion (2) and (3) they were additionally asked to synchronously re-enact
the actress’ gestures while watching the same monologue or this scene
performed without speech (‘gesture scene’) with the actress wearing
a sports outfit, respectively. Participants’ positions and postures were
tracked via Kinect and rendered as a simple moving skeleton on the
scene. Thus, participants were driven to focus on the actress’ gestures
and their own movements at the same time and to check for congruency
of their limb positions with the actress’ gestures. In the second part of
the experiment, participants performed a visual sorting task via Kinect;
speed and precision were measured. Finally, data on emotional state
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(PANAS; Thompson, 2007) and empathic behavior (Enz, 2009) were
gathered.
Comparing conditions (1) and (2), we expect to determine the impact
of forced ideomotor empathy on emotional state and empathy. Con-
dition (3) serves as a baseline revealing the influence of the movement
task alone. Furthermore, by comparing the PANAS-results, the empa-
thy scale outcome, and the performance in the sorting task, we evaluate
whether there is an increment in validity and reliability when measur-
ing ideomotor empathy via Kinect as compared to common question-
naire instruments.
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cVIS – Combining Visualization and Cognition
Michael Raschke and Thomas Ertl
Institute for Visualization and Interactive Systems, University of Stuttgart
To study the perception and cognitive processes when users are work-
ing with visualizations we are developing the cVIS framework with
three modules. The three modules are: eye tracking analysis, semantic
visualization models and a cognitive simulation based on ACT-R. Vi-
sualizations are for example bar charts, pie charts or scatter plots. The
cVIS framework aims at providing a simulation framework for the op-
timization of visualizations from a user centered perspective.
We have performed several eye tracking user experiments, which show
that general eye movement strategies can be found when participants
are solving tasks by using data visualizations. Beside heat maps and
scan path visualizations we have used the Parallel Scan-Path Visual-
ization technique to find common scan paths in our user experiments.
This new eye tracking visualization technique provides an AOI based
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graphical representation for a large number of scan paths in one dia-
gram without visual clutter [1].
Today the development of data visualizations is mostly driven by a
technical perspective. However, new approaches optimize the data vi-
sualization from a cognitive perspective. One approach is to annotate
graphical elements with semantic information from visualization on-
tologies. This annotation supports the eye tracking analysis by study-
ing the semantic structure of the scan paths and allows adapting the
graphical layout to the cognitive skills of the users [2].
Using these two techniques we are getting two types of information
for a simulation: first, completion time values and information about
common geometrical structures of scan paths; second, a basis for a knowl-
edge processing model of visual perception by studying the temporal
order of focused semantic entities. Our aim is to use this information to
develop an ACT-R based model which describes mental processes when
working with simple visualizations.
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Time and Space in Possible Worlds
Klaus Robering
University of Southern Denmark
robering@sitkom.sdu.dk
The logical analysis of reasoning relating to perception and action of-
ten requires the consideration of possible courses of events (“possible
worlds”) which differ with respect to their spatio-temporal properties.
An example at issue is the case of the Ames room illusion (cf., for in-
stance, Metzger 1975, 241-244, 253f): The obsverver sees a person grow-
ing and shrinking while that person is moving from one corner of a
room to the other. It is of course knwon to the observer that such rapid
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changes of body size is (physically, though not logically) impossible.
The observer thus recognizes a discrepancy between two possible cour-
ses of events: namely, between that what is seen and that what is (known
to be) actually the case. These two courses of events are systematically
connected to each other by a certain relationship between their inter-
nal geometries, which (together some facts of geometrical optics) “ex-
plains” the illusion.
Logics based upon classical possible worlds semantics are not able
to deal with such situations in the most direct way since their possible
worlds are not provided with any geometrical infrastructure. Here, in-
stead, a many-sorted mereological framework will be proposed for ex-
plicitly reasoning about both spatial and temporal features of possible
courses of events. That framework is based on a modification of Tarski’s
(1937) axiomatization of (“atomistic”) mereology. Possible worlds - i.e.,
entire courses of events - are mereologically maximal individuals within
the logical sort of “occurents” and their minimal counterparts are “point
events”. Occurents are considered to have both temporal and geomet-
rical extencsion; hence we deal with the “geometry” of 4-dimensional
entities. Since some applications of the framework will require worlds
differing in their internal geometries (for example: euclidean vs., per-
haps, spherical or hyperbolic), geometrical structure is stepwise added
upon the mereological layer: first axioms of a topological character will
be added which are followed, then, by postulates governing the proper-
ties of “convex” occurents thus opening the way to affine geometry; cf.
Coppel (1998).
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Cognitive Mechanisms of Systematic
Enumeration in Positional Number Notation
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Systematically enumerating numbers in positional notation (PN) cannot
be learned by memorisation. It exceeds early numerical competence and
requires the cognitive realisation of an algorithmic structure which im-
poses order on numerical thought that is indispensable regarding actual
tasks. In contrast to the precision and sparseness of formal definitions,
there is ample evidence that numerical cognition rests upon a plethora
of redundant, intuitive and also metaphorical structures. As it remains
unclear how humans realise such a system, we used a combined qual-
itative/quantitative approach to investigate the fine-grained, inductive
processes of constructing an unfamiliar enumeration algorithm.
As a qualitative case study, 12 semi-structured interviews with 1st-
year students were conducted. Their task was to learn a camouflaged
quaternary system with the symbols A, B, C, D (instead of 0, 1, 2, 3) by
way of example, and to intermittently explain their ideas. A quantita-
tive online study with 60 subjects confirmed the subjects’ preferences
towards different continuations, and aspects that they perceived to be
central.
As was expected, the system’s unfamiliar presentation effectively pre-
vented subjects from recognising that it was PN at all. Instead, they
derived rules from the given examples and made up a generative struc-
ture from scratch. Interestingly, many subjects had problems under-
standing the mechanism of zero (“A”) which in general lead them to
try diverse strategies incorporating perceived inconsistencies as a rule.
Further points of interest were the discovery and arduous instantiation
of analogies and the emergence of comprehensive metaphors.
Based on the analysis of the protocols we hypothesise that the enu-
meration algorithm is cognitively implemented by a rich assembly of in-
terlocking structures, which dynamically adapt and apply to given sit-
uations. Several mechanisms are discussed: Continuous re-approaches
to the task yield multiple variants of perceived structures, enriching the
understanding and making it more flexible. In order to solve conflicts,
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hypotheses of smaller and wider scope are formed which are locally ap-
plied and tested. Subjects either change their hypothesis (accommoda-
tion) or reinterpret the stimulus (assimilation). This results in a detailed
understanding of enumeration through a modularisation of differing
scopes. Even after having learnt the system, the subjects’ remarks show
that their conception remains in development.
Modelling Adaptation Effects as Similarity to
Dynamic Prototypes
Michael Siebers1, Johannes Folger1, Simone Schineller1,
Dominik Seuß1, Stella Faerber2, and Ute Schmid1
1 Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Science, University of Bamberg
2 Department of General Psychology and Methodology, University of
Bamberg
Every day we have to make decisions: what to do, what to wear, what
to buy. Many of these decisions are based on aesthetics. The similar-
ity of objects to the individual’s prototype for the objects’ category is a
fundamental decision criterion (Rosch, E., 1978). However, prototypes
are dynamic and change with experience. To investigate this prototype
shift we conducted an experiment using the Repeated Evaluation Tech-
nique (Carbon, C. C. & Leder, H., 2005). As stimuli we used 2D images
of forks. As forks are everyday objects it is ensured that every subject
has an already established prototype. However, the amount of commer-
cially available models leads us to expect a great variance in prototypes.
To reduce complexity we restricted the stimuli variations on two dimen-
sions: the overall roundness and the length of the handle.
As first experiment step subjects are required to model their prototyp-
ical fork within the given variability. Then subjects rate a presented set
of fork variated on both dimensions. Rated are the typicality, the inno-
vativeness, and the attractiveness of the presented fork. Then subjects
will be presented an adaption set of forks with extreme values on both
dimensions. Using diffent tasks subjects are forced to engange with the
unusual fork models. Finally subjects again have to rate the initially
presented forks and to model their prototypes.
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We expect a shift of subjects’ individual prototypes in the direction
of the unusual objects. This should also be reflected by the final attrac-
tiveness ratings: In the last phase objects that are extreme are expected
to receive higher attractiveness and typicality ratings than they did in
the first rating step. On the other hand innovativeness is expected to
decrease.
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Generalizing Schemas in a Complex Scenario –
Can Analogy-Based Training Material Trigger
the Acquisition of Solution Principles in Chess?
Christoph Sonnenberg
Cognitive Systems Group, Faculty Information Systems and Applied
Computer Science, University of Bamberg
christoph.sonnenberg@uni-wuerzburg.de
It is empirically established that analogical problem solving can lead to
an abstraction of the common solution structure. This phenomenon is
known as schema induction or generalization of schemas. The acquired
solution principle can facilitate the transfer for similar subsequent prob-
lems. Previous studies used simple tasks which were easily manageable
for the participants. In contrast, I chose chess as a test environment in
order to find evidence for generalization of schemas in a domain which
is more representative for complex cognition. Moreover, a direct com-
parison of three kinds of teaching material - including two different
analogy scenarios - is another novelty in my experiment and addresses
the question which type of analogy is more useful to the learner.
A between subject design was used to investigate which type of teach-
ing material can efficiently trigger schema induction. 33 participants
received one of three trainings on two different solution principles for
chess positions. The varying training conditions were ’abstract rule’,
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’analogy within the domain of chess’ and ’analogy between military and
chess’. In the following they had to work on a series of chess tasks which
all could be solved by the trained solution principles. In detail, the par-
ticipants had to select all chess pieces which they regarded as essential
for the problem structure (in order to measure the schema quality) and
to specify a solution. Previous knowledge and current motivation were
surveyed for being possible influencing variables.
In general, the results showed an advantage for the within analogy
group. The group differences were, however, only statistically signif-
icant for one of the two solution principles. Previous knowledge of
the participants appeared to be an influencing factor on performance,
whereas the current motivation in the learning situation was not. Fur-
thermore, the schema quality could be identified as a predictor for the
solution frequency. This points to the importance of knowing the solu-
tion structure in the used problem solving domain.
A Functionalist Approach to the Concept of
‘Delusion’
Patrice Soom and Gottfried Vosgerau
Institute of Philosophy, University of Düsseldorf
{patrice.soom, vosgerau}@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de
Delusions are key symptoms of many severe types of mental disor-
ders. Even though the empirical research made considerable progress
towards etiological and reductive accounts of delusions, an adequate
theoretical definition of this concept is still to be offered. This contribu-
tion aims to use the theoretical tools of analytic philosophy of mind in
order to provide a functional definition of the concept of ‘Delusion’, and
to show how this definition may be used to set up a sub-type classifica-
tion of delusions.
Starting from a critical evaluation of the DSM-IV definition of delu-
sions, we shape a positive account of what delusions are from a func-
tional point of view. According to this analysis, the criteria of i) false-
hood, ii) inadequacy with the beliefs spread within the surrounding so-
cial community, iii) firm sustainment and iv) that delusions are about
the external reality, are inadequate because they describe unnecessary
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conditions for delusionality. In fact, the content of delusions and its
epistemic relations to the world and to the beliefs of others are inade-
quate to define delusions. We argue that from a functionalist point of
view (see Soom, Sachse, & Esfeld, 2010, for a methodological analysis of
functionalism), delusions are essentially characterized by an asymmet-
rical inferential profile, which explains their immunity to revision in the
absence of medication. Accordingly, delusions might impact on other
beliefs of the patient, whereas they are not inferentially affected by the
latters. This view is supported by arguments according to which delu-
sions do impact on other beliefs, that normal beliefs are revisable and
that assuming that delusions stand on a continuum with normal beliefs
leads to intractable theoretical difficulties.
Building on from the above functional definition, we consider etiolog-
ical and reductive accounts of delusions. According to the latter, there
are two factors at play here: (a) tokening a problematic belief while (b)
preventing rejection of this belief in spite of its inconsistency with evi-
dence (Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011). In turn, this suggests that
all delusions share a specific inferential profile and that the specific eti-
ology of different delusions might contribute to individuation of (func-
tional) sub-types of delusions. An empirically informed taxonomy of
delusions might be established on that basis.
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Mental Models of Spatial Cognition: Toponyms
and Orientation
Martin Thiering
Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
This paper focuses on mental models of topographical coordinates in
two unrelated languages. Eipomek is spoken in the central mountains
of the Province of Papua (West New Guinea), and Dene Chipewyan,
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spoken in the prairies of Cold Lake, Alberta (Canada). The paper ex-
plores the degree to which environmental experience of landmarks and
spatial orientation is reflected as cultural-specific mental models (Hut-
chins 1983, 1995; Thiering 2012). The hypothesis is that non-linguistic
information as cultural practice has its impact upon spatial language
and mental models (Mark et al. 2011). Furthermore, topographical in-
formation of the immediate environment in particular is represented as
mental models constituting gestalt-like representations (Thiering 2011).
Field data from the author using different visually-based elicitation tools
and different ethnographic grammars, texts, and films (Heeschen 1990,
1998) serve as empirical background showing the influence and con-
structive process of environmental landmarks upon shaping of spatial
categorization. Hence, the general aim is to survey some fundamental
spatial notions based on regional landmarks. Landmarks are defined
as any kind of cultural-specific environmental external reference points,
e.g., mountains, river, house, or a tree. Landmarks are point references
external to the person. In a city, landmarks may be distant buildings
or geographical features that can be seen from many angles and dis-
tances, or they may be primarily local such as buildings, signs, trees,
storefronts, doorknobs, or other urban details. A personÕs account of
his/her spatial orientation and navigation generally begins with mental
models of landmarks, and these mental models are strategic foci to and
from which the person moves or travels (Hutchins 1995). Hence, land-
marks are used as proximate course-maintaining devices in the encod-
ing of figure-ground asymmetries (Thiering 2011). It is argued here that
these landmarks shape and determine a detailed topographical mental
model of the environment as externally represented via language and
practices. Indeed, the presented data show a dense linguistic system
of topographical mental models represented, e.g., in toponyms (Mark
et al. 2011). Hence, the overall focus of this paper is on the intricate
interplay between language and culture and mental models.
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Making the Most of Affordances?
A. Tillas, T. Seuchter, and G. Vosgerau
Department of Philosophy, University of Düsseldorf
atillas@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de
The notion of affordances is one of the most controversial notions in
psychology and cognitive science. Our target is to secure the explana-
tory role of affordances in understanding behavior while avoiding the
controversies of ecological psychology. Traditionally, it has been argued
that the explanatory role of affordances could be secured by appealing
to their objective nature and their direct perceivability. We appeal to the
methodological merits of empirically informed analytical philosophy of
mind in order to suggest that the explanatory role of affordances could
be secured on different grounds. We argue that affordances are rela-
tional properties, ascribed to objects by agents not by being perceived
directly but on the basis of the feedback information received when sub-
jects interact (even unintentionally) with their environment. Here affor-
dances are seen as inherently linked to unintentional movements and
possible intentional actions. More specifically, it is argued that in virtue
of the linkage between affordances and intentions one could account for
the infinite number of affordances that any given object could have. Fur-
thermore, perception of affordances and in turn their explanatory value
could be secured by appealing to objective systematic contingencies be-
tween movements and perceptual inputs that provide the actor with
information about the effects of his/her actions on the environment. It
is courtesy of these systematic contingencies that affordances acquire
their objective aspect and are thus perceived universally. For instance, a
simple unintentional contact with a solid surface suffices for any subject
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to gather information about solid objects affording bumping into them.
On the basis of such unintentionally acquired affordances, other affor-
dances could be acquired through intentional movements. That is, once
a subject has acquired knowledge of solid objects affording bump-on-
ability, for instance, s/he could use this knowledge in fulfilling his/her
intentions of using a rock as a doorstopper. In this sense, perception
of bump-on-ability of solid objects is complementary to perception of
door-stop-ability of a rock. Note here that affordances perceived on the
basis of unintentional movements are neither necessary nor sufficient
for perception of affordances perceived on the basis of intentions. It is
just that, as it happens, the latter are perceived by making use of knowl-
edge acquired on perception of the former.
Motor Imagery of Interpersonal Coordination
Cordula Vesper1, Günther Knoblich1,2, and Natalie Sebanz1,2
1 Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Center for Cognition,
Radboud University Nijmegen
2 Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University
Many of our actions are not performed in isolation but together with
other people. When performing such joint actions, we often need to
closely coordinate the timing of our own actions with a partner’s actions
in order to achieve a shared goal. This study investigated the mech-
anisms underlying interpersonal coordination by using a novel motor
imagery paradigm. The task was based on an earlier study (Vesper, van
der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012) in which pairs of participants syn-
chronized the landing times of simple forward jumps. If performance
in the present imagery task were to resemble actual performance, this
would provide evidence in favour of a motor simulation account for
joint action (e.g. Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato,
2003) according to which co-actors use their own motor system to pre-
dict and adapt to others’ actions. Individual participants were asked to
imagine performing jumps either alone or together with another per-
son and to indicate the timing of their take-off and landing by pressing
a key. By varying the difficulty of their own and the imagined other’s
actions, we could determine to what degree and under which condi-
tions individuals adapted their actions in the service of coordination.
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The results suggest that, first, imagery of interpersonal coordination re-
sembles performance during actual interaction and that, second, partici-
pants achieved coordination by integrating predictions about the timing
of their own and their partner’s actions. These findings are consistent
with a motor simulation account for joint action.
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Perceiving Through Moving? A Conceptual
and Empirical Critique of Enactivism
Arne M. Weber
Institut für Philosophie, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
According to Noë’s enactive theory of sensorimotor contingencies (Noë
2004; O’Regan & Noë 2001) sensorimotor processes are constitutive for
perception. An obvious problem here is that the sensorimotor basis is
seen just as a constitution condition, but not as an acquisition condition
of perceptual abilities. This critique is based on conceptual consider-
ations of and empirical evidence for a theory focusing on the interde-
pendencies of motor control and action-related cognitive processes like
thinking about an action or perceiving an action.
For Noë perceptual experience – especially vision – derives from ac-
quaintance with sensorimotor contingencies depending on the visual
apparatus, bodily activities and properties of the world. Perceptual
awareness depends constitutively on the perceiver’s sensorimotor knowl-
edge, an implicit know-how of the way sensory stimulation varies with
movement. Thus, for Noë perception is fundamentally shaped by the
motor abilities of the perceiving body. A specified approach – call it
grounded action cognition – can provide a theory of the relation be-
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tween motor control and action-related cognitive processes by distin-
guishing between grounding qua acquisition and grounding qua con-
stitution. This approach is also empirically supported by studies con-
cerned with motor disorders and related cognitive or perceptual im-
pairments as in ALS or Parkinson’s disease and proprioceptive deficits
like deafferentiation.
According to representative studies, motor abilities are constitutive
of some action-related perceptual abilities, but not of others previously
acquired; impaired motor control mechanisms influence the perception
of actions, such that it is degraded but not lost altogether. Movement
is thus not necessary to maintain certain perceptual abilities. Moreover,
some perceptual abilities can be counted as part of the motor control
domain and the action cognition domain. Thus, the domains overlap
to a certain degree, but can still be empirically distinguished. The fact
that the domains mere partially overlap is also an indication for a partial
independence of these domains.
Given that a breakdown of motor abilities does not result in a com-
plete breakdown of perceptual abilities, Noë’s approach is at odds with
the empirical evidence and his claim that perception solely depends
on motor abilities falls short. Instead, a distinction between constitu-
tion and acquisition of cognitive abilities fosters a more accurate under-
standing of the mind.
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Cognitive Linguistics as a Framework to Study
the Evolution of Language from a Cognitive
Science Perspective
James Winters1 and Michael Pleyer2
1 Independent Researcher
wintzis@gmail.com
2 University of Heidelberg
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Studying the evolution of language and its underlying cognitive mech-
anisms is an important topic in cognitive science, requiring a highly in-
terdisciplinary approach (Tallerman & Gibson 2012). In this talk, we ar-
gue that Cognitive Linguistics (CL) (Evans 2012), which sees language
as relying on general cognitive abilities, can make significant contribu-
tions to language evolution research. As CL actively seeks converging
evidence from other disciplines in cognitive science in its analyses and
explanations, we claim that it presents a theoretical approach ideally
suited to integrate cognitive science and research on the evolution of
language.
We will illustrate this proposal in terms of the three timescales rele-
vant in accounting for the structure and evolution of the complex adap-
tive system of language (Kirby 2012):
1. The ontogenetic timescale: individuals acquiring language
2. The glossogenetic timescale: historical language change
3. The phylogenetic timescale: the biological evolution of the species
On the ontogenetic level, studies within the framework of CL have de-
monstrated the importance of social, cultural, interactive and cogni-
tive processes in the acquisition and learning of language (Beckner et
al. 2009). Concerning the diachronic level, work in CL is beginning
to unravel the interaction of general cognitive mechanisms and cul-
tural transmission in influencing language change and the emergence
of structural patterns through processes of grammaticalization.
Lastly, CL can inform accounts of the phylogenetic evolution of lan-
guage by specifying the representational and cognitive abilities that need-
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ed to evolve to support the dynamic processes of interactive meaning
construction fundamental to language.
In our talk, we will present case studies from these timescales to illus-
trate that CL promises to be a highly fruitful framework for elucidating
the factors and cognitive mechanisms involved in the evolution of hu-
man language from a cognitive science perspective.
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A Framework for Computer Simulations of
Motivated Behaviour on the Base of a Cognitive
System of Motivation (COSMO)
Andreas Ammann
Didactics of Biology, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg
Due to the ambition for a more holistic view on human behaviour in
cognitive modeling, the implementation of motivational concepts in this
field is progressing. A recent example -amongst others- is the cognitive
architecture CLARION (e.g. Bach, 2009; Sun, 2006) where motivational
concepts are implemented as integrative elements. A disadvantage of
this approach is that a substantial disarray in the classification of mo-
tivation concepts (e.g. Spinath, 2008) is directly transferred from mo-
tivation psychology to cognitive modeling. To solve this problem an
analysis of the motivation elements itself from a cognitive perspective
has to be taken into account. The results of such an analysis constitute
a valuable theoretical support for the classification of motivation in the
field of motivation psychology thus improving the cooperation of these
two fields.
For this purpose a concept of a cognitive system of motivation (COSMO)
was constructed. It focuses on the question to what extend motivation
like mechanisms are effective problem-solving-strategies in the context
of complex environments. A set of interrelated mechanisms was devel-
oped that shows parallels to a broad range of motivational concepts.
This parallels span basic motivation concepts as well as complex ap-
proaches on human behaviour (e.g. competence motivation and cul-
tural activity theories), goal orientated and non goal orientated concepts
(e.g. performance motivation and intrinsic motivation) and biological
orientated approaches such as evolutionary psychology. Based on these
results, suggestions are derived for functional relationships between
concepts of motivation psychology. A framework for computer simula-
tions based on COSMO was designed. The intention of this framework
is to test the optimization mechanisms with respect to their problem-
solving abilities.
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How to Bring Down an Airplane: Inverting the
Word-Action-Compatibility-Effect in Phrases
Eduard Berndt, Fritz Günther, Jonathan Gabriel Maier,
Monica De Filippis, and Barbara Kaup
Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen
According to the experiential-simulations view of language comprehen-
sion, understanding language is tantamount to mentally simulating the
experience of the described objects, situations, or events (e.g., Barsalou,
2008). Presumably, words automatically re-activate traces in memory
stemming from experiencing their referents. Indeed, previous studies
showed compatibility effects during word processing between the ver-
tical location of a word’s referent (roof: up; cellar: down) and the re-
sponse that was required by the experimental task (up vs. down). Re-
sponses were faster in compatible conditions (up response to roof, down
response to cellar) than in incompatible conditions (down response to
roof, up response to cellar; Lachmair et al. 2011; see also Dudschig et
al., in press). With respect to sentence processing, the experiential sim-
ulations view holds that the re-activated memory traces are combined
to yield a simulation consistent with the meaning of the whole sentence
(Zwaan & Madden, 2005). In the current study we aimed at investigat-
ing this hypothesis by extending the compatibility effects already ob-
served with single words to two-word phrases.
Participants were presented with adjective-noun combinations in a
sensibility-judgment task. All experimental nouns had referents with
a typical location in the upper part of vertical space (e.g., airplane).
Each noun was combined with four different adjectives: (a) an adjec-
tive that was associated with an up-location and supported the refer-
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ent’s up-location (e.g., flying airplane), (b) a neutral adjective that sup-
ported the referent’s location (e.g., red airplane), (c) a neutral adjective
that changed the referent’s location from up to down (e.g., parking air-
plane), and (d) a neutral adjective that made no sense in combination
with the noun (e.g., hairy airplane). Participants were instructed to
judge the phrases sensibility by pressing an up- vs. a down key. For half
of the participants the yes-key was up, for the other half the yes-key
was down. The results provided strong support for the experimental
simulations view: For combinations with up-supporting and neutral-
supporting adjectives, up-responses were significantly faster than down-
responses. In contrast, for combinations with neutral inverting adjec-
tives, down-responses were significantly faster than up-responses. These
results go beyond previous studies in showing that comprehenders had
indeed combined the adjective and the noun to yield a simulation con-
sistent with the whole phrase.
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Neuronale Veränderungen durch
Schriftspracherwerb im Erwachsenenalter
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1 Abt. Neuropsychologie, Institut für Psychologie II,
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Funktionale Analphabeten weisen große Defizite im Lesen und Schrei-
ben auf; sie verlassen die Schule in der Regel mit Fähigkeiten, die min-
destens drei bis vier Jahre unter dem zu erwartenden Niveau liegen. Ei-
ner aktuellen Studie zufolge gibt es in Deutschland 4,1 Millionen funk-
tionale Analphabeten mit deutsch als Muttersprache.
In der vorliegenden Studie wurden die neuronalen Korrelate der Schrift-
sprachverarbeitung bei 20 erwachsenen funktionalen Analphabeten mit
fMRT und mit ereigniskorrelierten Hirnpotenzialen untersucht. Vor und
nach einem achtmonatigen, spezifischen Lese- und Rechtschreibtraining
wurden den Teilnehmern Wörter, Pseudowörter und Buchstabenketten
präsentiert.
Mit standardisierten Lese- und Rechtschreibtests konnte bei allen Teil-
nehmern eine deutliche Verbesserung im Lesen und Schreiben nachge-
wiesen werden. Die N170-Komponente des ereigniskorrelierten Hirn-
potenzials differierte in ihrer Amplitude vor dem Training nicht zwi-
schen Wörtern und Symbolen; nach dem Training konnte eine erhöhte
N170 Amplitude für Wörter beobachtet werden. In den beiden Kontroll-
gruppen (funktionale Analphabeten ohne spezifisches Training und re-
guläre Leser) trat keine Veränderung in der N170 für Wörter auf. Ana-
log zu diesem Ergebnis wies bei funktionalen Analphabeten der lin-
ke Gyrus fusiformis (einschließlich des visuellen Wortformareals) nach
dem Training größere Aktivierungen als vor dem Training auf. Weiter-
hin konnten trainingsabhängige Aktivitätserhöhungen in präfrontalen
Hirnarealen beobachtet werden.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass auch bei erwachsenen funktionalen An-
alphabeten Verbesserungen in der Schriftsprache mit neuronalen Ver-
änderungen einhergehen. Nach dem Lesetraining wird unter anderem
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verstärkt das visuelle Wortformareal aktiviert, welches als eine begin-
nende Automatisierung der Worterkennung interpretiert werden kann.
Insgesamt sprechen die Ergebnisse dafür, dass sich bei erwachsenen
funktionalen Analphabeten eine Spezialisierung für Wörter entwickelt,
die vergleichbar mit der Entwicklung bei Leseanfängern im Kindesalter
ist.
The Limits of Cognitive Assistance – The
Limits of the Inferential Model?
Gerhard Chr. Bukow and Bernhard Will
Department of Philosophy, University of Magdeburg
bukow@ovgu.de
If cognitive agents are able to use cognitive models/theories of other
agents for prediction and explanation, then they have basic theory of
mind-abilities. They are able to assist other agents in a cognitively in-
formed way, i.e. both rational norms and psychological formats of as-
sistance are given. Generally, assistance in such a way is the usual
case in man-man-interaction, but it is also desirable for man-machine-
interaction. Especially, the ability of thought-following over several
changes of agents’ belief states is desirable to manage complex inter-
action.
The standard solutions in man-machine-interaction are typically based
on certain very strong normative rationality assumptions that limit cog-
nitive assistance to the inferential change of belief states, or (less of-
ten) the inferences on possible perception. These changes happen in
very comfortable “spaces” fulfilling properties like consistency, coher-
ence, closeness, etc. We call this the inferential model of cognitive as-
sistance. The inferential model reduces Theory of Mind in the realm of
man-machine-interaction to a seemingly comfortable syntactical view.
However, this implicates several problems:
1. Deficits: Is it legitimate to set certain norms like the consistency-
assumption as “the” norms and to declare everything else (e.g.
actual humans) as deficient?
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2. Lacks: We daily assist in a cognitively informed way in these
areas:
a. Inconsistency in belief systems
b. Indeterminacy in truth values
c. Perception of impossible objects
d. Non-extensional semantics and pragmatics of communication
We present a new model of cognitive agency that locates the limits of
cognitive assistance at these four much more “anarchic” places: human-
level agents are typically able to thought-follow in e.g. inconsistent
cases. However, this requires a re-analysis of the requirements of cogni-
tive assistance and the specification of construction methods for agents.
Based on the assumptions that Theory of Mind-using agents develop
theories in order to assist, we use methods from philosophy of science
to characterize Theory of Mind-theories with respect to these four ar-
eas, e.g. reduction, observability, conceptual parts, properties like con-
sistency or closeness, and “natural” limits given by syntax/semantics
and pragmatics.
Which Parts of the Body Schema are Influenced
by the Rubber Hand Illusion?
Martin V. Butz, Esther Kutter, and Corinna Lorenz
Cognitive Modeling, Department of Computer Science and Department of
Psychology, Faculty of Science, University of Tübingen
martin.butz@uni-tuebingen.de,
{esther.kutter, corinna.lorenz}@student.uni-tuebingen.de
To successfully invoke the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen,
1998), the dynamics of the concurrently applied strokes on hand and
rubber hand need to match. However, also the position of the rubber
hand and the orientation of the strokes are important. This suggests that
the felt stroke is compared with the visually perceived one by projecting
the tactile perception into a visual frame of reference or vice versa.
Other research has shown that our brain continuously maintains a
body schema over time (c.f. Hoffmann et al., 2010, for a comprehensive
review). It appears that the body’s pose itself is estimated by continu-
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ously comparing and adjusting various sensory modalities. Given in-
consistent information, either sensory plausibilities or the current body
schema needs to be adjusted. In the rubber hand illusion, participants
partially perceive their hand at the rubber hand’s position. Thus, the
current body schema of the hand appears affected. However, for main-
taining a consistent body image, it may be necessary to adjust the com-
plete body pose.
We are currently investigating if the perception of the elbow angle is
affected by the rubber hand illusion. To do so, we are invoking the illu-
sion, but we are asking the participants to estimate their elbow posture
rather than the position of their hand. Elbow angles are estimated by
adjusting the relative orientation of two lines on a screen. In a prepara-
tory study we are also evaluating if the participants can estimate their
elbow angle reasonably well at all.
We expect that the angular pose of the elbow can be estimated with
reasonable accuracy. Moreover, we expect that the rubber hand illusion
will affect this self-perception in that the elbow angle will be estimated
closer to an angle that matches the position and orientation of the rubber
hand. By manipulating the synchrony and orientation of the concurrent
strokes, we expect angular estimation dependencies. Given success, the
evidence will point out that the rubber hand illusion indeed affects the
perception of the whole arm and that the brain tries to continuously
maintain a coherent mental body image.
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Semantic and Syntactic Interaction in a
Morpho-Syntactically Complex Language:
Evidence from Event-Related Potentials
Gulay Cedden and Aykut Eken
Department of Foreign Language Education, Middle East Technical University
Kim & Osterhout (2005) have proposed that language comprehension
is served by partially independent but highly interactive streams of se-
mantic and syntactic processing machinery. Electrophysiological mea-
sures are well suited to shedding light on the neural mechanisms of lan-
guage processing, Our first aim was to examine ERP responses (N400,
LAN, P600) elicited by single morphosyntactic and semantic violations
using the Turkish language. Our second aim was to investigate the in-
teraction between syntactic and semantic processes by comparing the
ERP responses to single violations with the ERP responses to combined
syntactic and semantic violations. Three hundred sentences consisting
of five words were presented visually to 46 right handed, native Turk-
ish speaking volunteer participants. Three hundred sentences served as
filler sentences and did not follow any predetermined linguistic pattern.
Three hundred sentences following a fixed grammatical pattern [NP
+ word2 +word3+ word4+V(fin)] served as stimulus sentences. Four
variations of stimulus sentences were used: correct sentences, sentences
with a morphosyntactic subject-verb agreement violation, sentences with
a semantic expectancy violation and sentences with a combined mor-
phosyntactic and semantic violation. All types of linguistic violations
were situated into the high frequent finite verbs (with three suffixes),
thus creating strong and local incongruences between the verb and the
subject noun phrase (NP).
Contrary to the standard view, that lexical-semantic conflicts elicit a
centro-parietal negativity occurring approximately 400 ms post stimu-
lus onset (Kutas and Hillyard, 1984; DeLong et al., 2005) and morpho-
syntactic violations engender later parietal positivity effect, P600, (Ha-
goort et al., 1993; Osterhout & Holcomb,1992) we obtained a biphasic
pattern in reaction to all three conditions – an N400/LAN followed by
a P600 effect.
124 POSTERS
According to the principle of superposition a clear nonlinear sum-
mation of LAN, N400 and P600 components in the combined syntac-
tic and semantic violation paradigm would imply that an interaction
was going on during the processing. Taking together the findings that
a P600 component was found in the semantic violation paradigm and
that all three components elicited by the combined violation were found
to summate non-additively, we conclude that in a morpho-syntactically
complex language syntactic and semantic processes are interacting in-
terdependently during sentence processing.
An Awesome Party or a Horrible Tragedy:
Approach and Avoidance Mechanisms can Tell
Us More about Meaning-Composition
Processes
Irmgard de la Vega, Mónica De Filippis, Carolin Dudschig,
Martin Lachmair, and Barbara Kaup
Department of Psychology, University of Tuebingen
A well-known phenomenon in psychological research is the connection
between the approach / avoidance motivational systems and emotional
concepts: People want to approach positive and avoid negative stimuli
(Lang et al., 1990). This is reflected in shorter RTs when participants
respond to a positive (negative) word by making an arm movement to-
wards (away from) themselves (Chen & Bargh, 1999), even if the valence
of the word is irrelevant to the task (Neumann & Strack, 2000).
We employed this phenomenon to investigate whether an interaction
between the motivational system and the valence of linguistic stimuli
emerges when readers process sentences with a positive / negative va-
lence, and where in the sentence such an interaction shows and how it
develops over time.
Two types of sentences were used, one containing a positive adjective
and a positive noun (e.g., Susi sees a beautiful beach on the photo.) and
one containing a negative adjective and a negative noun (Tom sees a re-
pugnant snake on the branch.). Sentences were presented on the screen
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word by word in a self-paced moving windows technique. Participants
controlled the presentation by pressing keys on a modified keyboard
located vertically in front of them. Thus, they made, key press by key
press, an arm movement either away from their body or towards their
body to get from the beginning of the sentence to its end. RTs were
obtained and analysed of every key press.
An interaction between the movement direction and the valence of
the sentence emerged at two points during sentence presentation, name-
ly on the word just after the noun and on the very last word of the sen-
tence. The fact that the effect took some time to develop and showed
only after the respective noun phrase was completed, and again in the
sentence-wrap up, may be taken as indication that the effect is not word-
based but rather reflects meaning-composition processes at the phrase
or sentence level.
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Distinguishing Between Valence and Location:
Does “sun” facilitate upwards-responses
because of its typical location or because of its
valence?
Carolin Dudschig, Irmgard de la Vega, and Barbara Kaup
Universität Tübingen
Traditionally language processing was assumed to take place in a sep-
arate system in the human brain, whereby language relies on amodal
computations of meaning. Recently there has been converging evidence
that language understanding is grounded in the sensorimotor system
126 POSTERS
and relates to spatial processing. Interestingly, hereby both words refer-
ring to concrete objects and words having a negative or positive valence
relate to the vertical spatial dimension. Words referring to entities typ-
ically located in the upper visual field facilitate upwards movements,
in contrast words referring to entities in the lower visual field facili-
tate downwards responses (Lachmair et al., 2011). Similarly, it has been
shown that if words are judged as positive, subsequent visual target dis-
crimination in an upper screen location is facilitated and the opposite
holds for negative words (Meier & Robinson, 2004). In the current ex-
periments, we investigated if both word categories automatically inter-
act with vertical motor responses. In the first experiment, word mean-
ing was fully task irrelevant. Participants saw a word and performed
an upwards or downwards movement according to word-color. Words
referring to entities with a typical location in the world facilitated move-
ments towards the congruent location. In contrast, positive or negative
words did not have any effect on responding. The second experiment
was conducted in order to investigate, whether emotional words inter-
fere with responding, if the valence of the words becomes task-relevant.
The experiment was identical to experiment 1, with the difference that
participants were instructed only to respond if the words were emo-
tional in nature. The results showed a clear compatibility effect, hereby
positive words facilitated upwards responses and negative words facil-
itated downwards responses. In summary, spatial features are automat-
ically activated by words that refer to entities with a typical location in
the world (see Lachmair et al., 2011). In contrast, emotional words only
interact with vertical responses if word valence is task-relevant.
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How cognitive is Content-based Grammar?
Daniela Elsner
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
With this poster we want to compare two grammatical theories: Content-
based Grammar, which was primarily developed by Weisgerber from
the 1920s on, focuses on basic questions concerning the relation be-
tween grammar, semantics, and pragmatics. They are also fundamen-
tal to Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar as well as to other grammatical
frameworks. Cognitive Grammar analyses language with reference to
the daily experiences we make, and argues that grammar is inherently
meaningful. The grammatical meanings though are abstract, so their
essential import resides in construal. The Cognitive Grammar enter-
prise started developing in 1976, that is decades after Content-based
Grammar has been established. Interestingly one can quickly find par-
allels when comparing Cognitive with Content-based Grammar. Just as
Content-based Grammar Cognitive Grammar postulates that language
is not organized in a modular way but is regarded as a general cognitive
process. Following the symbolic thesis, form can not be studied without
reference to meaning, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no
categorical difference between syntax and semantics.
We can adhere to the fact that Content-based and Cognitive Grammar
show specific affinity. Sylla (2009:178) ascertains that a resemblance be-
tween ‘Sprachinhaltsforschung’ (content-based language research) and
Cognitive Linguistics has only been hinted at in the research literature
but has not yet been fully investigated. Many appeals to Weisgerber’s
ideas do not show any connection to his Content-based Grammar (cf.
Sylla 2009:271). With the poster we want to answer the question how
cognitive Content-based Grammar really is. A close look at both the-
ories shows that they share the same philosophical background but di-
verge with respect to their goals, their assumptions concerning language
and thought and the function they ascribe to language.
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Right Hemispheric Involvement in Recognition
of Proper Names? A Reaction Time Experiment
with Broca Aphasics
Cornelia Geukes and Horst M. Müller
SFB 673 - Experimental Neurolinguistics Group, Bielefeld University
{cornelia.geukes, horst.mueller}@uni-bielefeld.de
Within the class of concrete nouns, proper names represent a distinct
group based on linguistic and neuropsychological findings. Further-
more, proper names seem to have a cortical representation possibly dif-
ferent from concrete nouns. A few case- and EEG-studies [1, 2] discuss
an additional right hemispheric involvement during comprehension of
proper names. To test this, we completed a reaction time study (lexi-
cal decision task) with patients diagnosed with Broca aphasia who had
damaged left hemispheres. Speech healthy persons show a clear short-
ened decision time for proper names (PN), even though they exhibit a
low word frequency, in comparison to common nouns (CN). In general,
Broca aphasics show a lower score in reaction time tasks than controls
[3, 4]. However, if Broca aphasics demonstrate a decision time for PN
that is less impaired than their decision time for CN, the hypothesis of
an additional right hemispheric recognition of PN would be supported.
We investigated 12 Broca aphasics between 49 and 89 years (classifi-
cation of Aachener Aphasie Test, AAT) and 12 matched speech healthy
persons. All participants were right-handed. The study was divided
into two sections. 1. Reaction time: to determine the reaction time in
general, participants were asked to push a button when they heard sim-
ple sounds; 2. Lexical decision: we presented 165 two-syllabic acoustic
stimuli (25 proper names, 50 common nouns, 42 pseudo words, 48 dis-
tractors), while participants pressed a button for each real word (not
pseudo word).
1. Reaction time: Broca aphasics show a significant lower response
time in general when hearing simple sounds in comparison to speech
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healthy persons (Broca: 478,1 ms; controls: 280,2 ms). 2. Lexical deci-
sion: even Broca aphasics show a faster decision for PN (Broca: 977,6
ms; Controls: 876,2 ms) than for CN (Broca: 1079,4 ms; Controls: 919,2
ms). In comparison to speech healthy persons, Broca aphasics show a
selective lower impairment for PN than for CN, particularly in relation
to the significantly low reaction time for simple sounds. One possible
explanation is the optionally right hemispheric support while recogniz-
ing PN. A slower response time for CN within the group of left hemi-
spheric damaged aphasics in comparison to the speech healthy control
group could suggest that the intact right hemisphere does not support
the left hemisphere in recognizing CN at all, or at least much less than
it supports the left hemisphere in recognizing the class of PN. In addi-
tion, while PN have no conceptual meaning, semantic processes during
conceptual meaning constitution of CN could explain why PN could be
faster classified and comprehended.
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PsiCasso: Simulating the Dynamics of
Aesthetic Appreciation
Mike Imhof, Marius Raab, and Claus-Christian Carbon
Department of General Psychology and Methodology, University of Bamberg
Aesthetic appreciation is not stable. As everyone knows from personal
experience, how much we like something—say, a work of art, a piece of
music, a movie—depends on our current mood. On a much larger scale,
what is considered good design (shown by Carbon, 2010, for cars) is
Zeitgeist-dependent and subject to oscillate over the years and decades.
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To establish a psychological foundation for this so-called “cycle of
preference”, we propose the PsiCasso model. It combines the cognitive-
emotional-motivational PSI-theory by Dörner (1999) with the MINERVA2
memory model by Hintzman (1988). Employing an unsupervised arti-
ficial neural network (ANN), the agent has “eyes” to perceive visual
stimuli. The ANN translates the stimuli’s features (like color, contrast
etc.) into arbitrary (but reproducable) numerical vectors.
This agent, proposed in Raab et al. (2011), was now implemented in
JAVA and is able to use frequency and similiarity judgements (utilizing
the MINERVA2 model) to decide if any given stimulus is considered as
novel, familiar, or somewhere in between. Novel stimuli (i.e., pictures
that don’t match with existing memory content) are considered a source
of uncertainty and thus thought to repel the agent. After some more
novel pictures of the same type, the agent should get familiar with them.
These pictures now become a source of certainty and are considered
pleasant—until, again after some more pictures of the same type, the
familiarity is so strong that these pictures are considered as boring.
In test runs with different image sets, we measured arousal and needs
of the agent. When preference is considered as a function of novelty and
emotional state (which follows from Dörner’s theory), the agent shows
the predicted “cycle of preference”. The model grasps phenomena like
the mere-exposure-effect (Zajonc, 1968) and theories about processing
fluency (e.g., Reber et al., 2004)—and at the same time relates perception
to the agent’s inner state, allowing for long-term changes in “taste”.
In future research, we will extend the architecture to incorporate what
Fechner (1876) called “associative factors”: That is, image content will
be related to the agent’s needs, so in a state of “hunger” images that
depict food would get valued higher. While keeping the set of assump-
tions sparse, we expect the agent to exhibit motivational patterns resem-
bling the dynamics we know from every-day life.
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Knowledge-Based Approach for a
Context-Aware Augmented Reality Assistance
System
Darko Katic´1, Simone Brandstädter2, Anna-Laura Wekerle3, Hannes
Kenngott3, Beat Peter Müller-Stich3, Rüdiger Dillmann1, and
Stefanie Speidel1
1 Humanoids and Intelligence Systems Laboratories (HIS),
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
darko.katic@kit.edu
2 Institute for Psychology, University of Heidelberg
simone.brandstaedter@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de
3 Department of General, Abdominal and Transplantation Surgery,
University of Heidelberg
Augmented reality is a very promising paradigm for intraoperative as-
sistance in minimally-invasive surgery. However, information over-
flow caused by advanced assistance functions and visualizations has
emerged as a new obstacle in bringing such systems into clinical appli-
cation. For instance, the display of information about vital structures
like nerves or vessels is desirable when those structures are in danger
of being harmed. In other cases such visualizations only convey unnec-
essary or even distracting information. To avoid mental overload of the
surgeon, it is necessary to restrict the display to relevant information,
depending on each phase of the surgery. Based on the principal ideas
of Neumann and Moeller (2008), we aim to automatically interpret the
ongoing surgery and recognize the current phase. With this contextual
information, we can provide an intelligent selection of visualisations.
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This type of man-machine interaction promises a more intuitive work-
flow with complex assistance systems. Only relevant information is dis-
played by observing and interpreting the surgery progress without the
need for explicit interaction between surgeon and software system.
For recognizing the current situation, intraoperative sensor data un-
dergoes knowledge-based analysis and interpretation. Elementary con-
textual cues like distance or speed are extracted and stored in an OWL-
based knowledge base using Description Logics. According to the dif-
ferentiation of declarative and procedural knowledge in human cogni-
tion, we use a combined approach for knowledge representation. Declar-
ative knowledge is represented as hierarchical knowledge base, which
contains information about surgical instruments, activities and anatom-
ical structures. For procedural knowledge, a rules-based system is im-
plemented which represents meaningful relations between all relevant
entities, like instruments and the anatomical structures they act upon.
The rule-based approach is founded in real annotated case studies.
For evaluation, clips of real surgeries are assessed by medical experts
and their phase interpretations are compared to those predicted by the
system, i.e. computing the detection rate. We are going to introduce the
system and discuss first evaluation results regarding the special bene-
fit of context-sensitive knowledge-based approaches for complex assis-
tance systems.
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Properties and Mechanisms of Sensory
Enhancement
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Aleksey Lytochkin1, Robert Muil1, Alisher Numonov1,
Bianca Sieveritz1, Maria Schmitz1, Susan Wache1, Saskia K. Nagel1,
Frank Schumann1, Tobias Meilinger2, Heinrich Bülthoff2,
Thomas Wolbers3, Christian Büchel4, and Peter König1,5
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2 MPI for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen
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Enacted theories of consciousness conjecture that perception and cog-
nition arise from an active experience of the regular relations that tie
together sensory stimulation and associated motor actions [1,2]. By em-
ploying the technique of sensory substitution [3] and sensory augmen-
tation [4] previous experiments explored this assumption. In this study
a sensory augmentation device delivered global orientation information
by mapping directional information of a compass to a set of vibrators
around the waist, activating the element pointing north (feelSpace belt)
[4]. Here we use it to investigate the impact on cortical plasticity sen-
sory processing, and spatial cognition. Therefore we want to answer
the questions how the brain is able to integrate and use new sensory
input, where this processing takes place and whether the newly sup-
plied directional information can be used by the subjects for enhanced
orientation and navigation leading to many useful applications.
Out of fourteen subjects (age 19–32y, seven female, five controls) nine
were wearing the belts during all waking hours over a period of six
weeks. We compared belt-on and belt-off conditions in a series of mea-
surements including homing, fMRI, and subjective methods before, dur-
ing and after training.
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(1) In the homing task using polygons of varying complexity we ob-
served a slight reduction of the systematic error and a larger reduc-
tion of the stochastic error in belt-on condition after the training pe-
riod. (2) Most areas that were reported in a previous fMRI study on
navigation [5] could be replicated in our subjects. Furthermore, we ob-
served widespread cortical activation induced by the belt in the pre-
training baseline measurements which is more localized and less intense
after training. (3) Subjective reports indicate that by training with the
feelSpace belt the scope of perceived space grows wider and includes
areas that are not within reach or directly visible; subjects feel more se-
cure in known as well as previously unknown environments; and navi-
gational abilities improve and emphasize an egocentric reference frame.
The data provide evidence for an integration of the newly supplied
signals in sensory integration (homing), cortical processing (fMRI) and
spatial cognition (subjective methods). However, further analysis is
needed to elucidate significant individual variations.
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Physiological and Behavioral Consequences of
Delayed System Responses in
Human-Computer Interaction
Christin Kohrs1, David Hrabal2, and André Brechmann1
1 Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology
2 Medical Psychology, Ulm University
Even after decades of stunning enhancements in computer science, re-
search on psychological effects of delayed system response time (SRT)
has not lost its topicality. Especially in times of network based com-
puting, uncertainty in providing immediate system response remains.
When delays in SRT occur, the user’s expectancy about the temporal
course of an interaction is interrupted which may be interpreted as irri-
tating.
The current study investigates the physiological effects of unexpected
delays of 0.5s, 1s, or 2s on skin conductance (SC) and heart rate (HR).
The naïve participants (n = 23) performing a two-choice auditory cate-
gorization task expected the system to respond immediately after their
input, but 20% of all trials contained delayed SRTs to maintain the un-
expectancy of delayed feedback. The aim of the current study was to
directly measure the SC and HR in response to a single delayed system
response. In detail, we wanted to investigate if a small delay of no more
than 500ms is sufficient to elicit a physiological reaction and if this re-
sponse increases with longer delays lasting 1s or even 2s. Furthermore,
we analyzed the behavioral consequences of delayed SRTs by measur-
ing the dynamics of the participants’ button presses and inquired the
emotions of our participants at the end of the experiment.
The results indicate that a delay which increases the uncertainty about
the temporal course of interaction with a computer system induces emo-
tional and physiological changes. The physiological data reveal an in-
crease in SC response and a deceleration of HR. Even delays of only
500ms are sufficient to trigger these physiological changes which seem
to be characteristic for the negative emotions of uncertainty and annoy-
ance reported by our participants at the end of the experiment. Further-
more, the button press results confirm the negative effect of delayed
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SRTs as subjects tend to press the button with more intensity and longer
durations following delayed feedback. In addition, the button press dy-
namic is able to differentiate between correct and incorrect trials and
therefore might be a useful tool to infer the uncertainty of a user’s deci-
sion.
To conclude, the results of the current study verify the recommenda-
tion to use only very short and constant SRTs during human-computer
interactions.
Beware of Blue: Background Colours
Differentially Affect Perception of Different
Types of Ambiguous Figures
Jürgen Kornmeier, Kirsten Wiedner, Michael Bach, and
Sven P. Heinrich
Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health
When we observe ambiguous figures our percept changes spontaneously,
while the figure stays unchanged. The dynamics of this perceptual in-
stability is modulated by cognitive factors. Recent studies indicated ef-
fects of surround colour on cognitive task performance. In the present
study we studied the influence of surround colour on the perceptual
dynamics of ambiguous figures.
14 subjects viewed the Necker cube and Rubin’s Face/Vase stimulus
on a white background with three different surround colours (light red,
dark red and blue) and indicated perceptual reversals manually. We
analysed initial percepts, reversal rates and durations of stable percepts
(“dwell times”).
Results: For the Necker cube we found a preferred initial percept
(top-view orientation, 89%). This perceptual variant also showed longer
and more variable dwell times. The preferred initial percept for the
Face/Vase stimulus was the face variant (75%). No effects on dwell time
were observed. Blue backgrounds reduced the dwell time effect in the
case of the Necker cube and the initial percept bias for the Face/Vase
stimulus (54%).
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Discussion: Surround colour influences the perception of ambiguous
figures. Especially the blue colour seems to weaken the a-priori per-
ceptual biases, but differentially for the two types of ambiguous figures
analysed.
Investigating Dynamic Changes in Visual
Working Memory Content
Johannes Lohmann1, Lars C. Kipferl, Gregor Hardieß2, and
Martin V. Butz1
1 Department of Cognitive Modeling, University of Tübingen
2 Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Tübingen
A recent study on strategy usage in visual working memory (VWM)
tasks [1] applying a block-copying paradigm [2], revealed that mem-
ory usage depends on stimulus complexity and the length of the re-
tention interval. Participants adopted a memory-intensive strategy for
long retention intervals and simple stimuli. For more complex stim-
uli and shorter retention intervals, acquisition-intensive strategies were
observed more frequently. A direct comparison between the simple and
complex stimuli revealed that the memory capacity for simple stimuli is
1.5 times higher than for the complex ones. We are currently replicating
this experiment with a change detection paradigm.
The stimulus material consists of colored images of block configura-
tions, similar to the physical block patterns applied in the original study.
We vary presentation duration and ISI to manipulate the memory load
of the participants. We are also collecting the scan-paths of the partici-
pants to investigate if stimulus complexity affects eye movements. We
hope to find significant interactions between stimulus complexity, pre-
sentation duration and the number of fixations. These interaction would
reflect the different strategies observed in the original study. We will
model the data with a computational model of VWM that we developed
recently as an extension of the theory of visual attention (TVA [3]). The
model can be described in terms of differential equations that allow to
model encoding and maintenance of information in VWM. Our model
predicts that stimulus complexity, presentation duration of the stimuli,
and ISI have a significant impact on the amount of preserved informa-
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tion in VWM and hence on change detection performance. We expect
that the model will reveal similar correlated complexity estimates for
the respective stimuli used in [1]. The successful application will con-
firm that our model provides a quantitative model of VWM that fully
integrates sensory memory, short-term memory, and visual attention.
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Neurolinguistic Investigation on
Turn-Anticipation in Dialog
H. M. Müller, H. Wesselmeier, and S. Jansen
SFB 673 “Alignment in Communication” & EC “Cognitive Interaction
Technology” (CITEC), Experimental Neurolinguistic Group,
Bielefeld University
Interlocutors in a conversation are able to anticipate when the current
turn is going to end in order to avoid gaps and overlapping speech
(Magyari & De Ruiter 2008). Even though we know that a number of
manipulated signals that listeners use, such as syntax, semantic and
prosody, can hamper turn-anticipation, it is still unknown what exact
combination of these signals enables turn-anticipation with such high
accuracy. A previous EEG-study has shown that brain areas involved in
estimating the timing of a turn-end are part of the same functional net-
work that subserves sentence and discourse-level comprehension pro-
cesses and control (Magyari et al., 2011). To analyze turn-anticipation
related ERP’s, 30 right-handed healthy participants (14 men, 16 women,
ages 21–35 years) volunteered in our EEG experiment. The stimuli con-
sisted of 24 auditorily presented sentences (including 1/3 sentences that
were semantically and 1/3 that were syntactically violated), 35 audi-
tive questions and 40 declarative sentences, where the participants had
to anticipate the end of each utterance. The Experiment consisted of
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3 parts, where the participants had to 1. give short answers, 2. reacted
with a verbal cue “Ja” to the end of the turn, and 3. reacted with a
button-press to indicate the anticipated end of turn.
The readiness potential (RP) of the verbal responses was identified
in order to be compared to the RP of the button-press responses of the
declarative sentences. For analysis, we compared ERP’s during syn-
tax/semantic violations, sentence endings and responses, and tried to
correlate them with expected brain signatures. We expect comparable
RP’s for button-press and verbal cue. For syntactic and semantic viola-
tions we expect reduced and/or delayed RP’s for responses.
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From Cognition to Corpus, from Corpus to
Cognition: How Corpus Research in Child
Language can Benefit from Research in
Developmental Psychology, and Vice Versa
Michael Pleyer and Martin Zettersten
University of Heidelberg
michael.pleyer@hggs.uni-heidelberg.de,
Zettersten@stud.uni-heidelberg.de
Cognitive Linguistics (CL) is a fast-growing school in cognitive science
that explains linguistic phenomena by relating them to general human
cognitive capacities (Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007). This has important
implications for our understanding of how children learn language: From
the perspective of CL, children employ general cognitive skills to con-
struct a language from the linguistic utterances used around them (To-
masello 2003). Research in child language acquisition must therefore
involve the study of children’s actual language use on the one hand
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and children’s cognitive development on the other. The creation of a
public corpus of child language has made it possible to analyze a vast
amount of children’s speech production in various stages of develop-
ment (CHILDES; MacWhinney 2000). We offer the theoretical proposal
that research in cognitive development needs to be taken into account
both when generating hypotheses for corpus studies and when inter-
preting corpus data. A researcher investigating metaphors in child lan-
guage can only construct and analyze a corpus study adequately by con-
sidering the developmental trajectory of cognitive skills that underlie
understanding metaphors, such as analogy.
However, analyzing large child language corpora can also benefit the
field of developmental psychology by investigating linguistic phenom-
ena that correlate with the emergence of specific social cognitive skills.
One such correlation that has received increased attention is the connec-
tion between theory of mind and language (Astington & Baird 2005).
Child language corpora offer a powerful tool to investigate linguistic
phenomena that relate to false-belief understanding. These include se-
mantic measures such as the usage of cognitive terms like ‘think’ and
‘want’, as well as the related syntactic phenomenon of sentential com-
plement constructions.
We therefore argue that an interdisciplinary perspective in corpus
studies of child language can benefit both the field of language acquisi-
tion and developmental psychology.
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Back to the Roots: Measuring Motoric
Correlates of Ur-Emotions
Marius Raab, Nato Shengelia, and Claus-Christian Carbon
Department of General Psychology and Methodology, University of Bamberg
Emotions have been a key research topic of psychology ever since; yet,
what emotions really ‘are’, and what the underlying structure—across
people and cultures—really ‘is’, remains a matter of debate. Kafka (1950)
has postulated four so called “Ur-Affekte” (ur-emotions), referencing
Karl Bühler, and sees basic motoric responses of an organism at the heart
of these emotions. Following Kafka, one can try to bring oneself nearer
towards or further away from an object; or can try to bring this object
nearer or further away. This concept has been taken up, e.g. by Parrott
(2010), searching for “underlying structure[s] or abstract feature[s] of an
actual emotion” (p. 20).
At the same time, current approaches to measure emotions all have
their drawbacks. From verbal reports to EDA, EEG and fMRI—there’s
no method that is able to measure emotions with high temporal resolu-
tion ’in’ the situation while providing a clear relation of data and emo-
tion at the same time. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose pos-
turography which we employed with low cost commercial hard- and
software. The utilized setting (a Nintendo Balance Board) shows high
temporal resolution (100Hz) and is capable of reliably tracking a per-
son’s balance control. A pilot study (n=5) showed high and distinct pos-
tural responses to visual emotional stimuli. In a further study (n=21) we
presented 23 distinct high-quality images (selected in a pre-study, rated
for emotional intensity and value) in randomized order, each preceded
and followed by an isoluminant mask, while the subject was standing
on the balance board.
With these data, we can relate the motoric responses—intensity and
direction, as a pattern over each picture’s presentation time—to the emo-
tional content. This combination allows new insights into the basic
states of action readiness that go along with the perception as well as
with the cognitive and emotional appraisal of visual stimuli.
Once this relation is established and refined in further research, the
’emotional footprint’ can serve as cost-effective measurement device in
aesthetic research; and at the same time stimulate the research about
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emotions, about the basic motoric roots of cognitive and affective pro-
cesses.
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The Role of Causal Models in Causal-based
Categorization
Anselm Rothe and Ralf Mayrhofer
Department of Psychology, University of Göttingen
Research about how people categorize exemplars with causally linked
features has found two competing effects. The causal-status hypothe-
sis proposes that people consider causally more central features (e.g.,
a cause in a common-cause model) more than causally less central fea-
tures (e.g., the effects in a common-cause model). In contrast, the coher-
ence hypothesis claims that people often focus upon feature patterns
that are more or less coherent with respect to the causal relations be-
tween the features (i.e., a cause and its effect are both present or both
absent). According to coherence, individual feature values are not im-
portant for people when categorizing exemplars with causally linked
features. We conducted experiments to analyze the conditions that in-
fluence the strength of the causal-status and the coherence effect. Fol-
lowing up on the proposal that categorization can be seen as inference
to the best explanation (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985), we propose that
causal models might serve different explanatory roles. First, a causal
model can serve as an explanation why the prototype of a category is
as it is. Second, a causal model can also serve as an explanation why
an exemplar might deviate from the prototype. Depending on role, we
expected a stronger causal-status or a stronger coherence effect, respec-
tively.
In the experiment, our participants learned non-real world categories
as used by Rehder (2003) and others, including the causal links between
category features (i.e., the category’s causal model). They, then, had to
give a category membership rating for 16 exemplars that were presented
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sequentially. In two between-subject conditions, we manipulated the
causal model in the instruction phase. In one condition, typical feature
values were described as causally active and atypical feature values as
not active. In the other condition, atypical feature values were causally
active and typical feature values were not. The results showed huge
differences in the category membership ratings. More specifically, we
clearly found a causal-status effect in the first case and a coherence ef-
fect in the latter one. The strong influence of our manipulation might
serve as an important explanation for the varying strengths of the causal
status and the coherence effect found in the literature. Therefore, we be-
lieve that causal-status as well as coherence effects are both faces of the
same coin.
Self-Motivated Learning of a Flexible Motor
Control System
Konstantin Schmid and Martin V. Butz
Cognitive Modeling, Department of Computer Science and Department of
Psychology, Faculty of Science, University of Tübingen
konstantin.schmid@student.uni-tuebingen.de,
martin.butz@uni-tuebingen.de
In our everyday life we perform a mere infinite number of different
movements. Most of them are executed in an automatic, unconscious
way – hardly requiring any attention. Thus, the underlying control sys-
tem needs to be both highly flexible and easy to invoke.
Here we focus on learning such a control system, based on insights
gained from neurobiological research (Shadmehr & Wise, 2005). Learn-
ing is accomplished unsupervised, or self-supervised. For flexible be-
havioral control, the architecture supports the flexible generation of man-
ifolds of behavioral policies for particular targets. This flexibility is a
basic requirement for the online consideration of obstacles and other
behavior-relevant constraints, such as broken limbs. Finally, to choose
the currently most appropriate behavior, redundancy resolution mech-
anisms need to be applied.
We are developing an autonomous, self-motivated, self-supervised
learning system, based on the SURE REACH architecture of human arm
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reaching (Butz, Herbort, & Hoffmann, 2007) and techniques for the self-
motivated learning of behavior-oriented spatial representations (Butz,
Shirinov, & Reif, 2010). The system is currently being tested on a three
degree- of-freedom arm in a two dimensional environment. Given kine-
matic motor commands as well as angle and location sensors about the
arm state in simulation, self-supervised learning is applied. Redundant
arm space representations are encoded by population codes, which are
learned by growing, self-organizing neural network techniques. Redun-
dant forward and inverse kinematic mappings are learned by means of
temporal Hebbian learning techniques. Motivations inherent in the sys-
tem guide the self-supervised learning process and also goal-oriented
planning, by flexibly inducing priorities and constraints into the devel-
oping network architecture. Some of the simulated motivations can be
related to the body morphology of actual biological systems, thus mov-
ing the arm, for example, in an effort-saving way. The developing archi-
tecture can execute goal-directed actions progressively more effectively.
The strong motivation to reach a particular hand location, for example,
results in the activation of overlapping location neurons. The learned
inverse kinematic mapping consequently induces corresponding neu-
ral goal posture activities. In turn, these priorities are laterally prop-
agated in posture space, generating a prioritized motion plan. Evalu-
ations have confirmed the effectiveness and flexibility of the resulting
self-motivated planning and control architecture. At the moment, we
evaluate to which extent curiosity-based motivations in posture space
and in hand location space can speed-up the learning process.
In the near future, the architecture will be further modularized for
scaling it to seven degrees of freedom in three dimensional space. More-
over, resulting behavior will be compared with actual behavioral data
from psychological experiments. Finally, the combination with fast di-
rect inverse learning techniques is aimed at (Rolf, Steil, & Gienger, 2011).
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Automatic and Intentional Level 1
Perspective-Taking in Adults with
High-Functioning Autism
Sarah Schwarzkopf, Leonhard Schilbach, Kai Vogeley, and
Bert Timmermans
University of Cologne
Perspective taking is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. The abil-
ity to decide what another person can or cannot see is referred to as
visuospatial “level 1 perspective taking” [1]. This is thought to be a
process that we can make use of intentionally, but which may also take
place automatically [2].
The diagnostic group of patients with high-functioning autism (HFA)
is characterized by impairments of social interaction and deficits in per-
spective-taking [3]. Interestingly, they are able to take the level 1 per-
spectives of other persons.
To investigate whether persons with HFA also automatically adopt
the level 1 perspective of others, we made use of an established perspec-
tive-taking paradigm [2] to test autistic and control participants. Partic-
ipants were looking at virtual scenes with a virtual character and had to
decide as quickly as possible by button press how many objects either
they or the virtual character saw. Our results indicate that both persons
with HFA and controls cannot suppress the other’s level 1 perspective
even when this goes against ostensible task demands, demonstrating
that the perspective taking was to a large degree automatic. Thus, pa-
tients with HFA not only can take others’ level 1 perspectives, but also
do so automatically. Furthermore, we find that only participants with
HFA have difficulties if they intentionally try to take others’ level 1 per-
spective. If we measure level 1 perspective taking implicitly they seem
to take it even automatically. This shows that even if level 1 perspective
taking is intact, in people with HFA other processes seem to have an
influence on this ability if it is used intentionally. We argue that difficul-
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ties, persons with HFA have with this task, come from a more general
problem they have with attention shifts and we discuss the underlying
cognitive processes of perspective taking.
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Scaffolding Hypermedia Learning through
Student’s Self-Created Metacognitive Prompts
Christoph Sonnenberg and Maria Bannert
Institute of Human-Computer-Media, Educational Media,
University of Wuerzburg
christoph.sonnenberg@uni-wuerzburg.de
Research in self-regulated learning with hypermedia shows that learn-
ing processes of participants are often not very strategic and goal orien-
tated. Learners have difficulties in performing adequate metacognitive
activities spontaneously, which – as a consequence – results in lower
learning outcomes. Hence, it is necessary to develop effective instruc-
tions in order to support the learner in reflecting upon his own way
of learning and activate his repertoire of metacognitive knowledge and
skills. These interventions are called metacognitive prompts.
Several studies provided evidence for the effectiveness of different
types of metacognitive prompts in hypermedia learning scenarios. How-
ever, the specific influence varies to a significant degree: only half of the
sample dealt with the metacognitive support in an optimal manner and
interviews showed that participants felt restricted in their own way of
learning by demand activities. Therefore, it is important to investigate
how the compliance of the participants can be increased and how the
effectiveness of metacognitive prompts can be further enhanced.
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In a research project funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG:
BA 2044/7-1) we want to analyze the effects of a new kind of metacog-
nitive support on learning processes and on learning outcomes of uni-
versity students who have to face a hypermedia learning scenario. In a
pre-post between subject design the experimental group is instructed to
create their own prompts and has to learn with them afterwards (con-
trol group: learning without prompts). Think-aloud data is collected
during the experiment in order to investigate the quality of the learning
process of both groups.
An enhancement of the compliance of the learners is expected by us-
ing these self-created metacognitive prompts. Moreover, an enhanced
use of the provided support should also result in an increase of learning
and transfer.
EcoSphere – A New Paradigm for Complex
Problem Solving Assessment in Adolescence
David Alexej Tobinski
Institute for Psychology, University of Duisburg-Essen
The assessment of complex problem solving (CPS) in adolescence is a
challenge for cognitive psychology. As previous research is mainly fo-
cused on adulthood and hardly ever uses systems with eigendynam-
ics, we developed the paradigm EcoSphere (ESP). So far, testing devices
feature round-based dynamics in time-discrete steps, whereas ESP sim-
ulates a momentum for the first time. The ESP technology uses a sys-
tem of differential equations. The exploration of the system takes place
in a vivid simulation and generates a new quality of ecological valid-
ity. This fact qualifies the assessment of CPS to provide scenarios with a
semantic embedment near the participants’ curriculum. The current se-
mantic embedment describes an ecosystem with an animal- and a plant
population (BioSphere). This ecosystem consists of four interconnected
endogenous (animal, nutrient, plant, water) and two exogenous (bulb,
heater) variables with multiple effects, multiple dependences and lat-
eral effects. Further semantic embodiments will be the Gulf Stream
(HydroSphere), the system of a glacier (CryoSphere) and space debris
(AtmoSphere). The substantial progress in creating curriculum scenar-
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ios lies in the possibility to analyze an additional and central factor of
complex problem solving: the previous knowledge. A deeper insight
into complex problem solving processes is afforded during the explo-
ration and the identification of CPS strategies can be more differen-
tiated. Regarding the importance of knowledge, the ESP technology
uses a new, highly standardized computer-based test for causal dia-
grams. Every testing situation starts with a training sequence for draw-
ing computer-based causal diagrams (CBCD). All participants have to
create accurate CBCDs of three instructed models with different com-
plexity. Subsequently, the previous knowledge has to be charted before
the exploration sequence of the ecosystem will start. The exploration
of a system causes the construction of a mental model of the system.
The program closes with the task of drawing a CBCD of the current
mental model, which was adapted in the exploration phase. In consid-
eration of the previous knowledge interferences now can be identified
in the analysis of the current mental models. A valid model empow-
ers the participant to control the system. The ESP technology provides
four different designs: (1) instruction of a complex system; (2) observ-
ing a complex system; (3) exploring a complex system and (4) control-
ling a complex system. In the first design the curriculum-near system
will be fully instructed and the CBCD has to be drawn by the partici-
pant. There are three types of instruction: verbal (audio), verbal (video)
and graphical (animation) plus verbal (audio). Observing a complex
system takes place in a graphical scenario without verbal information.
In this scenario the experimental group receives additional information
from numerical feedback. The animation can present a stable or an in-
stable development of the system. Exploring the system demands the
participants to modify the exogenous variables. The system can react
directly, e.g. the animals will change to a blue color when the water
becomes cold, or the reaction occurs after a delay. Controlling the sys-
tem requires a goal-directed intervention, which means transferring an
instable state of the system into a stable state by changing the param-
eters. The control performance and the construction of mental models
will be tested with different items with de- and increasing complexity,
which are going to be developed, and an editorial program for item
construction (instruction of a complex system) is going to be available.
ESP is the first paradigm for complex problem solving within systems
with eigendynamics (CPSSED) and therefore a photo-realistic version is
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in planning. The first study focuses on the instruction of knowledge of
complex systems and the resulting CBCDs. The ESP technology is pre-
pared for large scale assessment using XML and will be supported by
automation processes in R.
Problem Space and Planning Space – Two
Types of Error in the Tower of Hanoi
David Alexej Tobinski
Institute for Psychology, University of Duisburg-Essen
The traditional paradigm Tower-of-Hanoi (TOH) has long been an im-
portant task environment for research on problem solving in adulthood
and reflects the concept of problem-space in a fruitful way (Kotovsky,
Hayes & Simon, 1985). One big research question is still the develop-
mental perspective on problem-spaces: when occurs the competency of
transforming a problem space into a planning space? The presented
study focuses on this aspect of problem solving processes. In order to
fill this huge research gap, the TOH has been digitalized in a computer-
based version (TOH-D) suitable for young people. TOH-D offers a three,
four and five-disk version of the classical task. The application flow is
separated into three phases: a motor-skill training, the rules-and-goal
instruction and the traditional TOH task. Regarding the effects of extra-
neous cognitive load every computer-based test material for childhood
and adolescence needs special training to reduce motor skill effects on
the input devices. Special motor-skill training precedes the TOH task.
The training demands the same moves as the following task, e.g. a fish
has to be moved from a small glass to another and back. The TOH-D
is still introduced as a power test for analytical problem solving but in
the background the time is taken for every single move, as a speed test
would measure it. Taking the time of the training enables an accelera-
tion of the moves in the task later. Motor effects can be controlled well
in the TOH-D this way. Offering a differentiated protocol of every sin-
gle move, the TOH-D technology opens a completely new theoretical
view on this traditional paradigm. The concept of a problem space (Ko-
tovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985) should be expanded by a planning space.
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The problem space covers every possible state of the system, e.g. states
when bigger disks lie on smaller ones. This allows having a deeper
insight into instructed and non-instructed information flow within the
problem solving processes (PSP). In TOH the forbidden states are all in-
structed. Using another way but the shortest, is an error to avoid. The
correct states, the sub-goals, are not instructed and have to be interpo-
lated. Thus taking the ‘wrong’ way would be more a planning-error
than a problem-solving error and should be declared as an inefficiency
error (error type II). The more serious error would be to disregard in-
structed information; this is an ineffectiveness error (error type I). In the
classical scenario the error type I has to be avoided completely while
error type II is an indicator for planning competencies and shows the
grade of efficiency. The concept of efficiency is secondarily new for fo-
cusing on participants with the best results. They can be distinguished
now by their time values. The data of two studies in childhood (N=47)
and adolescence (N=309) accentuates this completely new point of view
in analytical problem-solving, old digital versions of TOH even disabled
the possibility of producing an error type I, so it has never been mea-
sured. The results of the two studies bring up significant age-related
effects in the production of the two error-types. Trend analysis reveals
age-related patterns and strategy-related patterns either. The concept
of differentiation between planning-spaces and problem-spaces leads
to an enhancement of the classical paradigm. Getting more insights
into error type I the work on an exploring scenario of the TOH is in
progress. This version will replace the phase of rules-instruction with
an exploration-phase of the rules. In exploring scenarios neither error
type I nor error type II can be avoided and the problem solver will have
to learn from his error to transform a problem space into a planning
space.
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Towards a Mereotopological Framework for the
Unity of Consciousness
Wanja Wiese1 and Thomas Metzinger1,2
1 Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
2 Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies
Mereotopologies are formal theories that define mereological and topo-
logical notions in an axiomatic way and specify how these notions are
related. Although it is common in philosophical accounts of the unity
of consciousness to use mereological and topological notions like “part-
hood”, “overlap”, “continuity” or “connectedness”, it is uncommon to
apply mereotopological theories explicitly and in a rigorous way. We
seek to occupy this niche and show that a mereotopological treatment
of the unity of consciousness can promote the discussion in at least two
ways:
1. Mereotopology can help formulate different philosophical accounts
in a clearer and more systematic manner, as well as open paths to
new, conceptually coherent accounts;
2. Mereotopology can be used to formulate bridging principles be-
tween different levels of description. We exemplify this by show-
ing how mereological and topological notions used in phenomeno-
logical descriptions of the unity of consciousness can be given a
representationalist reading and thus offer a first step towards a
more rigorous treatment which is also more directly amenable to
empirical validation.
This emphasizes two specific advantages of mereotopology:
1. Mereotopology brings the notions of parthood ands connection
into the focus of discussion on the unity of consciousness, thereby
forcing researchers to rethink in what way the notions are related
and which is to be regarded as more fundamental regarding the
problem at hand;
2. Mereotopological formalisms can be interpreted on different lev-
els of description (like the phenomenological, representational or
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neurobiological level) and can therefore be used to formulate a
common framework for research on the problem of the unity of
consciousness.
Spoken Feedback in Computer-Supported
Learning: The Impact of Prosody
Susann Wolff and André Brechmann
Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology
Today, human users interact with cognitive technical systems on a daily
basis, using them as companions, conversational devices, or teachers,
for instance in language tutoring programs or brain jogging applica-
tions. Due to its closeness to the predominant inter-human dialog form,
speech-based communication has increasingly gained in importance.
Therefore it is crucial to consider the potential effects of prosodic varia-
tions in ‘spoken’ system output. In a computer-supported learning con-
text, we tested whether participants’ learning performance would be af-
fected by a) the type of speech generation (i.e. computer-synthesized vs.
pre-recorded natural speech) and b) motivational prosodic modulations
(i.e. neutral vs. motivating intonation, with the latter sounding either
praising or blaming, depending on the correctness of the response).
To explore these questions, we conducted a simple computer-con-
trolled learning experiment which required participants to categorize
tonal stimuli according to certain acoustic features. The relevant stimu-
lus properties for the categorization were not known to the participants
prior to the experiment, and therefore had to be inferred from the sys-
tem feedback. To this avail, contingent auditory feedback (e.g. posi-
tive: “richtig”; negative: “falsch”) was presented following each par-
ticipant response. One of the experimental groups received this feed-
back in the form of computer-synthesized speech, one as pre-recorded
natural speech with a neutral prosody, and one as pre-recorded nat-
ural speech with a motivational (praising/blaming) prosody. Partici-
pant performance (% of correct responses) and reaction times (ms) were
recorded and analyzed by means of multivariate analyses of variance.
While the reaction time analysis only showed a general decrease in
reaction time over the experiment for all experimental groups, the per-
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formance analysis revealed a significantly steeper learning curve when
the system feedback was pre-recorded from human speakers than when
it was computer-synthesized. Furthermore, an additional significant
learning benefit was observed when the feedback was spoken motiva-
tionally, i.e. when it sounded praising or blaming instead of neutral.
These results demonstrate clearly that prosody is an important fac-
tor influencing user performance in computer-supported learning tasks.
Factors like the type of speech generation or the adequate use of prosodic
modulations should therefore be carefully taken into consideration in
future implementations of spoken feedback in cognitive technical sys-
tems.
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